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ABSTRACT
Despite a growing body of research on African American schoolteachers and their role in 
the civil rights movement, as well as increased interest in South Carolina’s civil rights 
movement, few historians have uncovered the contributions black schoolteachers made to 
the South Carolina movement.  Additionally, while many histories have highlighted how 
integral the NAACP was to the civil rights movement, few have revealed the deliberate 
relationship they built with black teachers associations.  This dissertation uses the 
NAACP papers, political manuscript collections, oral histories, newspaper and magazine 
articles, and court documents to address this gap in the historiography.  Chapter 1 
discusses the Charleston black teacher hiring campaign of 1917-1920 in which the newly 
created NAACP chapter fought to get black teachers placed in the city’s black schools.  
Chapter 2 examines the 1940s teacher salary equalization campaign in which the NAACP 
filed lawsuits on behalf of local teachers to acquire salary equalization between white and 
black teachers.  Chapter 3 focuses on the Clarendon County movement, which started in 
the 1940s as a fight to acquire bus transportation for black students, grew into a fight for 
equal school facilities, and became the first of five the desegregation cases that 
culminated into the historic Brown decision.  Chapter 4 examines a 1956 case in which 
twenty-one teachers in Elloree, South Carolina lost their jobs for their alleged connection 
to the NAACP.  Chapter 5 looks at the case of Orangeburg schoolteacher Gloria Rackley 
who was dismissed from her job because of her civil rights activism.  Collectively, these 
chapters not only prove that black teachers played an integral role in South Carolina’s 
 vii 
civil rights movement, but that they were vital in pushing the movement from one of 
racial uplift and equalization to a mass protest and desegregation.  
 viii 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 9, 1908, the Colored Ministerial Union presented a petition to the Charleston 
City Board of Public School Commissioners in which they conveyed a “great and crying 
need” for more and better school facilities for black children.  Without these facilities, the 
ministered argued, black children were “roaming the streets and growing . . . in 
ignorance, idleness and crime.”1  The African American ministers stressed that more 
schools for African American children would cure these social ills.  Convinced that 
industrial training was the “greatest and most immediate needs,” they also believed that 
black teachers should instruct black children.  The ministers asked the board to allow 
African American teachers to complete the teachers’ examination.  After all, there were 
“many [black teachers] in the city—of acknowledged ability—and competence.”2  These 
competent black teachers should be “put in full charge” of the “colored schools.”3 
 During the Reconstruction era and in the decades thereafter, black Charlestonians 
struggled believed emphatically that a quality education was central to advancing social 
and political rights.  With the conscious push by African Americans to hire black 
teachers, these educators often joined and played critical leadership roles in the 
burgeoning civil rights movement.  This dissertation focuses on that role.   
																																																								
1Minutes, Records of the City Board of Public School Commissioners, Charleston 
County Public Library, Box 8. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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This research relies heavily on sources created by the organization at the center of 
the South Carolina civil rights movement—the NAACP.  The NAACP papers contain 
newspaper clippings, correspondence between members of local chapters and the New 
York office, as well as between the NAACP and other organizations such as the Palmetto 
State Teachers Association (PSTA) and the American Friends Service Committee.  
Correspondence between the NAACP and the PSTA is especially important because it 
provides evidence that the PSTA often worked in conjunction with the NAACP.   
A very critical part of my research examines the massive white resistance to the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.  In order to probe the resistance of white 
residents and the adverse impacts this resistance had on African American educators, I 
explored the papers of the South Carolina White Citizens Councils (WCC), which 
document ordinary citizens’ efforts to prevent desegregation. I mined the papers of the 
Gressette Committee, appointed by Governor Jim Byrnes, to demonstrate state-mandated 
efforts to avoid desegregation and to show that South Carolina’s politicians differentiated 
themselves from other southern politicians by anticipating rather than reacting to Brown. 
All of these materials enabled me to employ segregationists’ own words to show the 
motives behind their opposing movement. 
I will also incorporate oral histories with teachers and others directly connected to 
my research.  Oral histories will permit me to give a fuller understanding of what teacher-
activists were risking, connect their activism to the communities they worked in, and add 
emotion to these histories.  
This dissertation builds on previous histories of the black teacher’s role in their 
community.  These histories can be vastly different in chronological and geographical 
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scope, but tend to address four central issues.  One major area of focus is African 
Americans’ efforts to gain and retain education autonomy.  One of Heather Williams’ 
most persuasive arguments in Self Taught: African American Education in Slavery and 
Freedom is that the newly emancipated freed people initiated their education.  They both 
funded their schools and worked as the teachers. Likewise, Christopher Span argues in 
From Cotton Field to Schoolhouse: African American Education in Mississippi that 
African Americans were black education’s most ardent supporters during and after the 
Civil War.  They envisioned that these schools, built by and for them, would help ensure 
full citizenship.  
 Secondly, this historiography has largely positioned teaching as women’s work. 
Sonya Ramsey does this with her focus on women teachers in Nashville.   Her goal is to 
explain how these women defined their middle-class status and navigated the path 
between the various social movements that helped define their lifetimes—racial uplift, 
the women’s movement, and the black civil rights movement. Likewise in Freedom’s 
Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark, Katherine Charron’s analysis of the career of a 
woman teacher in Charleston and Columbia uncovers how education was understood to 
be women’s work.  And it would be this mostly female teaching force that turned these 
segregated spaces into places where citizenship could be taught alongside an emerging 
civil rights movement.  Moreover, women’s roles as teachers lead to their participation in 
black teachers associations, providing them with an opportunity to be politically active.4  
																																																								
4 Sonya Ramsey, Reading, Writing, and Segregation: A Century of Black Women 
Teachers in Nashville, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008); 
Katherine Mellen Charron, Freedom’s Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark, (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
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A third central theme in the historiography has been that teaching black children 
was inherently political work. This theme is at the forefront of Adam Fairclough’s m 
book, A Class of Their Own: Black Teachers in the Segregated South, in which he argues 
that black teachers were at the center of the long struggle for education equality in the 
South, and that education and educators remained heavily politicized elements of 
southern culture.   Fairclough further argues that black segregated schools were one part 
of the larger system of Jim Crow—that segregated schools were as instrumental to 
maintaining white supremacy as sharecropping, disfranchisement, etc. Ronald Butchart 
devoted his book, Schooling the Freed People, to contesting the notion that the freed 
people’s teachers were predominantly northern, white, middle-class, and unmarried 
women.  Instead he proves that: these teachers were predominantly black; the 
overwhelming majority (white or black) were southern; they were just as likely to be 
male as female; and that a substantial number had poor/working-class backgrounds.  
More importantly for the purposes of this study is Butchart’s argument that even when 
the teachers themselves did not embrace abolitionist politics, or the Radical Republicans’ 
goals to expand black political rights, education itself is “always, everywhere, and 
inevitably, political.”5  
 A fourth central issue in this history has been that teachers served a constituency 
that consisted of both their students and the broader black community.  Such an emphasis 
is present in African American Women Educators: A Critical Examination of Their 
Pedagogies, Educational Ideas, and Activities from the Nineteenth to the Mid-Twentieth 
																																																								
5 Ronald Butchart, Schooling the Freed People: Teaching, Learning, and the Struggle for 
Black Freedom, 1861-1876. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 
xix.	
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Century.  The women featured in this collection often demonstrate a deep commitment to 
the communities they served, and their work easily overflowed from the schoolhouse to 
the neighborhood.  In fact, the editors and contributors seem to argue that community 
involvement was a pedagogical practice that enabled these women to be more effective 
teachers.  Vanessa Siddle Walker’s scholarship also positions teachers in their 
communities.  In “African American Teaching in the South: 1940-1960” Walker argues 
that although African American teachers dealt with difficult circumstances beyond their 
control, it is more important to understand that those obstacles did not constrain them.  
Instead, these men and women developed professional practices around their 
understanding of what their communities needed most. 
 My dissertation builds on all of these themes.  Even before the NAACP’s arrival 
during World War I, black Carolinians demonstrated that they wanted to have a greater 
say in their children’s education, and that they believed the black teachers were central to 
this goal.  This assertion takes center stage in my first chapter.  My research also 
positions teaching as women’s work, proving that women teachers played a critical role 
in the South Carolina civil rights movement.  In my research they serve as some of the 
most important organizers and litigants.  Education’s politicization is apparent throughout 
the whole study as African American teachers found themselves at the center of intra-
racial and interracial political discussion.  Additionally teachers, especially in rural 
communities, knew their work extended outside the classroom.  These men and women 
took the lead demanding and advancing education equality. 
My first chapter examines the Charleston teacher hiring campaign of 1917 to 
1920.  The NAACP had just arrived in South Carolina, forming its first chapters in 
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Charleston and Columbia in 1917.  Their movement into South Carolina was part of 
larger goal to increase its southern black membership and form a mass movement.  At the 
same time, WWI created a higher expectation for socioeconomic advancement. This 
campaign was part of a larger labor struggle.  Charleston had a policy of not hiring black 
teachers in the city schools.  Black teachers could work in the county, but not in the city 
limits.  However, there were black public schools, which meant that white teachers taught 
black children in segregated schools.  
 Black Charlestonians were adamantly opposed to this policy because they 
believed it would reinforce ideas of racial inferiority. They believed that black teachers’ 
presence would give them more control of their children’s education and better prepare 
them for the future.  So, although the black teacher hiring campaign benefitted black 
teachers, the main impetus was providing better education opportunities for black 
children.   
 The teacher hiring campaign was successful and proved to be a clear catalyst for 
greater civil rights participation.  In 1920, the city agreed to hire only black teachers in its 
black schools. NAACP membership increased.  At the same time, more black 
Charlestonians joined the city’s growing NAACP chapter.  As a highly visible and well 
organized mobilization effort, the campaign to African American teachers in the city’s 
black schools proved to the newly arrived NAACP that education could be the 
centerpiece of a mass protest movement.   
 The second chapter examines the teacher salary equalization campaign of 1940-
1947. States throughout the South routinely paid black teachers substantially lower 
salaries than white teachers, and these equalization suits became a central part of the 
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NAACP’s judicial method in the 1940s.  South Carolina’s first three equalization cases—
Malissa Theresa Smith, Eugene C. Hunt, and Viola Louis Duvall—originated in 
Charleston, but Duvall’s case was the only one to make it to federal district court. The 
NAACP won Duvall’s case in 1944 before Judge Waites Waring.  When Albert N. 
Thompson, a teacher at Columbia’s Booker T. Washington Heights Elementary School, 
submitted his salary equalization petition to the Richland County School Board on June 
7, 1944, the NAACP took up his case as well.  
On May 26, 1945, Judge Waring ruled in Thompson’s favor, concluding that 
Columbia’s black teachers were entitled to an equal salary plan. The board had to begin a 
new classification system, effective spring 1946.  Ben D. Wood, the National Teacher 
Examination (NTE) creator, predicted that black teachers would score lower than white 
teachers. The South Carolina State Board of Education did a two-year study that 
supported Wood’s prediction, and beginning in 1945 all the state’s teachers were required 
to take the exam.   
South Carolina’s use of the NTE not only facilitated unequal salaries between 
black and white teachers but also emphasized the black community’s preexisting 
economic disparities. The gap between the highest and lowest paid black teachers 
widened.  Those who did well on the exam and earned higher wages were better 
financially situated to pursue advanced degrees and further increase their earning 
potential. These additional economic and educational achievements helped legitimize the 
state’s use of standardized testing since white officials could now present this as proof of 
the exam’s alleged objectivity.  
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Nonetheless, the teacher salary equalization campaign also revealed the shifting 
tides of civil rights activism. These suits helped to increase the NAACP’s southern 
membership. They were sometimes the first experience African Americans had in formal 
protests and provided the foundation for a broader protest movement. Indeed, those who 
participated in the campaign found it transformative and defining. 
Chapter 3 examines the historic Briggs v. Elliott case that challenged educational 
inequity in Clarendon County, South Carolina. While the Briggs case attracted attention 
from many historians and legal scholars, this study will specifically underline the critical 
roles teachers played in crafting and supporting this pivotal legal effort. Although I have 
endeavored to discuss the leadership and activism of several teachers, Rev. J. A. De 
Laine takes center stage because he was the major driving force behind the case. De 
Laine’s role as a preacher has been closely examined in the past, (Lochbaum) but one of 
the ways this study will differentiate itself from previous histories is by examining De 
Laine’s career as an educator.  Additionally, I focus on the juxtaposition of teaching and 
preaching, and how the combination of these careers uniquely positioned Rev. De Laine 
to lead the equalization turned desegregation suit.   
This chapter begins with the Pearson suit, initiated by an African American 
farmer and property owner named Levi Pearson, that would provide school bus 
transportation to black children.  It then moves on to the Briggs school equalization suit, 
that later evolved into the Briggs school desegregation suit.  The Briggs case is 
historically important because it was the first of the five cases that formed the historic 
Brown decision.  But this chapter also underscores that civil rights activism was met with 
a white massive resistance efforts that often included sever economic reprisals.  The 
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Briggs case demonstrates that those economic reprisals could be just as effective as racial 
violence.  Simultaneously, the Briggs case reveals that reprisals could spark activism and 
bolster membership in and support of the NAACP.  Local level activism in Clarendon 
County further reveals that the 1950s was a conduit to the youth-led 1960s movement.  
This is best demonstrated by the events at Scott’s Branch High School where high school 
seniors led the ouster of S. Isaiah Benson, the school’s principal who they regarded as 
unqualified and currupt.  
 Chapter 4 is a case study on twenty-one teachers in the small town of Elloree in 
Orangeburg County who were all effectively dismissed from their jobs on the same day 
for refusing to satisfactorily answer questions regarding membership in the NAACP.  As 
African American activism in South Carolina expanded in the aftermath of the Brown 
decision, black Carolinians began submitting desegregation petitions in 1955, including 
in Elloree. The White Citizens Councils (WCC), originally founded in Mississippi, 
emerged in South Carolina at the same time. Its first two chapters were founded in 
Elloree and Orangeburg. S. Emory Rogers, the state’s lead attorney in the Briggs case, 
was the principal founder and organizer and organizer in the state.  The Council levied 
economic reprisals against the desegregation petitioners and the NAACP launched a 
counter attack.  They boycotted all WCC owned businesses. 
 In 1956, the state legislature passed a slew of anti-NAACP legislation—a 
reflection of the WCC’s inability to stymie local activism. This study closely examines 
the anti-NAACP oath—a law that required civic employees to reveal if they were 
NAACP members. South Carolina’s black leaders believed the law was geared towards 
teachers. As a result teachers all across the state lost their teaching positions. But the 
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events in Elloree stood out from the rest. When it came time to renew their yearly 
contracts, the school district superintendent gave out a new lengthy questionnaire that 
directly questioned if teachers were NAACP members and if they supported 
desegregation. Not all these teachers were NAACP members, yet they all believed that 
the questions on their contract were an infringement on their constitutional rights. As a 
result twenty-one teachers (the majority of the Elloree Training School’s faculty) were 
not re-hired. This created an opportunity for the NAACP to bring a legal suit, Ola Bryan 
v. M. G. Austin, in 1956. In the suit the NAACP argued that the anti-NAACP oath was 
unconstitutional. When the district court refused to address the oath’s unconstitutionality, 
the NAACP appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The state repealed the law 
only to replace it with two new anti- NAACP laws: 1) the barratry law which was 
intended to prevent desegregation petitions, and 2) a law requiring teachers to list all of 
their organizational affiliations—proving that teachers had been the target all along.   
 The fifth and final chapter focuses primarily on an Orangeburg teacher named 
Gloria Rackley, a young wife and mother who became one of the city’s most prominent 
activists. Orangeburg blacks already had a history of civil rights activism.  But in the 
1960s the city—home to two black colleges—became a hotbed of student activism.  
Local teachers, including Rackley, openly supported student activism.  
 The legal case that brought Rackley to the forefront was a desegregation suit 
against Orangeburg Regional Hospital. On October 12, 1962, She took her daughter, 
Jamelle, to the hospital after she was hurt at school. Rackley was told to sit in a 
segregated waiting area that only had crates for patrons. Refusing to abide by the 
hospital’s segregation policy, Rackley sat in the whites-only waiting area and faced 
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threats of arrest as her daughter was being treated.  Before Rackley could be arrested, her 
daughter reappeared, and they were able to leave the hospital.  When they returned for a 
follow-up visit and Rackley sat in the white waiting area again, she was arrested.  The 
NAACP brought a desegregation suit against the hospital—Rackley v. Board of Trustees.  
When the federal district court did not rule in their favor, civil rights attorney Matthew 
Perry appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Rackley’s arrest led to a mid-school year dismissal in 1963.  Matthew Perry filed 
a suit against the school district—Rackley v. School District that challenged the grounds 
on which his client was fired.  Rackley and the NAACP won both the hospital 
desegregation case in 1965 and the case against the school board in 1966.  It was clear 
that the hospital practiced racial segregation, which was a violation of the Constitution.  
The judge in the school case concluded that the sole reason Rackley was dismissed from 
her teaching position because of her activism, and that was an insufficient reason to 
dismiss her.  But they were both moot points because by the time the decisions were 
made, Rackley and her daughters were living in Virginia.  Rackley’s activism 
demonstrated the ways in which reprisals could be gendered and wreak havoc on one’s 
personal life. Rackley’s activism contributed to her divorce. (Her husband lost is 
professorship at SC State.)  A juvenile court judge threatened to remove her younger 
daughter, Lurma, from the home because her activism resulted in numerous arrests. And 
the Rackley’s never return to South Carolina to live, even though it was their home.   
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CHAPTER 1: “I HAD TO FIND A JOB TEACHING:” THE CHARLESTON 
BLACK TEACHER HIRING CAMPAIGN, 1917-1920 
 
 
 After Mamie Garvin Fields graduated from Claflin University (a small African 
American Methodist college in Orangeburg, South Carolina) in 1908, she received her 
first teaching job in Pine Wood, South Carolina—an area she described to as “the poorest 
part of the state.”1  She taught there with her sister Hattie in a one-room school building 
provided by the black community.  Fields was initially hired to teach one month but local 
African American residents raised enough funds for her teach a full school year. 
Afterwards Fields needed consistent employment and returned home to Charleston to 
find a teaching job.  With a teaching diploma and special “Licentiate of Instruction” she 
quickly realized that her credentials were not sufficient to secure a position in the city.2  
Instead, she was sent to teach in a rural county area.  Fields remembered: 
In 1909 I landed a school on John’s Island, a coveted 
venture, because very few of the black graduates were 
getting jobs.  All the schools were taught by white women, 
mainly the wives of trustees. . .  But since white people 
taught in the city schools, you had to try to go in the 
county.3 
 
Fields’ experiences reflected those of other contemporary African American 
teachers’ in Charleston during a time when a black teacher in a city school “was still the 
                                                            
1 Mamie Garvin Fields, Lemon Swamp and Other Places: A Carolina Memoir (Free 
Press, 1985), 104–106. 
2 Lemon Swamp and Other Places, 107-110. A “Licentiate of Instruction” was given to 
those who did special courses in pedagogy. 
3 Ibid., 110. 
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substance of things hoped for.”4  Despite the fact that there were public schools for black 
children in the city, Charleston school officials only hired them in rural county schools.  
Only white teachers worked in the city schools.  As a result, white teachers instructed 
black students in racially segregated schools. White teachers’ placement in black schools 
was not peculiar to Charleston.  It was practiced in several southern urban areas.  For 
instance, Nashville, Tennessee’s African American residents began petitioning the 
Nashville City Board of Education for black teachers in 1868; and the board began hiring 
black teachers in 1887. When New Orleans began hiring black teachers in 1916, 
Charleston became the only remaining southern city to continue this practice.5 
This chapter will discuss black Charlestonians’ efforts to ensure black teachers’ 
placement in black schools through the teacher hiring campaign of 1917 to 1920.  The 
case would ultimately demonstrate to the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) that education could serve as the ideal centerpiece to a mass 
social movement.  This chapter will also emphasize the ways in which gender issues 
intersected with education and segregation.  The teacher hiring campaign provides a 
chance for scholars to rethink the intersections of race, class, and gender in historical 
research—to move beyond explaining multiple oppressions or privileges in order to 
analyze how the two intersect.6  This case also presents scholars with an opportunity to 
                                                            
4 Edmund L. Drago, Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations: Charleston’s Avery 
Normal Institute (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 169.  Jeannette Cox's 
words, African American schoolteacher and wife to Avery Normal School principal 
Benjamin F. Cox. 
5 Sonya Yvette Ramsey, Reading, Writing, and Segregation: A Century of Black Women 
Teachers in Nashville (University of Illinois Press, 2008), 1; Katherine Mellen Charron, 
Freedom’s Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009), 89. 
6 See Jennifer C Nash, “Re-thinking Intersectionality,” Feminist Review 89, no. 1 (June 
2008). 
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rethink and reimagine African Americans’ goals on the local level, and reconsider how 
much their aims reflected the national NAACP headquarters. 
 The policy of hiring white teachers in Charleston began in the years following 
Reconstruction when the school superintendent complained that there were not enough 
qualified black teachers.  The state superintendent was largely responsible because 
although there was an effort to expand the number of teachers’ summer schools, over 
eighty percent of those funds were for white teachers’ programs.  Moreover, teachers 
complained that the examinations they were given went far beyond what was necessary 
for an elementary school teacher to know.  Nonetheless neither the city or the state 
proposed a way to improve black teachers alleged lack of qualifications, but instead 
remedied the issues by first recommending lower standards for black teachers, and then 
hiring white teachers in black schools.7  
African Americans were opposed to the use of white teachers in black schools for 
multitude reasons. On one level, it subjected black children to notions of racial 
inferiority. The fact that white teachers regarded black children as inferior and favored a 
limited education for black children overshadowed any possible benefits these children 
received from going to school. Many African Americans correctly believed that white 
teachers, who used their time in black schools to gain the necessary experience for a 
promotion to a white school, cared more about their salaries than about their charges. On 
another level, African American leaders believed that white teachers did not have the 
                                                            
7 George Brown Tindall, South Carolina Negroes: 1877-1900 (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1952), 219-220. 
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same social contract with the children that black teachers did.8  An editorial in the 
NAACP journal The Crisis observed:  
Of all the cities in the South, Charleston is guilty of the 
meanest act toward colored folks.  It keeps in their school 
white teachers, teachers who do not want to be there; 
teachers who despise their work and who work mainly for 
the money which it brings them.  These teachers are 
Southern whites and they are teaching little colored 
children, doing the work mechanically and with a  cruelty 
of discipline that is shameful.  Openly and persistently the 
white city gives two and only two reasons for this farce: 
first, that they want to teach black folk their place; and 
secondly, that they want to supply certain people with 
employment.9 
 
Conversely, black teachers’ work was influenced by a “contractarian rationale” that to act 
in their students’ best interest was to act in their own best interest.10  African Americans 
feared that white teachers’ mediocre expectations, coupled with attending schools in 
inferior facilities, would teach black children that they were, in fact, second-class citizens 
and should regard whites as their innate superiors.11  Indeed, that was exactly what white 
supremacists intended.  In 1925 Andrew Butler (A.B.) Rhett, Charleston’s school 
superintendent, recalled: 
I have always been of the opinion that the reason why there 
has been so little race friction in Charleston was that the 
colored children from a very early age were under the 
control and influence of white principals and teachers and 
were taught to look up to and respect white people.12 
                                                            
8 I. A Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to 
1968, 1st ed., South Carolina Tricentennial Commission no. 6 (Columbia: Published for 
the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 
1973), 158; Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 175. 
9 Editorial, The Crisis, XIII(April, 1917), 270 . 
10 See David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford University Press, 1986), 8–9. 
11 Black Carolinians, 158. 
12 Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 175. 
   
 16 
 
Although African American teachers’ presence was largely about improved education 
opportunities, their hiring went hand-in-hand with decreasing segregation’s adverse 
psychological effects.  For Charleston’s African Americans, increasing control of black 
schools through the employment of black teachers was the best way to combat 
segregation’s damage.  In the privacy of their own community, African American 
families sought to prepare their children for the hard reality of living in a society shaped 
by the forces of white supremacy.  Through positive reinforcement they would ensure 
their sons and daughters’ self-confidence, grooming them for the possibility of 
professional jobs and leadership.13  In this sense, the black school and teacher served as 
an integral part of this preparation. 
Positive perceptions of black teachers stood in stark contrast to those of the white 
teacher.  This was partly because the teaching profession could attract the best and the 
brightest African Americans.  For example, Mamie Garvin Fields always thought she 
would make a good teacher because she often had the highest grades.14 Established in 
1869 through Methodist Episcopal missionaries, Claflin was the first college for blacks in 
South Carolina. 15  Its students “in training to be teachers had to take pedagogy, the art of 
teaching, as well as all the regular school subjects—English, history, math, music, 
science, and of course the Bible.”16  Given Claflin’s strong curriculum, Fields felt that she 
received plenty of experience as a student teacher since they “were in great demand all 
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around, because almost every [black] schoolteacher had more to do than one person could 
handle well.”17  And despite the fact that legislation explicitly intended that black land 
grant schools, like South Carolina State College, have an agricultural and industrial based 
curriculum, these higher education institutions quickly became important teacher training 
schools with a curriculum that was more classical oriented and focused on liberal arts.18  
In fact, a comprehensive study of black land grant schools from 1911-1917 revealed that 
almost every school was neglecting rural-life training, and had “poorly run farming and 
mechanical programs.”19  State legislatures may have preferred agricultural/industrial 
education, but it was rare for any black land-grant school to receive more than half the 
monies allotted to them.  Therefore, by 1917 most of these schools were essentially 
running as autonomous institutions. Such autonomy allowed black land grant schools to 
focus on a classical education strategy and operate as teacher training centers. 20 
Many of South Carolina’s African American teachers worked hard to reduce the 
boundaries to success that many students faced. For instance, teachers asked local 
churches for clothing and shoes for their students since this was sometimes a reason 
parents did not send children to school. When Fields and Rosalee Brown began teaching 
on John’s Island, the former teacher, a white woman who was a trustee’s wife, told them 
that the children did not come to school very often.21  That may have been true, but Fields 
contended that “white folks didn’t care much if our children came to school or didn’t, but 
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we tried to get them to come.”22  This unremitting commitment to their students was part 
of black teachers’ training.  Fields, and the other student teachers, were taught “to keep 
close to the parents, even if that meant going home with a child after school.”23  Mary 
McCleod Bethune, the well-known African American educator and civil rights activist, 
noted that her ability to inspire other teachers came from understanding that their work 
seeped outside the classroom.  She recalled: 
She didn’t wait for the parents to send the children.  She 
went out and got them.  And if something was holding the 
children back, she took that as her business too.24 
 
Indeed, African American colleges trained their teachers “toward service.”25  They were 
encouraged to get to know the communities in which they taught.   Fields demonstrated 
such service to her students and the larger community when she read a news article at a 
PTA meeting announcing a minimum wage increase, therefore ensuring the parents knew 
that they had legal recourse to demand higher wages from their employers.26 
 African American teachers were deeply committed to removing white teachers 
from black schools.  From their perspective, this was sure to provide a better education 
for black children, as well as increased professional and personal opportunities for 
themselves.27  These professional opportunities helped them “adopt to—and sometimes 
overcome—the economic and social obstacles of a racially inequitable system.”28   
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Through their experiences, as teachers and students, black educators corroborated 
their community’s concerns regarding the negative educational and psychological effects 
white teachers imparted onto black students. Septima Clark—the well-known teacher, 
NAACP member, and leader with the Highlander Folk School and Citizenship Schools—
went to Shaw Memorial School in Charleston where she had white teachers “who 
expressed their gratitude for their jobs by reinforcing white ideas of black inferiority.”29  
Clark’s experiences translated into a negative perception of school until her mother, 
Victoria Poinsette, withdrew her from public school and sent her to a black-women-
operated private school on Logan Street in Charleston.  Those experiences with black 
teachers changed her negative feelings.30   
Fields’ experiences as a Claflin University student also support this perception. 
She felt ill-prepared for courses compared to her classmates who had been taught by 
black teachers.31  One of her best friends, who had African American teachers in 
Barnwell, South Carolina, helped Fields “catch up” on material “those Rebel do-nothing 
women” had not taught her.32  In fact, Fields’ experiences with white teachers were so 
damaging that even after Charleston agreed to hire black teachers she refused to send her 
children to the public schools because “those same white teachers were still there” and 
were yet “pure Rebels.”33  
By the same token, some African American educators had the opportunity to 
obtain teaching positions formerly held by whites and often felt they inherited a group of 
students who were not well prepared or properly trained by their white instructors.  Fields 
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found that she had to teach her students some of the most elementary basics.  For 
example, the previous white teacher told her that the students “dance[d] the Sam just 
nice.”34  Fields argued that: 
[w]hether or not the children know how to sing and dance 
wasn’t the point.  They did.  But to me, if they are 
Americans, they ought to be able to sing ‘America, the 
Beautiful’ and say the Pledge of Allegiance.  My school 
was in the United States, after all, and not the 
Confederacy.35   
 
She also recalled an incident when one of her students ran up to her say, “He cuss me 
black.”36  After Fields explained that and all the students were black, and forbade them 
from arguing over what was a fact, she developed a curriculum that taught the students 
that black was beautiful.37  She trained them not to lower their eyes or shuffle when 
speaking to her, saying that sometimes the “good manners” black children were taught 
were used to condition them to the ways of the Old South.38  These daily instances pushed 
black teachers to develop their own pedagogy and curriculum that intentionally went 
beyond what textbooks and prescribed lesson plans. As Fields’ words and actions 
demonstrate, not only were African American teachers equipped to teach their students 
the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic, they were deeply concerned with 
ensuring that their students understood concepts of citizenship and merged those concepts 
with notions of racial pride.  Likewise, positive experiences with black teachers 
reinforced the belief that they had a vital role to play in black children’s education.  For 
example, one teacher who went to school on Johns Island recalled learning about 
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important African American figures like Harriet Tubman and Frederick Douglass 
instilled in her a sense of racial pride.39 
 Many white southerners strongly opposed the employment of African American 
teachers in city schools.  For instance, the presence of educated blacks presented a 
challenge to the South’s racialized hierarchy.  It could flaunt the fact that some African 
Americans acquired a higher education level than many poor and working-class whites.40  
Moreover, as Florida gubernatorial candidate—and later governor—Sidney J. Catts 
proclaimed, there was “no room in the South for the well educated Negro, no one wants a 
Negro for a lawyer or a doctor or a banker.”41  According to him, all any African 
American needed was to be literate enough to read his or her Bible.42   
Fields recalled that “whites didn’t like to think you had leisure to do anything but 
pick cotton and work in the field.”43  Even children were not supposed to have access to 
time and/or money. And those who did have it “ought not show it.”44  When Florida 
passed a law stating that white teachers could not teach black children and black teachers 
could not teach white children, one white newspaper declared that it was customary, even 
in the days of slavery, for white women to teach black children.  Therefore, “the situation 
during slavery was . . . in a certain respect, better” and “to cut off the colored people from 
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any instruction from the whites is simply terrible.”45  The statements overlooked the fact 
that teaching slaves how to read was illegal and that these women generally were 
interested in teaching slaves enough skills to make them useful plantation laborers.  
Ironically, this type of teaching seems to be exactly what African Americans were 
striving to combat.  They wanted teachers with a pedagogy oriented towards racial uplift. 
In 1914 South Carolina passed a similar measure as Florida. Champions of the 
Fortner Bill wanted to “prohibit white persons from teaching in negro schools and to 
prohibit negroes from teaching in white schools.”46  Some white Carolinians, however, 
were defensive of their motives and warned that the removal of white teachers would 
result in bedlam: 
We deny that the white man needs any law to prevent the 
Negro from measuring up to a place of equality with him.  
If that proposition is once admitted and entered on our 
statute books it will stand as an ineffaceable libel on our 
South Carolina manhood. 
 In addition, the measure to prevent race equality, if 
enacted into law, will open the doors for the very evils 
which we most fear, and have reason to fear.  If white 
teachers are removed from our public schools and the 
youthful Negro mind is turned over to the mercy of vicious 
Northern Negro teachers to implant therein the seeds of 
race hatred, we will soon be face to face with incendiary 
conditions that may burst forth at any moment of the night 
or day with terrible consequences.47 
 
Such language reflected the insecurities and perceived threats educated blacks allegedly 
posed. Others believed that hiring black teachers was acceptable, but only if they were 
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under whites’ constant supervision.48  Either way, South Carolina legislators saw a clear 
link between controlling black education and maintaining white supremacy.  In short, 
educating black Carolinians would pose a direct challenge to southern notions of white 
manhood.   
White Carolinians made no secret of their intentions to maintain the status quo: 
In the northern part of this country are a few, a very few, 
scholarly and earnest men, some of them rich, who believe 
in the equality of the races and who wish to see it 
established in politics and in social life.  They are mistaken 
men, they are doing what they can to promote this 
equality.49 
 
The white press expressed serious fears of African American ascendency.50  To them it 
was clear that African Americans sought “forward movement” through “avidity for 
education” and “reach[ing] for agricultural independence.”51  Therefore, blacks’ and 
whites rhetoric placed teachers at the center of African American’s attempts for 
socioeconomic advancement. 
 The motivations undergirding white opposition to hiring black teachers become 
clearer when other legislative issues are considered.  For example, the Fortner Bill also 
forbade white nurses from treating black patients and the “intimacy of the races in houses 
of ill-repute.”52  The proposed bill obviously played on “the titillating and violence-
                                                            
48 “Neglect,” 179.  Taken from the Stateman (Columbia, SC). 
49 “Education,” The Crisis, August 1914, 175. Exerpt taken from the Columbia State 
newspaper. 
50 “Education," The Crisis noted that "[m]ost of the southern papers seem to regard these 
facts of advance as a very desperate situation.” 
51 “Land,” The Crisis, August 1914, 176.  Excerpts from the Philadelphia Public Ledger. 
52“Opinion,” The Crisis, March 1914, 233; “Along the Color Line,” The Crisis, March 
1914, 221. 
   
 24 
provoking” fears regarding miscegenation and rape by black men on white women that 
were employed “after emancipation, when it served the purposes of racial 
segregationists.”53  Members of the white press lambasted the 1914 bill as “shortsighted” 
and accused its presenter, Rep. Fortner, of holding office through “ignorance and 
prejudice.”54  It would “bring about the collapse of Bleaseism ‘and all that it portends.’”55  
The bill played on post-emancipation fears of miscegenation and the myth of the black 
beast rapist in order to “serve the purposes of racial segregationists.”56  Indeed, part of the 
difficulty in getting black teachers hired in the city schools was that it bore the 
appearance of “black men agitating against white women.”57  Moreover, as much as 
African Americans wanted their own teachers, they surely would have been opposed to 
the language Fortner used to describe the bill.  He promised that hiring black teachers 
would “prevent the possibility of equality between the races.”58  Therefore fears of 
miscegenation were linked, through proposed legislation, to public schooling long before 
the desegregation/integration struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, which places the massive 
white resistance movement’s roots in the early twentieth century.  
 African Americans also faced white Charlestonians’ opposition to passing a 
compulsory education law.  They made their reasons for opposition quite clear.  If 
African Americans were required by the law to go to school, it would grant them “the 
same provisions as the whites, with the result of exceedingly high education, but an 
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aggravation of the labor problem and an end of agricultural pursuits.”59  African 
American children, therefore, should not receive the same education as whites because it 
would result in two races being “equally educated” and create a “servant problem,” 
disrupting the “God intended” order of “master and servant.”60  Still some warned that the 
legislature’s maintenance of white supremacy by not passing a compulsory education law 
would “in the end operate to overthrow it.”61  Members of South Carolina’s white press 
made a compelling case connecting compulsory education to the disfranchisement of 
white men: 
With one accord our political leaders insist that no white 
man shall be prevented from voting in the primary and, so 
long as the primary is the election that elects, there is 
nothing to induce the illiterate or propertyless [sic] white 
man to fit himself to be a legal elector.  These same leaders, 
most of them, refuse to press for a compulsory school 
attendance law and so they consent to the growing up of 
thousands of white men in illiteracy.62 
 
As above quote indicated, African Americans’ continued oppression and 
disfranchisement complicated poor and working-class men’s status.  These efforts may 
have been intended to limit blacks’ socioeconomic advancement, but they concurrently 
affected some whites.  South Carolina did pass a compulsory education law in 1915.63  
Unfortunately there were still “a number of loopholes” that made it “only partially 
applicable to colored children.”64   
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 The Palmetto State’s black population had logical reasons to be wary of engaging 
in political activism, but none was more significant or terrifying than becoming a 
lynching victim.  Violence, as during slavery and Reconstruction’s end, was a very 
important part of gaining and maintaining white supremacy in the South.65 Some South 
Carolina whites argued that lynching was a necessary evil.  It was not the fault of those 
who participated in the violent acts, but the Republican party’s, “which put the South 
under the yoke of the carpetbagger, the Negro and the scalawag” making it “necessary for 
the white man to use lawlessness to secure the restoration of law and order.”66  The 
statement singularly dismantled notions that lynching was about protecting white 
womanhood.67 
In 1916, one year before the NAACP came to South Carolina, Anthony Crawford 
was lynched on October 21. The Crawford case took place in Abbeville and gained 
national attention from the black media.68  A “self-respecting, wealthy Negro citizen,” he 
was once quoted as saying, “the day a white man hits me is the day I die.”69  One witness 
reported that the clerks and merchants from nearby stores closed their shops and emerged 
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with “sticks, ax handles, and pick handles to beat him with.”70  There was only one 
African American around—not nearly enough to stop the violence.71   
African Americans also feared economic reprisals.  Whites employed most blacks 
who knew that participation in civil rights activities could mean job loss.  Likewise, the 
self-employed—i.e. carpenters, seamstresses, stonemasons, and tailors—risked a sudden 
and sure boycott of their services.  Very few were as lucky as Teddy Harleston, a Harvard 
educated artist whose family owned a successful funeral home business, whose 
membership in the black elite shielded him from economic reprisals.  He was able to take 
on a leadership role in the NAACP and the early Charleston civil rights movement 
because he and his family were all businessmen and women with a mostly black 
clientele.72   
 Nonetheless, black Carolinians found multiple ways to combat white supremacy.  
One particularly tempting method was northern migration.  Being “in constant danger of 
mob violence” provided “one of the most effective arguments” to leave the South.73  Lack 
of agricultural opportunities due to floods and the boll weevil, coupled with increased 
opportunities in the North because of fewer European immigrants provided powerful 
economic push and pull factors. As of 1917 approximately 250,000 African Americans 
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had gone North; 27,000 of them were from South Carolina.74  As one black Carolinian 
said: 
The immediate occasion of the migration is, of course, the 
opportunity in the North, now at last open to us, for 
industrial betterment.  The real causes are the conditions 
which we have had to bear because there was no escape.75 
 
African Americans were not only looking for economic advancements, but a way to 
evade the Palmetto State’s blatant racism and frequent racial violence.   
Another method of combating white supremacy in South Carolina was through 
the emerging form of collective activism.  Racial violence was a major contributing 
factor to the NAACP’s move into the South.  Indeed, the violence meant to drive people 
away from activism, could draw them towards it.76  For even as violence and the threat of 
violence could decrease activism, it made the “need of a militant, aggressive and 
uncompromising organization” increasingly clear.77  To be sure, despite the use of 
legislation and violence to tamp black progress, there remained a sense of ultimate 
advancement.  Referring to the racist rhetoric and policies of southern governors like 
South Carolina’ Coleman Livington Blease and Mississippi’s James K. Vardaman, the 
NAACP’s The Crisis said: 
The Bleases and Vardamans may retard the Negro race, 
they may increase the number of indolent and vicious 
blacks by denying them knowledge and a fair chance . . . 
but the Negro race in America is advancing rapidly in spite 
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of all opposition; increasing thousands of them are 
virtuous, wise and useful Americans.78 
 
After all, whites’ perceptions that blacks were sending more children to school, acquiring 
more land, and more of their men were qualifying for the vote perpetuated much of the 
racial tension.79  The teacher hiring campaign would have agitated whites’ paranoia 
regarding the repercussions of black advancement.   
This racial environment facilitated the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People’s (NAACP) arrival and enabled it to become the single most important 
civil rights organization in the state.  As a national organization explicitly dedicated to 
expanding social and political opportunities for African Americans, its arrival was as 
symbolic as it was helpful.80  The NAACP envisioned this movement into the Palmetto 
State as part of a larger objective to redefine itself as “a real first line defense” in the 
South.81  As part of a “dozen, lusty, young branches” it would mark “a new era in the 
history” of the primarily northern organization.82  The NAACP’s movement into the 
South not only made it a truly national organization, but entrenched it in local 
communities. It would be one of the NAACP’s greatest accomplishments during the 
World War I years. The first two South Carolina chapters appeared in Charleston and 
Columbia in 1917, a direct reflection of the increasing militancy among black Carolinians 
during World War I. The Charleston chapter, one of the liveliest among these new 
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southern chapters, was founded largely due to Edwin “Teddy” Harleston’s efforts, a 
former student of one of the NAACP’s founders and directors, W. E. B. Du Bois. In fact, 
this relationship helped lead to Du Bois’ Charleston visits in 1917 and 1921.83  I.S. Leevy 
led the Columbia branch’s founding.  He and other local black leaders began by forming 
the Capital City Civic League, whose “sole purpose” was “contesting and contending for 
our every Constitutional right, privileges and immunity, in a quiet, legal and peaceful 
manner.”84 Indeed, when Leevy and the other Capital City Civic League members drafted 
their 1917 Address to the People, their main goal was to “cite the Constitutional 
requirements of the State of South Carolina” for voting and prepare black men to vote 
“on the various important matters to be decided by the qualified electorate.”85  Among 
those “important matters” was compulsory education which if passed would result in 
“longer terms, better pay, better teachers.”86   Such rhetoric not only makes a direct 
connection between education and voting rights, but also makes better education and a 
desire for qualified black teachers founding principles for the state NAACP’s formation. 
Moreover, along with Columbia attorney Butler W. Nance, who served as the Columbia 
branch’s president, Leevy and the other members played an indirect yet important role in 
the Charleston teacher hiring campaign.  In the absence of a formal Conference of 
Branches, they were often the ones who communicated directly with the NAACP’s 
national office in New York.87   
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World War I presented black Carolinians with high expectations for 
socioeconomic advancement.  Charleston, like many urban areas, was transitioning as 
rural blacks and whites flooded the city in search of war industry jobs.88  Additionally, the 
existence of black soldiers made possible a “more militant race pride.”89  Black 
servicemen returned home with the confidence to assume the rights that Jim Crow South 
had been denying them.90  Black leaders like Harleston, one of only a few African 
Americans in the area able to vote, “imagined the possibility” of a black primary.91  Black 
Carolinians joined the war effort and “earned the commendation of them which is being 
freely voiced by white citizens everywhere.”92  During these early years the South 
Carolina NAACP employed effective direct action methods which solidified its role as a 
mode of “individual and collective empowerment.”93 
The teacher hiring campaign was a significant part of a small handful of issues the 
Charleston chapter chose to address in 1917.  At the time there were three black public 
schools in the city.94  As branch president Teddy Harleston explained, black 
Charlestonians found the public school system’s policy of not hiring black teachers “very 
irksome.”95  He was familiar with the problems these teachers faced because his wife, 
Elise, had been a teacher and was forced to take a position far away from the comfort of 
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her Charleston home.96  He acknowledged that the community had, “tried to have it 
changed three times; they tried it thirty-five years ago and they tried twenty years ago but 
failed.”97  In fact, just one year earlier, a group of black ministers unsuccessfully implored 
the city to hire black teachers.98  As Fields said: 
You may not believe it now, but we had to fight to get 
black teachers to teach in our segregated schools.  When it 
came to teachers, our black schools were “integrated”!  For 
the longest time, they didn’t want black teachers to teach 
black children in Charleston public schools.99 
 
These comments demonstrate a commitment to equality through autonomy. Even as 
many African Americans were keen on regaining the right to vote and fighting against 
segregation’s many humiliations, countless others were equally eager to “separate 
themselves as fully as possible” from whites.100  So, when the first state NAACP chapter 
was founded in Charleston local blacks almost immediately began developing a plan to 
replace the city’s white teachers. Septima Clark joined the effort in 1918 and recruited 
other teachers to help. She also recruited some of her sixth grade students, effectively 
initiating them into political activism.  The NAACP began petitioning the Charleston 
Board of Commissioners calling for the hiring of black teachers in black schools.  The 
Commission used a delay tactic; they promised to hire black teachers when more black 
schools were constructed.  Harleston had expected their petition to be denied.101  He said, 
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“We had that talk before . . . I told them I could not go back to our people and give them 
any such promise, that we had to have something definite and tangible.”102   
Taking segregationists’ demagoguery to its ultimate conclusion, Harleston and the 
Charleston NAACP enlisted a committee to petition the legislature to make a white 
person teaching in black public schools illegal.  On January 18, 1919, Teddy Harleston 
led several hundred people in a march through Columbia’s streets and delivered the 
petition to the state legislature.103 The petition—addressed to the governor, state 
superintendent of education, lieutenant governor, speaker of the house, and member of 
the state legislature—asked to end the “unnecessary, unusual abnormal conditions that 
surround the management, instruction and teaching” of Charleston’s black children.104  
The petition’s writers noted that there was no need to have white teachers in black 
schools since there were “thousands of educated [black] men and women who are 
prepared and worthy to teach.”105  As evidence, they pointed to the fact that “Negro 
teachers do teach Negro children” not only in every other southern state, but in every 
other South Carolina city.”106  In response, the Charleston school board sent their vice-
chairperson and superintendent to the state capitol to oppose the bill. In a desperate 
argument against the bill, one politician said that it did not represent the general black 
community’s wishes.107  White Charlestonians claimed that “it was not their cooks and 
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laundresses who wanted the change but the ‘mulattoes.’”108  In order to disprove this 
accusation, Thomas E. Miller, a former state legislature and one of the petition’s 
signatories, asked Benjamin F. Cox, the Avery Normal School principal, to encourage his 
teachers to “canvass the neighborhoods with petitions.”109 With the help of his friend, a 
physician named John McFall, Harleston worked for a year collecting signatures on 
individual cards.110   
The petition committee successfully acquired the signatures of five thousand 
heads of households—about three-fourths of Charleston’s black community. Therefore, 
the teacher hiring campaign mobilized the majority of the black community behind the 
NAACP.  The argument that the general African American community did not support 
hiring black teachers was not only proven false, but a new precedent was set for 
collective action.111 They were able to avoid legislative action altogether when, on 
February 3, 1920, the board of public school commissioners voted that as of September 1 
“no white teachers shall be employed in the public schools in the city of Charleston to 
teach Negro pupils.”112  It was a considerable victory for the new branch and the 
community they endeavored to represent.  By the fall, all of the teachers in the black 
public schools were black.113 As NAACP chairman Joel Spingarn noted in a letter to 
Nance, this was “a wonderful thing not only for the teacher but for the colored children” 
who up to that point were taught “by women out of sympathy with their best 
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development.”114 This brought about large-scale participation in the new branch because 
in order to obtain enough signatures large public meetings were held, bringing together 
Charleston’s hierarchical black community—a caste system largely based on colorism 
and one’s ability to trace their lineage to well-known whites.115  Of growing up in the city 
during the 1920s, Gussie Harleston—part of the same prominent African American 
Charleston family as Teddy Harleston—remembered: 
The Harlestons were light, and we didn’t associate with 
people who were much darker than we were.  Of course, 
we didn’t associate with white people either.  We were kind 
of in-between people.  But we were Negroes all the same, 
and everyone in our circle was colored to one degree or 
another.  In fact, I didn’t know any white people, except for 
my friend Mildred Weiters.116 
 
Thus despite their skin tone, segregation meant light-skinned blacks could not associate 
with whites.  As Gussie acknowledges, they were simultaneously part and apart from the 
black community.  Segregation and slavery’s legacy not only positioned black and whites 
against each other, but also ripped apart the black community.  Hence, the teacher hiring 
campaign was groundbreaking in its ability to disrupt both the white-black status quo, to 
challenge colorism.  Charleston did not have the clearly defined three-tiered racial caste 
system prevalent in other southern port cities like New Orleans, but there was certainly a 
tradition of differential treatment for light and dark skinned blacks dating back to the 
city’s antebellum era.  Charleston’s fair complexioned free blacks had been positioned in 
a space between their darker brethren and white counterparts.  They lacked the full 
citizenship rights granted to whites, but were also protected from some of the worst forms 
                                                            
114 Chairman to Butler W. Nance, February 10, 1919, Papers of the NAACP, Part 12, 
Series A.  
115 Democracy Rising, 44. 
116 The Sweet Hell Inside, 190.  Gussie also recalls that after reaching a certain age her 
white friend was no longer permitted to play with her. 
   
 36 
of racial control/oppression.117  Through collective action, African Americans were given 
a common goal and more singular purpose.   
But, equally important to this case study is the fact that hiring black teachers was 
only one part of a much larger goal.  After all, World War I and its accompanying labor 
struggle presented African Americans with the opportunity to demand more rights. This 
becomes increasingly obvious when the teacher hiring campaign is considered alongside 
other contemporary labor struggles.  The first case the Charleston NAACP took on was 
the Navy Ship Yard Campaign.  Prior to the teacher campaign, the Navy shipyard 
emerged as site of racial repression and violence.   In April 1919, African American 
veterans and their families were prevented from visiting the Mercury, a ship that brought 
U.S. soldiers back home.  In May 1919 a fight between white soldiers and an African 
American resulted in a riot between white and black soldiers.  As a result, Fridie's, a 
black-owned barbershop catering to whites, was destroyed; two African Americans killed 
and seventeen injured; and seven sailors and one policeman injured.  When the U.S. 
Navy decided to hire 600 Charleston women to sew Navy uniforms for America’s entry 
into the war, they refused to employ black women. As with the teacher hiring campaign, 
Harleston took the lead in challenging the decision.  In May 1917 he began passing 
around, to prominent whites, a petition objecting to the refusal to hire black women.  The 
petition reasoned that if jobs were not made available to African Americans, the result 
would be their mass exodus.  When local authorities mostly disregarded the petition 
Harleston contacted R. Augustine Skinner (New York NAACP branch president) and 
Archibald Grimke (the Charleston born former slave turned writer, intellectual, activist, 
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and politician).  The appeal to the comparatively progressive Republican legislatures 
proved effective after five representatives and both senators sent letters of critique to the 
Navy Department. The secretary of the Navy responded with a statement indicating black 
seamstresses were incompetent and that hiring practices were the local authorities’ 
prerogative.  The legislatures found the secretary’s response unacceptable, and continued 
to push for a more satisfactory answer.  They got it when, by the end of the year, the 
Navy Shipyard had hired 250 black women.118    
Combined, the teacher hiring and navy shipyard campaigns focused on ensuring 
access to employment opportunities.  This is underscored by the fact that when the 
Colored Ministers’ Union petitioned the school board in 1916, they also asked that the 
fifth and sixth grades be added, and for a more advanced program at the industrial 
school.119  Their reason for this request was that, “an eighth grade education, with a large 
percent of that industrial, is not sufficient qualification for race leadership nor the 
profession of teacher.”120  Therefore the Charleston teacher hiring campaign was not 
merely a stepping-stone to the Brown v. Board of Education decision.  Instead it reflected 
deep-seeded belief among African Americans that their teachers were the key to 
providing black students in an unfair school system and labor market with much needed 
assistance.121  Black teachers’ work simultaneously provided better education to black 
children, jobs for black teachers, and the hope that the next generation would have greater 
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access to professional jobs.  Additionally, considering the fact that the navy jobs were all 
for women, and that the majority of teachers were women, it becomes apparent that 
African Americans wanted to make certain black women had access to gainful 
employment, most likely to protect them from the sexual harassment and exploitation that 
were often par for the course when working in whites’ homes. 
Leaders like Harleston faced the daily oppressions associated with being an 
African American in the South.  Racism permeated every life factor—from where one 
lived and the spaces people occupied to their professional opportunities.  Yet because of 
his status and gender Harleston had access to a limited amount of privilege.  For instance, 
although Harleston was certainly the driving force behind the Charleston NAACP 
chapter’s founding and its initial campaigns, he was not necessarily the most invested 
Harleston family member when one considers the fact that the city’s policy had a more 
direct effect on his wife than himself.  Likewise, African American teachers faced daily 
racism.  Since most teachers were women, this meant that black women teachers faced 
the double oppression of race and gender.  They faced a particular discrimination 
reserved explicitly for black women, i.e., they were either the Jezebel or the Mammy. Yet 
it is also true that teaching and middle-class status granted these women some semblance 
of respectability.122  It made them an essential part of the NAACP’s constituency, 
granting women like Clark access to assistance and nominal leadership. 
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The black teacher hiring campaign was the chapter’s most victorious 
undertaking.123  Its success held real, concrete benefits since it helped connect black South 
Carolinians in innovative ways and informed them of the opportunities collective action 
could bring.  Not only were they connected to each other, but to a national organization—
making them part of the national black freedom struggle.  The mass meetings associated 
with the campaign also helped blur the long-held socioeconomic lines in the city’s black 
community as local and national racial conditions underscored the need to attach 
collective activism to concepts of racial uplift.124 
The teacher hiring campaign garnered more vocal support from local blacks than 
other important causes.  For instance, the second major set of issues Harleston and the 
rest of the branch addressed were two cases of violence: a murder case wherein a white 
streetcar conductor killed an African American man, and an attempted rape case of a ten 
year old black girl by a white man.  Harleston lobbied the solicitor to investigate both 
crimes.125  While the murder case “marked the first time in twenty years” that a white 
Charlestonian was tried for an African American’s murder, the all white male jury 
composition prevented even the hope of a conviction.126  In the rape case a grand jury 
refused to indict.127  Yet neither case garnered widespread community support.  Perhaps 
this could be partly attributed to a belief that these cases would not be successful, but the 
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imminent threat of violence and economic repercussions was more likely what affected 
black Charlestonians’ limited involvement.   
Instead, the teacher hiring campaign caused NAACP membership to rise 
drastically.  In only two years’ time the Charleston branch’s membership rose from an 
original group of twenty-nine to, by the close of the campaign, 646.  Such growth 
garnered South Carolina’s activists special attention.  In 1919, when Harleston attended 
the annual NAACP conference in Cleveland, DuBois asked him to share the campaign’s 
success with the rest of the attendees and to write about it in the Crisis.128  Hence the 
campaign was not just impressive on the local level.  It was significant on the national 
stage.  The community’s support implied that education was the cause the NAACP could 
use to build a mass social movement.  It insinuated that African Americans black success 
of black schools and students to be bound to black teachers’ fate. 
The positive effects of the campaign moved beyond the Charleston area.  The 
NAACP soon grew to rural areas.  Between 1918 and 1919 additional branches were 
founded in Aiken, Anderson, Darlington, Florence, Orangeburg, and Beaufort. This 
growth connected blacks in different communities and linked poor, rural blacks with civil 
rights activities throughout the nation. By 1919 the NAACP had positioned itself at the 
center of South Carolina’s black freedom struggle; and by the end of the Great War the 
NAACP completely transformed itself from a northern organization with white 
management to one with a growing southern constituency that provided both its funding 
and leadership.129  The NAACP changed with the times, moving away from being an 
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organization primarily concerned with a small, professional, urban community to a “mass 
organization representing the needs and interest of a broad cross-section of black South 
Carolinians across lines of geography, gender, and economic status.”130 This ability to 
change course and pursue a broader constituency’s interest propelled the SC NAACP’s 
power and influence.131    
Just as African Americans understood hiring black teachers to be inextricably 
linked to improving black children’s education, white official’s efforts to lessen teachers’ 
effectiveness proves they understood and feared this outcome.   Even after the teachers 
were hired, the school board continued to oppose high education standards in black 
schools.132  In 1925 the board agreed to add the eleventh grade at Burke Industrial 
School, but refused the inclusion of French and Latin courses.  A.B. Rhett defended the 
policy, saying that what African Americans needed most was an industrial education—to 
prepare themselves for “Negro jobs.”133  As Asa H. Gordon, a South Carolina State 
College professor wrote in 1925, “[t]he Burke Industrial School . . . is supposed to be the 
high school, but the real high school for the city is a private school, Avery Institute.”134  
In 1939, a committee including the PTA, civil, and ministerial organizations petitioned 
the board for an accredited high school.  They argued that Burke’s alumni were unable to 
go into institutions of higher education unless they completed two additional years of 
schooling that Charleston’s public schools did not provide.  Nonetheless, despite these 
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encumbrances, black schools improved significantly after the entrance of black 
teachers.135 
Yet the victory of the teacher hiring campaign did not mean the eradication of 
discriminatory hiring practices in public schools.  Prior to World War I and the teacher 
hiring campaign, African American women were kept from teaching positions because of 
their race. Afterwards their marital status often barred them.  Only unmarried women 
could teach in the city schools.  Married women were permitted to teach in the county, 
but that could mean less income and separation from their family.136 Fields noted that 
deciding to get married essentially meant giving up her teaching career: 
. . . I was going to turn twenty-five that summer; it was 
time for me to think about getting married.  If I stayed over 
there [on John’s Island], maybe I never would.  Quite a few 
teachers stayed single all their lives—[Cousin] Lala was 
one.  I didn’t want to become a spinster teacher, yet still I 
hated to leave my profession.  That’s the fix I was in: I 
hated to leave but couldn’t stay.137 
 
Women like Fields and her cousin found themselves in a precarious situation.  They 
could sacrifice their career, and probably a much-needed income, or they could sacrifice 
their personal lives. Pushing married women out of teaching jobs was almost certainly 
based on the assumption that their husbands could now provide them with financial 
support.138  For African American families, this was likely a grossly inaccurate 
assumption since black men in the South continued to face huge barriers to gainful 
employment.   
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African Americans may have witnessed the hiring of black teachers, but in the 
long run they lost school autonomy as white officials began closely monitoring the 
principals, teachers, and after-school activities.  Additionally, hiring black teachers did 
not necessarily mean hiring black principals.  In fact, white Charleston education officials 
endeavored to maintain control of the schools through a concession stating whites would 
still be the principals. Rhett was eventually forced to hire black principals when all the 
whites he approached for the positions turned him down.139  But Rhett later reasoned “the 
white people still have an interest in the schools and an authority over the schools, which 
they are prepared to exercise.”140  He created a new position, “supervisor of Negro 
schools,” and hired Shaw’s former white principal, Edward Carroll, to fill it.141  Rhett 
claimed that Carroll was the ideal candidate because he “was widely respected by the 
Negroes, knew how to talk to them, and how to influence them.  He exerted over them at 
all times a wise and salutary influence.”142  After his death in 1925, Carroll was replaced 
by F. W. Wamsley who complained in 1932 that B.B. Jones, Burke’s principal, did not 
acknowledge his authority on school issues.  It was not until Wamsley’s retirement in 
1944 that the board finally appointed an African American, William H. Grayson, Jr.  
Grayson used wartime labor shortages to his advantage, hiring college educated teachers 
and pushing Burke’s curriculum form primarily industrial to classical education.143  
Loss of autonomy is emphasized by the fact that the local white authorities 
decided to investigate Simonton school principal James Andrew Simmons’ political 
                                                            
139 Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 176-177. 
140  Katherine Mellen Charron, Freedom’s Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 95. 
141 Freedom’s Teacher, 94–95; Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 177. 
142 Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 177. 
143 Ibid., 177. 
   
 44 
activities when word spread that he encouraged his teachers to register to vote, and after 
he offended white audience members during a speech he gave in February 1932 on Race 
Relations Sunday in which he allegedly suggested that whites and blacks were social 
equals.144  During an interview with the school board, Simmons denied advocating social 
equality but admitted to promoting hiring black policemen and, after hours, encouraged 
teachers to register to vote.  He was instructed that if he continued to make “harmful 
statements” he would be censured as a public school official.145  Rather than face 
censorship, Simmons chose to leave Charleston and assumed a principal’s position at the 
Booker T. Washington High School in Columbia, the state’s largest black high school. 
Yet even this reflects the intersections of oppression and privilege.  On the one hand, 
whites limited Simmons’ political activities.  On the other hand, the fact that Simmons 
had the opportunity to leave for another job reflected gender and class privilege.  For as a 
male, he was much more likely to be considered for a principalship.   Born to middle-
class Charlestonians, he was able to go to private school at the School of Immaculate 
Conception from the first to eight grades, and then attend the Avery Institute for high 
school.  He then attended the prestigious Fisk University where he received his Bachelors 
degree.146  In short, Simmons’ socioeconomic background gave him greater educational 
opportunities, setting him up for a lifetime of improved professional opportunities. 
Throughout the upcoming decades of the twentieth century, education remained 
an incredibly politicized topic.   Teachers like Fields and Clark continued to follow some 
of the methods they learned in the teacher hiring campaign.  Both women worked 
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through black women’s clubs.  Clark continued to work with the NAACP and, later on, 
the Highlander Folk School. The NAACP, and the African American community as a 
whole, also learned some important lessons from the teacher hiring campaign.  These 
methods (petitions, marches, mass meetings, mass protest, etc.) were used continually in 
local blacks’ efforts to establish a more just society.  This case study also cautions that 
while black education is often viewed through the lens of the historic Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, it is important to consider these cases contemporarily.  For African 
Americans in Charleston (and other southern urban centers) desegregation/integration did 
not even factor into the conversation.   
With the hiring of black teachers in the city schools, superintendent A. B. Rhett 
told the school board in May 1919: 
It is customary in cities where negro teachers are employed 
to teach negro children to have an entirely different salary 
schedule.  I would recommend that a salary schedule for 
colored teachers in Charleston be adopted, which shall 
amount to 2/3 of the white schedule.147 
 
That same month the Board of School Commissioners approved the adoption of different 
salary schedules for white and black teachers.  Therefore, even as black teachers and the 
larger black community were winning one battle on the education front, they were being 
forced to wage another one.  The next major public schools struggle in the state focused 
on teacher salary equalization.  Clark and Simmons would both play key roles in the 
salary equalization cases.  Obviously Simmons did not take away from the encounter the 
need to avoid whites’ anger.  In the early 1940s, he was accused of initiating a salary 
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equalization lawsuit.148  Simmons, and other educated African Americans, “represented 
the emergence of a cultured and college-educated black leadership that advocated a more 
activist-oriented interpretation of the social uplift philosophy.”149  For his M.A. thesis at 
Columbia University in 1935, Simmons conducted a study of South Carolina teachers in 
black public and private high schools.  The study surveyed 141 teachers and found that 
the average male’s salary was $640/year and the average woman’s was $475/year.  These 
were well below the average whites’ salary of $1,249/year for men and $832/year for 
women.150  So the teacher hiring campaign presents an opportunity to reconsider and 
reanalyze the goals of African Americans on the local level.  It pushes us to not confuse 
the goals of the NAACP national headquarters with those of the broader community.  
If—as the fight to equalize teachers’ salaries suggest—the ultimate goal was equal 
education, then the African American teacher, and not desegregation, was possibly 
perceived as the key to that objective. 
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CHAPTER 2: “MY SALARY INCREASE WAS AMAZING:” THE TEACHER 
SALARY EQUALIZATION CAMPAIGN 
 
John McCray, editor of the prominent African American newspaper, Lighthouse and 
Informer, once reflected that: 
…the colored citizens in Sumter ought to change the 
city’s slogan from “Gamecock” city to something like “The 
start here city.” As we look over the past seven years and 
note the great strides our people have made in the state, 
especially in educational matters and in our fight for the 
right to vote, we cannot help but note that both of these 
either originated or were carried out by Sumterites.1 
 
South Carolina’s teacher salary equalization campaign began in 1940 in Sumter County 
where local African Americans embarked on a thirty-month crusade to accomplish this 
goal.  Osceola McKain’s return home marked the campaign’s beginning.  He had just 
spent sixteen years in Europe, where he owned a club in Ghent, Belgium, when World 
War II’s outbreak resulted in Belgium’s German occupation.  McKaine decided to trust 
the club’s management to friends and return to the United States.  The following year, a 
young group of teachers, including one of his cousins, spoke to him about the possibility 
of a salary equalization suit.  The national NAACP was still basking in their recent 
teacher salary equalization victory in Virginia, Alston v. School Board of the City of 
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Norfolk, and some black Carolinians were eager to bring a similar suit in their home 
state.2 
Supporters of a salary equalization lawsuit faced a number of challenges in getting 
things off the ground.  First, the NAACP’s lead attorney, Thurgood Marshall, informed 
the state’s black teachers that they needed to gather hard evidence of salary differentials.  
He also told them to start a defense fund to pay legal fees and assist plaintiffs who lost 
their teaching positions.  McKaine initially believed teacher salary equalization held even 
greater urgency than voting rights, so he was willing to take all necessary steps to ensure 
victory.  He travelled the state to collect salary data.  Then he, along with several other 
Sumter businessmen, started a legal defense fund.3 
The second challenge to getting the teacher salary equalization campaign off the 
ground was connected to the black teachers association, the Palmetto State Teacher’s 
Association (PSTA), whose executive committee did not support McKaine in his 
endeavors. The executive committee was comprised mostly of senior level teachers and 
administrators who were concerned that involvement in a lawsuit would result in loss of 
prestige and position. In response to their hesitations and ambivalence, McKaine and 
McCray, editor of the prominent African American newspaper, the Lighthouse and 
Informer, worked together to oust the PSTA’s leadership.    Through McCray’s 
newspaper, the two men publically criticized the organization’s president John P. 
Burgess, who made a speech in which he ridiculed black teachers for thinking they could 
get equal pay.  The speech propelled the Sumterites’ efforts.  Its aftermath actually gave 
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the salary issue some much-needed attention.  McCray and McKaine’s efforts were 
largely successful.  Over time the PSTA became more activist oriented as the 
organization’s financial and logistical support for the NAACP became increasingly 
unabashed. This increased militancy, combined with World War II, drastically decreased 
the organization’s membership.4  
 A third challenge came in convincing the state NAACP to finance the salary 
equalization case.  State president, John Hinton, certainly thought it was a legitimate 
issue, but believed black teachers—who, despite salary inequities were better paid than 
many black Carolinians—should finance the legal suit themselves.  He wanted the state 
NAACP to focus its resources on school facility equalization.  Nonetheless, Hinton 
eventually agreed to work towards both issues.  Since a local salary equalization 
campaign was already underway, and with the recent Alston victory, the salary 
equalization case took precedence over facility equalization.5 
On April 26, 1942 the Sumter NAACP met at Mt. Pisgah AME Church where Dr. B. 
T. Williams made a move to endorse teacher salary equalization.  Dr. E. C. Jones 
seconded the move, and the group unanimously passed it.  With the support of the local 
branch and state conference, McCray and McKaine were able to crusade, full force, for 
salary equalization.  From 1942 to 1947, the Sumter branch revisited the issue during 
almost every meeting.  They kept their movement relevant and energetic by bringing in 
several guest speakers with firsthand knowledge of the case and its importance, such as: 
NAACP Secretary and former teacher Modjeska Simkins; attorney Harold Boulware; 
North Carolina Mutual Insurance Company representative Tommie Gilliard; S. J. 
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McDonald, Sr.; Donald Sampson; and John McCray.  Moreover, these mass meetings 
enabled the Sumter branch to build up its membership, collect much needed membership 
dues, and take up donations which could be earmarked for the salary equalization fight.6  
Sumterites provided the initial groundwork for the teacher salary equalization suits, 
but Charleston was where the first case began.  On a Sunday morning in Charleston, 
South Carolina, Eugene C. Hunt was walking to Saint Mark’s Episcopal Church on the 
corner of Thomas Street and Warren Street when a car stopped in front of him.  The car 
carried James Hinton, president of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) South Carolina Conference of Branches; Mr. Robinson; and 
Harold Boulware, state NAACP attorney.  To anyone else, the meeting would have 
looked like a chance encounter between old friends.  And while the gentlemen had not 
accidentally bumped into each other on the street, the meeting was designed to look that 
way.   Hunt had been quite eager to serve as the plaintiff in a local teacher salary 
equalization lawsuit.  However, he received an A-1 designation from the military, 
heightening his risk of being drafted.  The plaintiff’s departure would have made the 
whole case fall apart.  So that morning, Hunt was giving the NAACP leaders directions to 
another schoolteacher’s home, Viola Louis Duvall—a woman he described as both “very 
brilliant” and “very pretty.”7   As Hunt was forced to step away from the case, Duvall 
would bravely take up the mantle as plaintiff. 
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The teacher equalization campaign that swept across the South was the “first 
systematic challenge to the southern caste system.”8 The campaign was momentous for 
the NAACP because it established an important precedent for taking public education 
cases before federal courts, and highlighted a strong legal challenge to prevailing notions 
of white supremacy. The NAACP’s legal strategy began largely with the work of Charles 
Hamilton Houston, the man Walter White handpicked to lead the NAACP’s legal 
division. In 1935 he showed a 30-minute documentary at the NAACP annual convention 
titled A Study on Education Inequalities in South Carolina. The film provided visual 
evidence that there were huge disparities in the funding between black and white 
schoolchildren. Houston believed that litigation would mobilize local communities and 
quickly cited unequal education as the chief issue in this expanding legal program. With 
Charles Houston at the helm, the NAACP entered the 1940s with a focus on using the 
courtroom to ensure African Americans’ constitution rights, and concentrated the great 
majority of those efforts on the South, where more than eighty percent of blacks lived.  
But instead of immediately beginning desegregation litigation, Houston purposely began 
with an equalization strategy that he believed would eventually make the courts more 
amenable to desegregation, and place a significant enough financial strain on school 
systems to make continued segregation unfeasible.9 
Houston’s legal strategy began with founding the Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund, Inc., a separate legal offshoot of the NAACP, which gave the fund’s lawyers more 
                                                            
8 R. Scott Baker, Paradoxes of Desegregation: African American Struggles for 
Educational Equity in Charleston, South Carolina, 1926-1972 (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2006), 44. 
9 John A. Kirk, “The NAACP Campaign for Teachers’ Salary Equalization: African 
American Women Educators and the Early Civil Rights Struggle,” The Journal of 
African American History 94, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 530; Sullivan, Lift Every Voice, 
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independence and led the NAACP to place an even greater emphasis on litigation. After 
Thurgood Marshall was appointed assistant special counsel in 1936, he went about 
acquiring black teachers’ support to finance the salary equalization lawsuits. These 
lawsuits were ideal for the NAACP’s legal strategy.  Unequal salaries elucidated the fact 
that “separate but equal” was not a reality. Racial discrimination was blatantly obvious 
because African American teachers were always paid less, even when their education was 
equal to or superior to that of white teachers.  Unlike other labor markets, blacks and 
whites were doing the exact same skilled labor.  If anything, black teachers’ labor was 
more challenging and difficult because they worked in inferior facilities and had 
significantly heavier teaching loads.10 
With the NAACP’s assistance, African American schoolteachers in every southern 
state sued local school boards for salary equalization.  The NAACP was committed to 
teacher salary equalization for a number of reasons.  It was only one part of a much larger 
anti-discrimination campaign that also included gaining entrance into white professional 
and graduate schools, and equalizing segregated public schools. In fact, with the 
NAACP’s assistance, African American schoolteachers in every southern state sued local 
school boards for salary equalization. Houston had his own reasons for focusing on salary 
equalization.  He believed the NAACP’s middle-class constituency would find it 
pleasing, that higher teachers’ income would increase the organization’s coffers, and that 
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teachers embodied a large, untapped pool of potential plaintiffs. Teachers may have 
found the salary equalization campaign appealing because it represented the possibility of 
a better salary without acquiring the personal financial burden of acquiring legal 
assistance.11 
 South Carolina’s  segregationists  were  equally  invested  in  maintaining  the  status  
quo. Teacher salary inequalities saved the state millions of dollars.  Although the state 
partially funded public schools, the allocation of those funds was left to the local school 
boards’ discretion. During the Duvall case, Charleston school superintendent A. B. Rhett 
admitted that teacher salary equalization would require additional funds for the school 
district. Although the school board of trustees allegedly had a plan to equalize salaries, 
Rhett was unsure where that extra money would come from. He mentioned that it would 
help if the state allocated more funds, and that the only other option was local taxation.12 
As the NAACP moved its teacher salary equalization campaign into the Palmetto State, 
this disconnect would prove to be a challenge to its legal strategy.  
Although the salary equalization campaign emerged in Sumter, the initial three 
plaintiffs were Charlestonians.   First was Malissa Theresa Smith, an ideal choice. She 
taught history at Burke Industrial High School, a well-known and respected institution.  
She was also well educated, having graduated from Charleston’s Avery Normal Institute 
in 1934, the city’s first accredited secondary school for blacks.  She continued her 
education at South Carolina State College, and had two years teaching experience when 
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James Hinton and J. Arthur Brown approached her. But, it was more likely Smith’s 
family connections and background that gave her the impetus she needed to step forward 
as a plaintiff.  Salary inequalities had persuaded her cousin, “Pearly” Simmons, to resign 
from a teaching position at Simonton. “Pearly” tried to prepare Smith for the inevitable 
consequences of her involvement, telling Smith that she would lose her position at Burke. 
Smith’s cousin, J. Andrew Simmons—a Charleston native, former principal of Simonton, 
and current principal of Columbia’s Booker T. Washington high school—was the one 
who finally convinced her to get involved with the case.13 
 Charleston would prove a particularly challenging city to wage the salary 
equalization campaign.  In demonstration of a complete lack of commitment to African 
American teachers, the city still had not developed a policy for paying pensions to retired 
black teachers. In March 1943 A.B. Rhett informed the Charleston City School Board of 
Commissioners that Hinton planned on addressing salary equalization. The board 
received Smith’s petition on behalf of herself and the other Burke teachers on June 24, 
1943.14 The petition requested that the school board:  
…immediately discontinue the policy, 
custome (sic) and usage of making any 
discrimination in the payment of salaries of 
teachers and principals because of their race 
and color.15  
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Initially, it looked as if the NAACP would be able to rely upon the PSTA’s unqualified 
support.  On April 9, 1943, executive secretary C. V. Bing announced during a House of 
Delegates meeting that $1,200 would be reserved for a Legal Defense Fund.  A long 
discussion of the issue followed because some the delegates had not been informed of the 
vote.16 When Rev. H. B. Butler’s motion that “the $1,200 be used with the words Defense 
Fund meaning fighting for equalization of salaries for teachers and transportation 
facilities and other facilities for Negro children to start this year” was almost 
unanimously passed it seemed to be an open and shut case.17 However, during a meeting 
later that day, twelve “very influential” delegates voiced their discomfort with a legal 
suit, and another drawn-out discussion followed.18 Instead of seeking a lawsuit, the 
organization sent a letter to the State Board of Education requesting that the state “close 
the gap between” black and white teachers’ salaries “with a 50 percent differential” and 
give at least two school buses to each high school and one school bus to each grammar 
school.19 If the Board met their requests, they would not seek court action.  Upon 
receiving an ambiguous response from the Board, PSTA members favoring a legal suit 
motioned that the funds be given to the NAACP to help with their efforts to equalize 
salaries.  Opposition to legal action was voiced again.  J. E. Blanton of Voorhees Institute 
in Denmark motioned that the previous motion be tabled indefinitely.  Blanton’s motion 
was seconded and, in a number reflecting the changing tides of the organization, passed 
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in a 39 to 31 vote.20  The PSTA still was not as militant as the NAACP, but its leadership 
was becoming more closely aligned with the civil rights organization. 
  Fortunately the NAACP’s commitment to the case remained steadfast.  Their 
attorneys, Thurgood Marshall and Harold Boulware, announced that if the school board 
denied the petition they were prepared to take the case to court. In fact, the attorneys said 
they had acquired the funds to take the case all the way to the Supreme Court if 
necessary.  Initially, the board’s legal advisor, H.L. Eckerman, informed them that 
racially based salary inequalities were unconstitutional.21 However, when the board met 
on August 6, they were also told that they could revise their pay scale based on whatever 
criteria they saw fit, as long as that criteria was not race or creed.  With this in mind the 
board passed a resolution stating that all teachers and principals would be classified.  
Salaries were to be based on this classification as well as “character, age, experience, 
preparation, teaching ability, and general fitness.”22 Essentially, the school board had 
simply found another way to pay African American teachers unequal salaries.  
Unfortunately for Smith, the resolution was a null factor.  On September 27, 1943, Smith 
called in sick. When the school board got wind of it, their legal advisor, H.L. Eckerman, 
informed them that they had legal grounds to fire her for failing to obtain permission for 
her absence. Additionally, she took the time off because she had just been married and 
used the time to honeymoon and the board still had a policy against hiring married 
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women. According to her contemporaries, the board’s true intent in firing her was that it 
provided a succinct way to dismiss the legal suit.23 
Yet, Smith’s case may have put Charleston’s segregationists on guard, for it 
confirmed that salary equalization was only one part of a much larger plan to acquire 
equal education rights for black Carolinians.  Marshall and Boulware revealed that they 
planned to engage the issues of equal access to graduate training, the transportation 
system, and unequal school terms.  Smith took a similar position in her petition when she 
aptly linked salary inequalities with the board’s refusal to provide Burke with sufficient 
funds, yet finding the funds to build a new gymnasium for the local white school and 
spend more on white children.24 
Another Burke High School teacher, Eugene C. Hunt, became the second 
potential plaintiff Brown and Hinton chose partly because he was a male teacher and 
therefore immune to the downfall of their previous potential plaintiff.25 Hunt remembered 
that he was also chosen because of his character and academic accomplishments: 
They contacted J. Arthur Brown, who was the president of 
the local NAACP chapter.  J. Arthur knew me and knew 
the type of person that I was, that I was qualified—
academically qualified—and also that I would not be afraid 
to bring suit and so he recommended me to that 
committee.26 
 
The NAACP was also considerably more secretive this time around.  Hunt flew from 
Charleston to Columbia to meet with Hinton and other NAACP officials at J. Andrew 
Simmons’ home.  During that meeting, they discovered a significant problem with Hunt’s 
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potential as a plaintiff.  The nation was in the midst of World War II.  Because of Hunt’s 
status as a teacher, he had already been deferred from military duty three times. This 
meant that he now had an 1-A designation for being drafted and they feared that if he was 
presented as plaintiff, local officials would find a way to ensure he was drafted before the 
case could be decided.27 
 Indeed, the war was having a negative effect on African American schools and the 
teaching community.  The PSTA suffered a decline in membership as many teachers 
enlisted in the military. Many teachers were leaving the teaching profession to pursue 
more lucrative positions in the war industries, creating even greater education disparities 
in areas already suffering from lower educational outcomes.28 
Still the SC NAACP continued in its efforts to find a suitable plaintiff.  They asked 
Hunt for a recommendation—someone who would be willing to stay the course.  The 
first person he thought of was a “brilliant young woman” named Viola Louise Duvall.29  
Duvall was a model candidate.  Like Smith and Hunt, she worked at Burke High School 
where she taught science. And as a Howard University graduate, she had the requisite 
academic background.30  Equally important to her education and work background was 
the fact that she “was young and single, and her parents were financially secure.”31 She 
was, therefore, in no danger of losing her job because of her marital status.  If she did 
lose her position, she had a family that could support her until she got back on her feet.   
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Duvall’s suit against the city school board and superintendent—Viola Louise Duvall, 
et al. v. J. F. Seignous—was filed with the federal district court on November 10, 1943. 
Like Smith’s petition, Duvall’s suit charged the school board with paying African 
American teachers less money solely on the basis of race, therefore denying her and the 
other teachers their fourteenth amendment right of equal protection under the law. The 
suit included an addendum outlining the salary inequalities.  White principals were being 
paid $2,500 to $3,000 a year while black principals were paid $1,100 to $1,450 a year.  
The salary differentials for teachers were equally stark with white teachers making $900 
to $1,340 compared to black teachers income of $600 to $750. Although in her third year 
at Burke Industrial, Duvall was making $645/year while white teachers with the same 
qualifications were making $1100/year. Furthermore, although African Americans were 
willing to acknowledge that the lack of access to professional/graduate school training 
sometimes resulted in fewer qualified teachers, salary was clearly not based solely on 
education and training.  Not all white teachers had high school degrees.  But a greater 
disparagement to black teachers was that white teachers with degrees from non-
accredited colleges and without any college degree had significantly higher incomes than 
black teachers with college degrees from accredited schools.32 
As Smith did with her petition, members of the black press successfully linked 
Duvall’s salary equalization suit to broader education equalization.  In an editorial 
column, Osceola McKaine noted that although African Americans constituted forty-three 
percent of South Carolina’s population, there were over 3,000 more white teachers; white 
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school property was valued at over $41,000,000 more than black schools; and while 
84,134 white children were taken to school on buses, only 551 black children were.  He 
then linked the lack of school transportation to the lower levels of high school 
graduation.33 
 Due to the amount of discretion Hinton and the other NAACP officials practiced 
with the Duvall case, the local authorities were caught off guard.  Hunt remembers: 
…when the suit hit the school board, they were entirely 
flabbergasted.  They were taken off their seat.  They were 
so sure that they had the colored teachers under that they 
were just shocked and there was very little resistance to that 
on the part of the board.  They saw the handwriting on the 
wall.  They had no way of fighting it.34 
 
The school board filed a reply to Duvall’s suit, stating that she could not bring a 
salary equalization suit since she signed a contract that would begin June 1, 1944.  The 
board could not raise or reduce salaries until that time, making the legal suit “premature 
and ill-advised.”35  The board further claimed that her school district could not raise 
additional funds until the next meeting of the General Assembly, and that it would take 
“some time to reclassify and grade the teachers along the lines proposed by the 
Resolution.”36 They even referenced the Smith petition, noting that the board had met in 
August and adopted a new method of deciding teachers’ salaries.  Duvall did not respond 
to the filing and the case proceeded. 
Her attorneys Thurgood Marshall and Harold Boulware had legitimate reasons to be 
concerned about the suit’s possibility of success. They would be arguing the case in front 
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of Judge J. Waties Waring, whose background made the attorneys wary. He came from a 
distinguished aristocratic Charleston family and had worked for U.S. Senator Ellison 
“Cotton Ed” Smith, a well-known white supremacist.  In fact, he largely owed his federal 
bench appointment to Smith, and many assumed that Waring embraced the South’s 
racially regressive social mores.37 
Waring heard the case in February 1944.  During Marshall’s direct examination of 
Dr. William H. Frampton, a Board of Trustees member, Frampton verified that as of that 
time, black teachers were being paid less than white teachers with the same 
qualifications.  When Marshall asked if, as a result of the Melissa Smith petition, there 
was supposed to be a new classification system for deciding teachers’ salaries, Dr. 
Frampton responded that it was “in the process of being put into effect.”38  When 
Marshall asked if he, as a board member, had any objection to black teachers being paid 
equal salaries, Frampton responded: 
The Supreme Court, as I understand, has made that quite 
clear that, regardless of what the individual’s own feelings 
in the matter might be, it is right, just and fair that there 
shall be no differentiation in payment of salaries for any 
race with the same qualifications; and it is my purpose to 
fulfill, as far as I can, that decision.39 
 
Such a response was hardly an endorsement, but it was a promise to at least follow the 
letter of the law.  Indeed, the Charleston school board passed a resolution to equalize 
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teacher salaries essentially because they saw the writing on the wall.  Their lawyer 
advised them that recent court decisions declared unequal pay on the basis of race 
unconstitutional.40 
Waring ruled in Duvall’s favor.  Extensively citing the Alston case, as well as noting 
similar teacher salary cases, Waring ruled that the law clearly entitled the plaintiffs to an 
equal salary. The Charleston school board agreed to equalize teachers’ salaries by 
September 1946.41 
Duvall was a significant victory for the South Carolina NAACP and African 
American teachers.  Yet, although a salary equalization suit in a U.S. District court 
should have meant statewide compliance to the law, it did not.  In April, just two months 
after Waring handed down his decision, Hinton announced that the state NAACP was 
preparing for another case in Columbia. Yet Waring’s decision may have, at least, 
placated the fears of some PSTA members.  In April 1944, the teachers’ group finally 
contributed $1,200 to the state NAACP to assist in the teacher salary equalization fight.42  
White reaction to the Duvall decision, and the broader 1940s black freedom struggle, 
was fraught with fear, anger, and ambivalence.  On March 15, 1944 the State Senate 
passed what was known as the Jeffries Bill, for Sen. Richard Manning Jeffries, which 
established a lengthy process for teachers who wanted to appeal their salary. First an 
aggrieved teacher had to appear before the county board of education. Teachers could 
only appear on their own behalf, meaning they could not petition on behalf of themselves 
and others as Smith and Duvall had.  If the teacher was unsatisfied with the board’s 
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decision s/he had thirty days to appeal to the State Board of Education.  Following this 
appeal, the State Board then had the right to reexamine and recertify all teachers in the 
aggrieved teacher’s school district. If the State Board also ruled against the teacher, an 
additional appeal could be filed with the Court of Common Pleas.  Only after these 
multiple appeals could the teacher file with the District Supreme Court.43  This process 
would not only put the appealer’s livelihood at risk, but the jobs of all teachers in the 
district. 
The Jeffries bill also determined that teacher’s salaries would be based “exclusively 
upon the merit of the individual teacher.”  Some of the qualifying merits were dubious 
and subjective, such as: “character,” “personality,” “refinement,” health,” “cultural 
background,” and “Any other things pertaining to the employment and its 
performance.”44  The bill was clearly “another legal subterfuge to postpone what the 
Legislatures conceived as the evil day of doing justice to the state’s Negro teachers.”45  
Others asserted that salary increases for black teachers would result in salary cuts for 
white teachers. One writer for the Columbia Record, the foremost white newspaper, 
insisted that the state would have to come up with an additional $3 million.46   
Possibly the most vitriol reaction was a resolution Union County Representative 
John D. Long introduced and the House of Representative passed.  The resolution—
referencing the “Yankee slave-traders,” “War between the States,” the North and South’s 
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need for “self-government,” and “agitators of the North”—sought to reaffirm Jim Crow 
segregation.47  
…we indignantly and vehemently denounce the intentions, 
utterances and actions of any person or persons and of all 
organizations seeking amalgamation of the White and 
Negro races by a co-mingling of the races upon any basis 
of equality, as being destructive of the identity and 
characteristics and integrity of both races, and as being Un-
American . . .48 
 
The resolution also expressed the legislative body’s commitment to white supremacy: 
…we re-affirm our belief in our allegiance to the 
established White Supremacy as now prevailing in the 
South and we solemnly pledge our lives and our sacred 
honor to maintaining it, whatever the cost, in War and in 
Peace.49 
 
For their part, moderate whites did not consider the resolution appropriate, noting that 
there were “very few” northern agitators and that mentioning the possibility only invited 
more attention from the North.50  As far as moderates were concerned, South Carolina 
was fortunate in avoiding the race riots that plagued other parts of the country; the 
resolution would not help keep the peace.51  The legislature would have better served its 
citizens by “keeping its mouth shut.”52 
Other white Carolinians may not have welcomed salary equalization with open arms, 
but assumed it was inevitable.  As the Columbia Record reported: 
There has been no criticism of Judge Waring’s decision in 
the “Teacher Pay Case” from any source.  That decision 
                                                            
47 “Journal of the House of Representatives of the 85th General Assembly of the State of 
South Carolina” (South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1944), 568–570. 
48 Journal of the House of Representatives of the 85th General Assembly, 569. 
49 Ibid., 570. 
50 “Exercise in Futility,” Columbia Record, March 1, 1944. 
51 “Without Thinking,” Columbia Record, March 2, 1944. 
52 “Exercise in Futility.” 
 
 65 
was a foregone conclusion as a matter of law in view of 
prior federal decision.  It should have been foreseen and 
anticipated as indeed some South Carolinians did foresee it 
and try to persuade the General Assembly to anticipate it.53 
 
For example, actress, feminist, and Charleston native Margaret Vale simultaneously 
lauded the merits of her Confederate veteran and former Ku Klux Klan member father 
while arguing that African Americans should receive equal pay for equal work.54  The 
Walterboro Press and Standard shrugged off assertions that the additional money needed 
to equalize salaries would be a burden to the state.  South Carolina could get the 
necessary funds from the federal government.  Lest its readers fear that receiving federal 
aid would lead to white and black children attending school together, the newspaper 
observed that the state already received federal aide to pay the salaries of agricultural and 
home economics teachers, and yet that had not led to “mixed race classes.”55 
Unsurprisingly, African Americans were upset by the Long resolution.  Nat 
Humphries, Executive Director of the Welfare Equity Association, wrote Long a letter 
which maintained that no “colored persons or Colored Organization, or white person or 
White Organization advocate amalgamation of the white and colored race[s].”56  He went 
on to point out how Representative Long’s amalgamation claim was hypocritical: 
I have particularly in mind, a T. Jones, a wea[l]thy citizen 
of your county, who was tried and acquitted of wife-
murder, and thereafter he lived with his colored mistress, 
borned [sic] him several children.  There was, and still is, 
many T. Jones’ in your state.”57 
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Despite the Jeffries Bill, the NAACP took the position that teachers should not be 
subjected to such a “long, drawn-out procedure to secure their rights” and that the 
legislature had no right to “close the doors of the federal courts to aggrieved parties.”58  In 
Columbia, Albert N. Thompson, a teacher at Booker Washington Heights Elementary 
School submitted his petition for equal salary to the Richland County School Board on 
June 7, 1944.  The petition asserted that the School Board and the City of Columbia had a 
policy of paying black teachers less money than white teachers, even when they had the 
same qualifications.  On behalf of all black teachers in the city, Thompson requested that 
the board discontinue this policy and asked that the board take action at its next meeting. 
The Board of School Commissioners denied that they had a policy of paying equally 
qualified black teachers less. When the petition went before the County Board of 
Education, they admitted that before February, 1941, there was a salary schedule that 
paid black teachers less.  But they also asserted that, in the summer of 1940, they had 
appointed a committee of school commissioners who advised the board to establish a 
salary schedule that did not consider race.59 
At this point Thurgood Marshall advised Hinton and Orangeburg attorney Shadrack 
Morgan to abandon the appeals process the Jeffries Bill outlined and to instead directly 
petition the federal district court.60  Like the petition submitted to the County Board Of 
Education, this one charged the school board and superintendent with maintaining 
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…the policy, custom and usage of paying Negro teachers 
and principals in the public schools of School District 1 of 
Richland County less salary than white teachers and 
principals.”61 
 
As with the Duvall case, the NAACP argued that unequal pay on the basis of race or 
color was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Additionally, black and white 
teachers had to meet the same certification requirements as all South Carolina teachers 
were required to obtain the same teaching certificate from the State Board of Education.62 
The complaint also noted that the teachers were being denied equal pay from public 
school funds.  So, not only were their fourteenth amendment rights violated with public 
funds that Thompson and the black teachers she represented paid in to. 
 The NAACP again went to the PSTA for support. On April 7, 1945, the state 
president James M. Hinton spoke to the organization’s House of Delegates, reiterating the 
NAACP’s commitment to ending salary inequalities.  Hinton suggested that the PSTA 
form a seven-member committee to work directly with the NAACP Defense Fund in 
order to coordinate future court battles.  The PSTA agreed and appointed representatives 
from six school districts and one college representative.  Isaac Bracy, of Sumter’s Stone 
Hill School, who moved that the PSTA immediately contribute $500 to the NAACP.  
Several members expressed wariness of the motion and someone else moved that instead 
the teachers should go back to their communities to request local teachers’ support.  
Fortunately, when Rev. C. H. Brown. of Benedict College, moved that they provide the 
                                                            
61 Complaint, Albert N. Thompson, et al., February 2, 1945. 
62 Ibid. 
 
 68 
NAACP with $400, that motion was carried and a decision was made to present the funds 
at the first joint committee meeting.63 
 On the same day that Hinton spoke with the PSTA committee, Thurgood Marshall 
filed a request for admission of fact.  In it, Marshall agreed with the school board’s 
assertion that prior to 1941 there was a salary schedule that paid lower salaries to black 
teachers, and that in 1941 the school district set up a new salary schedule with a 
minimum salary of $675 to all elementary and junior high teachers, and $720 for all high 
school teachers.  But Marshall also asserted that all black teachers were paid the 
minimum salary while all white teachers were paid more than the new minimum.64 
Therefore, although black teachers were, in fact, receiving a higher salary, the school 
district had not abandoned its policy of paying lower salaries to qualified black teachers.  
They had simply attempted to ameliorate the problem. 
 The defense responded by reiterating that they instituted a new minimum salary in 
1941. They also directly contradicted the plaintiff’s assertion by insisting that all teachers 
were earning more than the minimum salary and that the minimum salary for all teachers 
was $900 a year. But according to the documents they submitted, most white teachers 
were making over $1000 a year, while no black teachers received more than $882 a year. 
The school board essentially argued that black teachers were to blame for their lower 
salaries.  They asserted that ninety-three percent of white teachers/principal had 
voluntarily participated in the new certification process while only fifty-six percent of 
black teachers/principals had.65 
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 Unsurprisingly, Thurgood Marshall strongly objected to the defendants’ claims.  
He confirmed that Thompson filed a petition with the County Board of Education, but 
maintained that this should have no impact on the court’s jurisdiction in this case. 
Asserting that this case was about black teachers’ fourteenth amendment rights, Marshall 
argued that res judicata was not applicable because even though the General Assembly 
adopted a method for teachers to contest their salaries, that method was done through the 
county school board rather than a recognized court of law.  Marshall further asserted that 
a state statute could not limit a person’s ability to appeal to a federal court.  Even if a 
citizen appealed to a system established through state statute, that did no mean they had 
to accept that body’s decision. So although Thompson submitted a petition to the County 
Board of Education, that did not mean he relinquished his right to appeal to a federal 
court.  The NAACP also addressed the defense’s assertion that a new certification system 
would alleviate unequal teacher salaries.  He argued that a future certification plan had 
nothing to do with the Thompson case. This case was about whether or not black teachers 
were receiving equal pay at the present time.66   
For his part, Judge Waring believed that the court clearly had jurisdiction in this case.  
He referred to the Duvall case (which he had also decided) as proof of the court’s 
jurisdiction.67  The General Assembly was well within its rights to set up “system of 
hearing and appeals” for the state’s citizens, and said citizens had every right to pursue 
such a method.  But the General Assembly did not have the right to impede on the federal 
court’s constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction.68  
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On May 26, 1945 Judge Waring ruled in Thompson’s favor.  Waring believed that as 
of 1941, the school district made an effort to alleviate unequal pay, but that there was still 
a “startling disparity” between what black and white teachers made, even when they had 
the same amount of experience.69 Waring asked the defendants about the pay disparities 
and was told that other qualifications were the cause.  The defense also asserted that 
black teachers’ lower pay was a matter of supply and demand; there was a lesser need for 
black teachers so they were willing to work for less.  But the judge found these answers 
unsatisfactory.  He believed that the evidence demonstrated lower salary was due to race, 
and that there actually seemed to be a greater number of experienced white teachers than 
black teachers. The teacher salary equalization plan the General Assembly enacted in 
1945 did, according to Waring, lessen pay disparity.  But it only applied to the part of 
teachers’ salaries that came from state funds, and since it was part of the annual 
appropriations statute, the plan was only a temporary measure.70   
Waring ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, concluding that Thompson and the teachers he 
represented were entitled to a salary plan that was not influenced by their race. The Board 
had to begin a new classification system, effective spring of 1946. But Waring 
underscored that his order was related only to pay discrimination on the basis of race or 
color.71  The defense was still allowed to use their judgment “respective to the amounts to 
be paid to individual teachers based on their individual qualifications, capacities, and 
abilities.”72 
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Waring’s opinion in this case demonstrates that he already had a far broader 
understanding of contemporary racial disparities than the teacher salary equalization 
cases. In the Thompson opinion, Waring endorsed a central proposition of the NAACP 
that linked educational and political opportunities to citizenship rights.  Waring remarks: 
The idea that emancipation of a race long enslaved and 
without political rights, without political or any other kind 
of education, and without training to assume citizenship, 
would bring about a satisfactory situation over night could 
be held by only a few partisan, biased, persons motivated 
either by idealistic abstraction or by a spirit of political 
revenge and self-seeking aggrandizement.73 
 
Over the next decade, Waring’s perspective would play a key role in black South 
Carolinians’ efforts to improve their schools and to expand their civil rights agenda. 
Some of the NAACP’s most meaningful 1940s legal victories were the teacher 
salary equalization cases. As a direct result of the NAACP’s equalization campaign, 
salary inequalities across the South decreased by the late 1940s. In 1931-2 black teachers 
made about fifty percent of what white teachers made.  In 1935-6 they made fifty percent.  
And by 1945-6 they were making sixty-five percent.74  As Septima Clark remembered:  
And our efforts paid off . . . in actual cash.  The courts 
sided with us.  When I went to Columbia, my salary was 
$65 a month.  When I left I was getting almost $400 a 
month . . . I cannot rightfully argue that all the raise came 
from the action of the court.  But a greater part did.  And 
the decision of the court followed our institution of legal 
action.  As a matter of fact, my salary increase was 
amazing.75 
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But these legal victories were often hollow as state school boards found seemingly 
objective methods for determining salaries. In 1941 the South Carolina legislature—in 
response to the Alston case—appointed a committee to look at how teachers were 
certified and how their compensation was determined.  The committee recommended that 
the state consider using the National Teacher Examination (NTE) to develop a four-tier 
certification system.  The highest twenty-five percent of test-takers were to receive an A 
certificate, the middle fifty percent received a B certificate, the next fifteen percent 
received a C certificate, and the remaining ten percent received a D certificate. Southern 
officials began writing Ben D. Wood, the NTE creator, after the Alston and Mills rulings 
in an effort to find another way to determine teachers’ salaries. Wood asserted that the 
tests were objective because machines scored it.76  Still Wood, who initially expressed 
hesitancy with getting “mixed up in the racial problem,” also predicted that black 
teachers would score lower than white teachers.77  The South Carolina State Board of 
Education did a two-year study, which supported Wood’s prediction. In a 1944 four 
volume report conducted to comply with the committee’s recommendation, pretests 
revealed that ninety percent of the white teachers received an A or B certificate, and ten 
percent would receive a C or D certificate.  Conversely, only twenty-seven percent of the 
state’s black teachers would receive an A or B certificate while seventy-three percent 
would get a C or D certificate. Still, as it faced the possibility of another salary 
equalization suit, the state embraced the NTE and Wood’s salary plan. Beginning in 
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1945, all South Carolina teachers were required to take the exam.78  Like the Charleston 
Board of School Commissioners, the State School Board had found a legal means for 
sustaining unequal salaries.  As Sen. Hughs of Oconee admitted: 
What is the real reason for the certification program[?] . . . 
It is not going to improve our schools nor the qualification 
of our teachers.  The real reason for this program, is to set 
up, by a legalized method, a standard by which it is hoped 
that a vast majority of the white teachers can qualify for 
higher salaries, and the Negro cannot, thus legalizing a 
difference in their salaries.79 
Black Carolinians would have agreed with this assertion.  William Henry Grayson, 
principal of Burke Industrial High School, advised his teachers to continue their 
education beyond a bachelor’s degree because not only would it better prepare them for 
the classroom, but it would better position them to do well on the NTE. For Principal 
Grayson, this was part of a larger objective to hire a cadre of college-educated black 
teachers who could build up a more academic rather than vocational curriculum to better 
prepare their students for success.80 Eugene Hunt recollected that the exam was “another 
device, which was intended to discriminate against black teachers.”  For, officials had 
been “assured that by using this as a standard . . . they could still pay black teachers less 
money.”81  Another African American teacher, Rev. Joseph A. DeLaine, who would 
become the foremost leader in the Briggs v. Elliott desegregation case, called the new 
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certification program an “effort to legally dodge an equal salary decision by the Federal 
Court.”82 
 South Carolina’s use of the NTE not only facilitated salary inequalities between 
white and black teachers, but it also aided economic disparities within the black 
community.  Black teachers, like Septima Clark, who were able to attend private high 
schools and universities often scored higher than both black and white teachers. In fact, 
some white officials, such as Columbia school superintendent A. C. Flora, were hesitant 
to support using the examination out of concern that it could prove that black teachers 
were actually better trained than some white teachers.  However, the majority of black 
teachers, who were products of an unequal education system, made lower scores and 
therefore had lower salaries. Overall, the salaries of black teachers remained well below 
whites.  Sadly, the gap between the highest and lowest paid black teachers made also 
widened.  People like Duvall made $45 more than her lowest paid black colleague in 
1943.  But by 1948 she made $2,000 more.  Furthermore, as these already advantaged 
teachers began earning more, they were given even more opportunities for advancement.  
They, unlike their lower paid colleagues, could now afford to pay for continued 
educational opportunities in graduate school.  These additional economic and educational 
achievements helped legitimize the state’s use of standardized testing since white 
officials could now point to them as examples of significant achievement among African 
Americans.83 Therefore, while race remained the defining factor in teacher salaries, post-
NTE remuneration was also bound to one’s socioeconomic status.  
                                                            
82 Report on Education, October 16, 1952, Rev. Joseph A. DeLaine Papers, 1918-2000.  
83 Paradoxes of Desegregation, 45, 60. 
 
 75 
 Even Judge Waring, who handed down each of the equalization decisions and saw 
the new certification program as “a perfectly fair scheme of adjusting the whole [salary] 
thing,” conceded that the new certification program was problematic: 
I realized that it wasn’t going to [be] very satisfactory to 
anybody, because some of the school teachers were going 
to have a bad time under it, because they were so 
inadequately prepared.  And it happened.  They had trouble 
from it.  They were so inadequately prepared, many of 
them, that necessarily there were going to be a lot of 
failures.  But those are casualties that come about from bad 
to good—there are always a lot of casualties.  You have it 
in housing.  You have it in education.  You have in 
practically everything that comes about.  Whenever you put 
in another system, you’re going to have certain people that 
fall by the wayside.84 
 
The PSTA had these very concerns regarding the new certification system.  The 
organization pointed out that under Jim Crow segregation, the state had given them an 
unequal education.  While white teachers had numerous graduate school options, black 
teachers’ options were limited to South Carolina State College.  For the most part, they 
had to leave the state to pursue a graduate degree.  Therefore, while graduate training was 
an A or B certificate requirement, the state provided no in-state method for black teachers 
to meet that requirement.85  
Additionally, the lawsuits associated with these legal cases were most often in 
urban areas, leaving black teachers in rural areas still largely subject to significant 
inequalities. Indeed, according to a 1947-1948 State Superintendent report, white 
elementary school teachers, on average, made $601 more than black teachers.  This was 
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partly due to higher NTE scores.  But the difference was also attributed to unequal fund 
distribution on the district level. The school system was comprised of a series of largely 
autonomous school districts controlled by all-white school boards responsible for 
determining salaries.86 
African Americans pointed out various other subtle methods of preventing salary 
equalization. Some school officials were insisting the black school administrators hire 
teachers with less experience and qualifications—who could, therefore, legitimately be 
paid less than the teachers they replaced.  There was also a practice of hiring black 
teachers as substitutes rather than contract teachers.  These teachers were left in 
“substitute” status for years even though they had the appropriate qualifications for 
contracted employment.  Despite this unfair treatment, these teachers were often women 
who were married and settled, and therefore unable to move to another school district 
with better career opportunities.87  Consequently, not only did African American teachers 
continue to face discrimination, but women teachers were more negatively affected than 
male teachers.  And, in light of African American men’s continued exclusion from 
gainful employment, the limited or outright loss of women’s income could have a truly 
detrimental effect on a family.  
African American teachers’ larger teaching load magnified continuing salary 
inequalities.  As McCray’s Lighthouse and Informer reported, “[t]he Negro teacher, in 
                                                            
86 The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950, 103; n.d., 
Papers of the NAACP, Part 3, Series C, Reel 17; I. A Newby, Black Carolinians: A 
History of Blacks in South Carolina from 1895 to 1968, 1st ed., South Carolina 
Tricentennial Commission, no. 6 (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina 
Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1973), 304. 
87  "Your NAACP and You: A Challenge,” February 24, 1949, Modjeska Monteith 
Simkins Papers, South Caroliniana, University of South Carolina. 
 
 77 
many instances, does twice the work for half the pay of the white teacher.”88  That same 
State Superintendent report noted that there were 9,272 white teachers for 249,897 white 
students.  On the other hand, there were only 6,222 black teachers for 207,058 students.    
The average white elementary school teacher had approximately twenty-nine students, 
and the average high school teacher had twenty-three students.   This stood in stark 
contrast to the average black elementary school teacher’s thirty-four students, and the 
high school teacher’s twenty-nine.89 
These continuing differentials may have contributed to the NTE scandal. A large 
group was caught cheating on the exam.  Somehow an individual obtained part of the 
exam and distributed an answer key.  Unluckily, s/he was only able to obtain part of the 
test, and made several mistakes on the answer key.  Most of the cheaters were caught 
because they scored high on the same portions of the exam and all made the same errors.  
Judge Waring suspected the possibility of “a certain amount of entrapment among these 
poor devils.”  But he also concluded that “[i]n the long run it wasn’t a bad thing, because 
it got rid of a lot of inadequate teachers and crooked teachers.”90 
 Regardless of the scandal and black teachers’ legitimate concerns that a lack of 
educational opportunities would result in continued salary inequalities, there is significant 
evidence that they were willing to seek further training.  In 1930, 15.6% of black teachers 
in the thirteen southern states had a bachelor’s degree, but by 1940 that number had 
increased to 35.1%.  Furthermore, in rural areas where teachers often taught in one-room 
schoolhouses, the number of teachers with more than six years of training after 
elementary school more than doubled between 1930 and 1935.  They sought further 
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training because they linked their qualifications not only to their salary potential but also 
to their work for racial uplift which placed education at its core.91 
Still, despite their evident willingness to pursue further education, many teachers 
were opposed to or fearful of the NAACP’s litigation method.92  They believed the best 
method was to be “patient and reasonable and try to get the whites, the School board, the 
state to change [their salary] voluntarily.”93  The issue caused a rift in the PSTA. There 
was a small, but more activist, faction who sided with McCray and McKaine.  This 
faction had grown weary of the state’s education officials.  Their position was clear—the 
only way to rectify the issue was through a court battle, which meant providing support to 
the NAACP.  The opposing group saw waging a court battle as using force.  They argued 
that the NAACP was trying to control the PSTA.94  
Such uncertainty and apathy garnered criticism and outright anger from activists and 
other teachers.  Indeed, as one historian has noted, the salary equalization campaign 
presented “perhaps the 1940’s greatest clash between conservative and militant black 
leaders in South Carolina.”95  Eugene Hunt believed that a more cautious method never 
would have worked.96  Modjeska Simkins, then NAACP secretary and a former teacher, 
expressed the same sentiments in a newspaper editorial that strongly criticized the 
PSTA’S leadership and their “patience” argument: 
Resolve NOW that you will acquit yourselves as American 
citizens and not as sniveling, crawling nonentities that the 
petition of your Executive Committee would intimate that 
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you are. . . Believe me, that BEGGING will not improve 
your economic condition, or any other condition for that 
matter.97 
 
Simkins also sent out a letter expressing frustration with the PSTA and teachers’ 
lackadaisical and sometimes unfavorable attitude towards seeking salary equalization 
through the courts: 
The suit WILL BE BROUGHT.  Plans which have been 
under way for months were not started by the Palmetto 
State Teachers Association and the PALMETTO STATE 
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION cannot stop them. This letter 
is being sent, therefore, with the urgent request that you 
give all the money you possibly can to help finance the 
case. . . Now, I shall make a suggestion which should be a 
great insult to you: If for any reason you fear publicity or 
intimidation because of your contribution, you may either 
send a check or a cash donation directly to me or you may 
leave your contribution at the Victory Savings Bank in a 
sealed envelope marked “FOR TEACHERS FUND.”98 
 
John McCray expressed similar outrage: 
More and more (though it is a sinister feeling) I am 
reaching the conclusion that Negro teachers, as spineless 
and unworthy as those of Columbia have proven 
themselves, should be left to slave and starve and receive 
the wages of a serf.99 
 
 The belief that teachers were among the NAACP’s primary beneficiaries 
engendered these hostile feelings.  As Simkins later wrote in 1949: 
Teachers, in particular, must realize that court action, if it 
must come, is costly.  Ethically, teachers should contribute 
far more to the South Carolina Teachers Defense Fund of 
the NAACP because they have been the real benefactors, so 
far.  The years of indication and compromise are over in 
this fight.  Men and women of noble character . . . must be 
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willing to take the unequivocal stand in these matters, “and 
having done all, to STAND.”100 
 
These views of teachers reflect those of national leaders like Thurgood Marshall, and 
later by the militant activists of the 1960s such as Stokley Carmichael.101  Yet, there are 
many teachers’ actions that challenge the uncooperative-apathetic-teacher narrative.   
In fact, some teachers inspired student activism.102  Under school principal, William 
Grayson’s, leadership, Burke High School teachers like Duvall, Hunt, and Smith took 
advantage of changing school policies in order to “strengthen the curriculum and create 
new progressive educational programs.”103  As Duvall recalled, “We knew what the 
requirements for college were.  We wanted to make sure that our young people could 
meet them.”104 These new efforts—combined with an increasing number of college-
educated teachers who used the school as a safe space to teach black race 
consciousness—taught students citizenship and dissatisfaction with white supremacy.  
Within the walls of the black school, teachers found a way to ingrain citizenhip, 
democracy, and racial uplift in their pedagogies.105 And when Smith decided to stand up 
for herself and the other teachers, she felt that she was also taking a stand for her 
students.  
While I teach my pupils to be brave and fight for 
democracy I do not feel teaching by concept alone is 
sufficient.  I must set the example so that they might keep 
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alive and have more love for the democracy some day they 
must keep alive. . . Rousseau said “He who would be free 
must strike the first blow.”  I believe as ardently in that 
doctrine as I do in the concepts of that democracy and God 
himself.106 
 
In short, Smith believed that directly challenging discrimination would allow her to teach 
her Problems of Democracy students citizenship, in both word and deed.107   
Further evidence of South Carolina’s black teachers’ eagerness to ensure their 
students’ awareness of current events is found in their communication with 
newspaperman John McCray.  Dillon, South Carolina teacher Herbert Crawford wrote 
McCray requesting twenty-five copies of the Lighthouse and Informer because he wanted 
his students to be “acquainted with the activities of their state and the service and duty of 
the N.A.A.C.P.”108 Miss Alma Metcalfe, a teacher at Mather Academy in Camden, South 
Carolina, wrote to ask for materials to help her teach about civil rights in her Social 
Problems class.109 
However, the high risk of repercussions and ostracism certainly made teachers’ 
caution understandable.  Fighting for equal pay, and other civil rights activities, was a 
significant risk for African American teachers.  Their jobs were not guaranteed, and they 
were largely at superintendents and/or white school board members’ mercy.  
Furthermore, black teachers’ associations which supported these equal pay campaigns 
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were risking their well-cultivated relationships with white officials.110  Hence, an African 
American teacher’s willingness to challenge a white school board, and to do so in court, 
“required considerable courage, exposed them to recriminations, and, because the cases 
could be very lengthy, required great perseverance.”111 
 John McCray remembered Duvall assembling a small group in Columbia about 
three weeks before her court case began.  She told them she was “getting depressed and 
feeling the pressure of being cut-off by her fellow teachers.”112  Duvall said that if she did 
not have the support of her family, the NAACP, and the Lighthouse and Informer, she 
would not have been able to endure so much stress. Malissa Smith’s first cousin, J. 
Andrew Simmons chose to resign his position as Booker T. Washington High School’s 
principal rather than face the possibility of dismissal for his role in the salary equalization 
campaign.  Simmons moved to New York where he continued a life of public service by 
working for the department of welfare and founding a home for children.  He also 
maintained his commitment to education when he served on a U.S. task force to rebuild 
educational facilities in the Pacific area following World War II, and becoming the first 
African American elected to his district school board.113  Smith and Simmons’ stories 
elucidate why becoming a plaintiff and/or assisting in lawsuits was considered a huge 
risk.  Equally important to acknowledge is the fact that Smith and Simmons had 
resources many other African Americans did not have.  Smith came from a well-
established family who could afford to give her financial assistance.  She also had a four 
                                                            
110 A Class of Their Own, 311. 
111  “The NAACP Campaign for Teachers’ Salary Equalization,” 534. 
112  “Leading the Civil Rights Vanguard in South Carolina,” 473. 
113 Ibid.; Drago, Initiative, Paternalism & Race Relations, 242. Simmons did not return to 
South Carolina until his death, when his body was returned to Charleston. 
 
 83 
year degree which better positioned her to seek other career opportunities.  Likewise, 
Simmons was already a school principal.  He likely knew that, if necessary, a move could 
facilitate viable career options.  Unlike the married women mentioned earlier, his position 
as an educated man meant that although he faced racial discrimination, he had more ways 
to circumvent that discrimination than women or uneducated men. 
The teacher salary equalization campaign represents the shifting tides of civil 
rights activism.  These suits helped the NAACP’s southern membership grow. They 
garnered greater interest than the higher education cases. They were sometimes the first 
experience African Americans had in formal protests.114  They provided an avenue for 
civil rights activists’ move towards a “collective and forceful protest movement.”115  
Indeed, those who participated in the campaign, found it transformative and defining.  As 
Septima Clark remembered: 
My participation in this fight to force equalization of white 
and Negro teachers’ salaries, on the basis of equal 
certification, of course, was what might be described by 
some, no doubt, as my first “radical” job.  I would call it 
my first effort in a social action challenging the status quo, 
the first time I had worked against people directing a 
system for which I was working.116 
Indeed, for Modjeska Simkins the equalization campaign served as a catalyst for her 
“personal radicalization”—a move from racial uplift to protest politics.117  Furthermore, 
many of the individuals who helped realize teacher salary equalization—Boulware, 
Clark, McCray, McKaine, Simkins, etc.—would continue to serve as the seminal figures 
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in the Palmetto State’s civil rights movement.  Therefore, as this campaign transformed 
activists, it also transformed the whole movement. The critiques individuals like McCray 
and Simkins expressed against South Carolina’s black teachers illustrated this shift.118 
 The salary equalization cases also signified a transition in white segregationists’ 
methods.  On the one hand, the cases proved that it was possible to take on white 
authority and win.  On the other hand, Smith’s firing and the era’s racial violence also 
proved that taking on white officials could come with significant repercussions. South 
Carolina’s segregationists made a concerted effort to get the NAACP’s membership 
roster.  More specifically, white officials wanted to know which teachers were NAACP 
members.  This was especially obvious in rural areas.119  In addition, in 1948, three years 
after the NTE became a requirement, passing the law exam became a requirement for 
practicing the law in South Carolina.  It was clear that this was done to prevent African 
Americans from practicing law since the legislature who introduced the bill said that it 
would “bar Negroes and some undesirable whites.”120  The new law was reminiscent of 
the NTE. These issues served as a precursor of what was to come.  Efforts to track 
NAACP membership, with a specific focus on black teachers, would become a hallmark 
of the 1950s white massive resistance movement; and in South Carolina, it was rural 
school districts that came to the forefront of the fight for school equalization.  
Additionally, the NTE gave segregationists some valuable insight.  For, they now knew 
that it was possible to maintain white supremacy through seemingly objective processes.   
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 The salary equalization cases also indicated and helped strengthen black teachers’ 
long-term alliance with the NAACP and emphasized the fact that their goals could be 
aligned.  The salary equalization campaign helped legitimize the NAACP’s work in 
South Carolina.121  Therefore, the campaign benefitted both parties. 
The PSTA’s vocal support of the 1947 John H. Wrighten case to integrate the 
University of South Carolina’s law school exemplified this teacher-NAACP alliance.122  
And while the PSTA—especially the older, less militant faction—was hesitant to place 
its full support behind the equalization lawsuits, the organization was far less cautious in 
supporting improved education for black schoolchildren.  In fact, by the close of 1947, 
the PSTA seemed to have completely altered its public position on challenging 
educational inequality.  As one article noted: 
As one of the oldest organizations of its kind, and having a 
membership of approximately 6,000, the association 
[PSTA] has thrown its full strength behind the S. C. 
Conference of the NAACP in its fight for first-class 
educational opportunities for all children in South Carolina.  
The organization has made liberal contributions towards 
financing legal fights lead by the NAACP. . . From now on, 
for the PSTA in its avowed fight for all the children of 
South Carolina, it is “Full Speed Ahead!”  Close alongside 
is the strong right arm of the NAACP.  Now the two are 
inseparable.  They can become invincible.123 
 
All the difficulties to garner the PSTA’s support, and the necessary ousting of certain 
PSTA members and leadership enabled a PSTA-NAACP partnership by transforming the 
teachers’ association into what was, by contemporary standards, a much more radical 
organization.  Indeed, when the efforts of McCray, McKaine, and Simkins to oust what 
they considered a much too conservative PSTA leadership were combined with World 
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War II, the draft, and the ability to leave the teaching profession for better paying war 
industries jobs, a more militant and literally new PSTA was possible. Contemporaries 
understood that the NAACP/PSTA collaboration was not an organic transformation, but 
one wrought in “planning, scheming, and financial outlay.”124 
 This new PSTA’s goals foretold the coming civil rights fight in South Carolina 
and throughout the nation.  Although it had not initially confronted the teacher salary 
equalization cases head-on, the organization was making definite changes in the mid-
1940s.  On April 7, 1945, it petitioned the governor, superintendent of education, and 
speaker of the House regarding specific issues geared towards improving education for 
black children:  
1. Equal transportation facilities for all high school pupils.  
2. Full enforcement of the Compulsory School Law.  3. The 
same or equal opportunity for higher education on the 
undergraduate and graduate levels. 4. Qualified Negro 
representation in the state Department of Education. 5. A 
request made to all members of the United States Senate 
and the House from South Carolina petitioning them to 
support federal aid to education.125 
 
As the 1940s came to a close, the national and local civil rights movements were 
undergoing significant changes in style and objectives.  South Carolina’s African 
American teachers had to face the increasingly difficult segregation versus 
desegregation/integration debate. But two things were becoming increasingly clear. On 
one hand, the state’s white officials would never guarantee equal education for blacks. 
On the other hand, the NAACP’s national office was moving away from equalization and 
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towards integration.126  Indeed, as of the 1947-1948 school year, the average value for 
white school buildings, land, and equipment was still five times blacks’—$221 compared 
to $45.  State level NAACP officials began to see segregation and discrimination as 
inextricably linked.  As Modjeska Simkins noted, “We are concerned about the denial of 
civil rights, and the indignities experienced because of segregation.”127  Yet, the South 
Carolina NAACP was aware that attacking segregation would meet with resistance from 
local whites, and necessitate what James Hinton referred to as “supersalesmanship” to 
win over many black Carolinians’ support.128  The state’s black teachers would play a 
vital yet conflicted role in the ensuing struggle.  For, although they eagerly supported 
school equalization, they were often hesitant to support desegregation due to the possible 
loss of their position and their autonomy, and the belief that it would compromise the 
need for black schools.   
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CHAPTER 3: “A VERY BACKWARD COUNTY:” CLARENDON COUNTY AND 
THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL SCHOOLS 
 
 
The same year Judge Waring’s decision on the Thompson case became effective 
(1946) a man named Joseph A. De Laine received his second bachelor’s degree in 
divinity from Allen University.  His time at Allen would later prove to be essential to his 
activism because it was at Allen that De Laine became inspired by the idea that black 
churches had to provide more than spiritual guidance to their members.  A second degree 
was also quite fortuitous since the state’s new certification system created a direct link 
between education and earning potential.  However his wife, Mattie De Laine had not 
finished her degree.  She wanted to attend college but her parents could not afford to send 
her.  Yet her father’s friendly relationship with a Fairfield County school district trustee 
enabled her to get a $42 dollars a month teaching job.  Her salary was higher than most of 
the county’s black teachers, but it was still a small amount.1   As a result she and many 
others “flocked to colleges, taking both evening and summer courses to improve their 
credentials.”2  Mrs. De Laine furthered her education in Columbia at the combined 
Benedict College/Allen University Summer School. Rev. De Laine joined his wife and 
took a Race and Culture course where he heard a powerful message from NAACP state 
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president James Hinton. How he reacted to this message signaled an important shift in De 
Laine—one from civically minded community leader to civil rights activist.3   
But De Laine’s radicalization was already taking place, and it was directly 
connected to his work in Clarendon County where he was the elementary school principal 
in the little town of Silver, and pastor in the AME church’s Pine Grove/Society Hill 
circuit. Rev. De Laine held a place of prominence in the community because of his 
teaching and preaching.  Indeed, these were “the only professions that a black youth 
could aspire to”—the “only sources for educated leadership, or leadership of any kind.”4  
So teaching and preaching became a pattern that defined his career in South Carolina. His 
commitment to both informed his leadership and made him a person of authority on 
matters of both religion and education.  The active role he played in both the Palmetto 
State Teachers Association and the NAACP placed De Laine in a juxtaposition that 
seemed to foretell the vital role he would play in South Carolina’s civil rights movement. 
He did not separate his work of saving souls from tangibly bettering black folks’ lives. 5  
As he preached in a 1968 sermon, “race relations, poverty, and war” were not only 
secular matters, but effected “the souls of men and directly refer to the Christian Faith.”6  
It was likely his role in the black church that most informed his leadership because 
churches were regarded as “places of leadership development and morale building.”7  
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Religion was a central part of everyday life.8  And as the Clarendon County movement 
would prove, the black church was “a bedrock of NAACP organizing efforts.”9 
Clarendon County was one of the poorest in South Carolina.  Over two-thirds of 
the county’s approximately 31,500 residents were African American.  Most of these men 
and women were engaged in agricultural labor.  It seemed that little had changed for them 
since emancipation.  Most worked in agriculture, growing and harvesting the same crops 
as their enslaved ancestors, on land owned by slave owners’ decedents. For black 
children, their families’ dependence on white landowners and agriculture’s demands 
meant that farm work came first—even before school.10  Billie Fleming, who would 
become one of the county’s most prominent activists, remembered economic dependence 
and a life in servitude: 
We had no rights whatsoever that whites were bound to 
respect.  We suffered and we were held in bondage. . . we 
actually had tenant farmers living on farms owned by 
whites that had no freedom whatsoever.  These people were 
held in servitude and they were held in bondage. Many of 
these people were not free to move from these farms.  
Many of these people were jailed because they made 
attempts to question the accountability of these farmers to 
them when they sold the crops.  Life for blacks in 
Clarendon County in that era was deplorable and I think 
about as bad as they were anywhere in this country. 11   
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There were a few black landowners.  Their lives, though comparatively better 
than farm laborers, were far from easy.  Their work was backbreaking, and their incomes 
were low.  They were self-sufficient, not wealthy. Most black people who did not labor in 
the fields did other menial work such as loading trucks, sawing wood, cooking, cleaning, 
or caring for children.  They were not prepared to do anything better because, for most of 
them, their educational opportunities ended before seventh grade.  Black children could 
not even get to school because the county refused to provide them with bus 
transportation. 12  As Judge Waring remembered, the county’s lack of economic 
opportunities went hand-in-hand with its oppressive race relations: 
It’s a poor county; it’s a very backward county. . . One of the most 
backwards counties of the state.  It’s ruled by a small white minority very 
limited in their viewpoint and education, and a large population of 
Negroes, most of whom are dreadfully ignorant and poor, with very little 
opportunities.13 
 
As many of Clarendon County’s African Americans would soon learn, insisting on their 
constitutional rights as a way to move their children out of ignorance and poverty put 
them at the mercy of a small but powerful white minority who controlled jobs and their 
children’s education. 
 Yet race relations in this rural area were headed toward change.  During World 
War II concerned citizens became more civically engaged.  Rev. De Laine became 
increasingly involved in civil rights in this era—issuing food and gas ration stamps.  But 
it was the returning African American veterans’ growing militancy that truly helped 
radicalize De Laine.  Clarendon’s returning black veterans found that local school 
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officials were making it difficult for them to take advantage of the GI Bill’s education 
benefits.  Two local black veterans wanted the school district to offer GI agricultural 
classes.  School officials claimed that they could not find a teacher.  So the veterans 
found a qualified candidate.  When officials continued to drag their feet, the veterans 
approached Rev. De Laine who drafted a petition that they sent to the State Department 
of Education. The petition was successful.  They soon had so many students that they had 
to hire more teachers.14 
De Laine was pleased to help the veterans and learned valuable lessons.  In 
hindsight it seems unsurprising that the two veterans who lead the fight for those GI 
classes were Jesse and Ferdinand Pearson—the very same family who would initiate the 
school bus petition that culminated into a school desegregation movement.15  Just as 
important for this study is the fact that De Laine would have walked away from this 
encounter knowing the value of organizing, a petition’s effectiveness, and who to 
approach if he needed a petitioner. 
Rev. J. A. De Laine and Mrs. Mattie De Laine found themselves at the center of 
an all-encompassing fight for equal rights.  But it was a fight that Rev. De Laine’s role as 
a minister—particularly in the AME church which had historically linked leadership and 
social activism—and their experiences as educators in segregated schools made them 
well prepared.16  
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De Laines’ activism was also informed by more practical matters—namely he 
was not completely economically dependent on whites.  Rev. De Laine learned the value 
of economic independence while attending Allen University in Columbia where he 
worked his way through school with a series of jobs in and out of state. Now, Rev. De 
Laine worked for the AME Church.  He also bought a small farm that provided his family 
with another source of income.17  Mrs. De Laine was likely an ideal spouse to support his 
efforts to be economically autonomous.  Her childhood gave her an appreciation for rural 
life, and knowledge of how powerful economic autonomy could be. 
We lived in a rural district.  My father was a farmer.  He 
was a poor man but a rather independent farmer.  He made 
almost everything we used.  We had cows, hogs.  We raised 
farm products. . . We were poor.  There were many of us in 
the family.  But I don’t know a day that we wanted for a 
piece of bread.18 
 
So, while Rev. and Mrs. De Laine’s teaching positions made them vulnerable to powerful 
whites.  Farming and preaching positioned them to withstand the onslaught of economic 
repercussions that undid activists with less economic autonomy. 
The De Laines knew from experience how difficult it was for the children 
Clarendon County’s children to get a primary and secondary education.  Rev. De Laine 
spent his childhood working his family’s land. When he did have the opportunity to go to 
school, he had to walk five miles each way, and was taught the minimum when he got 
there.  Likewise, Mrs. De Laine knew what it was like to walk long distances to attend 
school.  Her father wanted all his children to have the best possible education so instead 
of sending them to the local one-room schoolhouse he sent them to a five room, four 
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teacher, Presbyterian parochial school five miles away. Her father always sent someone 
to walk her home from school, but she remembered that the white children had a school 
bus.19 
Mrs. Mattie De Laine taught at Scott’s Branch school in Summerton. She and the 
other teachers at Scott’s Branch not only had to contend with the labor demands on 
Clarendon County’s children, but also the fact that it was often impossible for students to 
traverse the surrounding landscape.  The Santee Dam, a $65 million project, was 
supposed to attract new business by making hydroelectric power and the transportation of 
goods by water possible.  Instead, it failed to attract business and continually flooded the 
roads black children travelled on their way to school.  Conditions were so bad that the 
children sometimes had to row a boat to go to school.  Yet when local blacks implored 
the school board to help they were shrugged off by a group that saw no need to educate 
black children, and had no desire to hide the fact that these decisions were based on racist 
sentiments.20  Indeed as a black father named James Gibson remembered the school 
board chairman told them, “We ain’t got no money to buy a bus for your nigger 
children.”21   
Embodying the self-help philosophy that had defined post-emancipation black racial 
uplift, a group of Davis Station parents purchased an old bus.  They hired a driver and 
started a fund to operate the bus.  (Parents in Society Hill, which adjoined Davis 
Station—did the same thing.)22  But over time the bus became less reliable.  The Santee 
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Dam’s continued flooding compounded the problem. No students died on the way to or 
from school, but two boys died on those roads, as well as a man who was visiting his in-
laws.  In fact, the only reason more locals did not drown was because they were so 
familiar with the area’s terrain.23  
When Rev. De Laine attended that Race and Culture class, he heard Rev. Hinton 
speak about the need to challenge the school bus transportation racism.  Hinton told those 
gathered that the state of black schools was proof that “the white man’s heel was still 
pressing the black man’s head into the mud.”24  Black Americans could not advance 
unless they were better educated, and white segregationists were purposely preventing 
black Carolinians from getting an equal education.  After all, an educated man would not 
be satisfied laboring in the field for wages so low they could scarcely afford the bare 
necessities.  Hinton implied that although the PSTA had enough funds to pursue a legal 
case, there was not a teacher or preacher with enough “damn guts” to serve as plaintiff.  
De Laine resented the implication.  It served as his call to action.  He promised Hinton 
that he would bring a client the next week.25  
De Laine’s task was not an easy one.  He may have had the courage to face the 
reprisals coming his way but he also had to find a parent with the same courage.  And that 
parent had to be a taxpayer, an upstanding citizen, and have a child in the right school.   
Fortunately as a teacher, preacher, NAACP organizer, and hometown man, De Laine had 
deep roots in the community.  If anyone could accomplish such a feat, he could.  When 
																																																								
23 “The Word Made Flesh,” 87-88. 
24 Simple Justice, 16. 
25 J. A. De Laine, “History Leading Up to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision Outlawing 
Segregation in Public Schools” (speech, May 17, 1974), Joseph A. De Laine Papers, 
University of South Carolina Political Collections; “Seeds in Unlikely Soil,” 180; Simple 
Justice, 16; Seeds in Unlikely Soil,” 180.  
	 96 
De Laine got home, he met with two brothers, Hammitt and Levi Pearson.  De Laine 
originally considered Hammitt to serve as the petitioner, but decided he was too hot-
headed.  Instead, they chose the level-headed Levi.26 
The disparities between black and white schools were obvious.  But for people like 
Levi Pearson, their first priority was simply getting their children to school on a regular 
basis.27  De Laine described how important it was to get black children to school safe and 
sound:  
As [a] country school teacher for seventeen years I have 
seen some conditions that many people do not even think 
exist. I have had children come to me wet from the rain and 
from the white school bus slashing mud and water on them 
when I did not have a stick of wood or other fuel to make a 
fire and warm their little bodies with.  I have seen children 
from the windows of the white school bus spit out of the 
window of the bus on the little helpless Negro Children 
coming to my school.28 
 
Pearson’s mindset and De Laine’s statement remind us that local level activism was most 
often sparked by a desire for practical changes, not grandiose ideals.   
 The following week De Laine and Levi Pearson went to a meeting in Columbia.  
The cohort—James Hinton; A. T. Butler, the PSTA executive secretary; and attorney 
Harold Boulware—represented the alliance that would take black Carolinians’ fight for 
equal education into its next phase.29  With the Pine Grove Church board’s approval Rev. 
De Laine and a committee of two others approached a local white Presbyterian minister 
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named L. B. McCord. McCord was the pastor at Manning Presbyterian Church and had 
served as the superintendent of schools since 1940. Such education and religious 
leadership made him a respected person among Clarendon County whites, but African 
Americans considered him a white supremacist. They did not believe he cared about 
whether or not their teachers were qualified.  So perhaps De Laine and his committee 
were unsurprised when their request for bus transportation was denied.  White school 
officials unwittingly left local blacks with few options.  In late June of 1947, attorney 
Harold Boulware drafted a petition bearing Levi Pearson’s name.  The petition, 
requesting bus transportation for black students, was filed with the board in July.  After 
three weeks with no response, Boulware wrote the Superintendent again, and requested a 
hearing.  But Clarendon County’s black parents were met, once again, with a deafening 
silence.  The Board of Trustees chairman, Vander Stukes, told Boulware that Levi 
Pearson was no longer interested in the case, but Pearson was adamant.30  Anyone who 
assumed he was uninterested in carrying the case out, “assume[d] too much.”31  In fact, 
De Laine and Pearson seemed eager for the case to move along.  De Laine believed 
people would gain courage after the case went public.32  
On March 16, 1948 NAACP attorneys Harold Boulware, Thurgood Marshall, and 
Edward R. Dudley filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court in Charleston, South 
Carolina, alleging that the practice of providing bus transportation to white students but 
not black students was unconstitutional because it was done on account of their race. The 
state constitution, argued the attorneys, made public education a state responsibility. It 
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was county and state school official’ duty s to provide free bus transportation for all 
students. Besides, bus transportation was paid for out of public school funds, which all 
Clarendon County residents, including African Americans, paid into.33 
Two defendants named in the complaint—the State Board of Education and the 
State Superintendent of Education, Jesse T. Anderson—argued that providing bus 
transportation was not their responsibility. They had not provided bus transportation to 
any students.  That was the school district’s responsibility. They also asserted that the 
court had no jurisdiction in the case. The other defendants—the County Board of 
Education; L.B. McCord, County Superintendent; Board of District Commissioners, 
School District 26; and E.G. Stukes, Board of District Commissioners Chairman—agreed 
with this assertion. They said that the District Commissioners of School District 26 held a 
hearing twenty days beforehand but had not had a chance to make a decision. The 
plaintiffs, according to them, had not pursued every available option.  State law provided 
a way to petition the County Board and the State Board of Education. Therefore the Court 
should not hear the case because the aforementioned procedures were better suited to 
address the plaintiffs’ issues.34  
The defense also argued that discrimination was not based on race.  Instead they 
claimed that black students greatly outnumbered white students.35  The larger number of 
black students prompted the district to situate the black schools closer to where the 
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students lived, but that white schools were not as close to white students’ homes because 
they were “scattered and sparsely settled.”36  
The Pearson case was to be tried on June 9, 1948, at the U.S. District Court in 
Florence. Unfortunately for the NAACP attorneys and the rural blacks they represented, 
the case did not go to trial.37  The reason proved to be embarrassing for Boulware who 
recalled that they “goofed.”38  It was dismissed, at the plaintiff’s request, because it was 
decided that Pearson had no legal standing.  His farm was located between school 
districts 5 and 26. He paid taxes in district 5, but his children attended school in districts 
22 and 26.  However, this is not an indisputable fact.  On Friday, April 9, 1947, L. B. 
McCord and E. G. Stukes stopped by Pearson’s home.  De Laine, who had been speaking 
with Pearson outside, overheard their conversation.  The two men informed Pearson that 
his taxes had been credited to District 5, not 26.  Pearson was confident that he had paid 
his taxes in District 26, but did not have his tax receipt.  He went to his brother Hammitt 
Pearson’s home, located only a few yards away from his.  Hammitt’s receipt was for 
District 26.39  Although the case may not have been a legal success, it was far from a 
waste of time.  As Billie Fleming recalled, the Pearson suit “was the beginning of the real 
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Clarendon County movement.”40 Likewise, De Laine said it was “the legal beginning of 
the movement” for equal education.41 Eugene Montgomery, one of the state NAACP 
leaders agreed: 
This was really, I would say, the beginning of the 
Clarendon County case because they decided then that they 
were not going to stop until they got some better 
educational facilities for the children.42 
 
Unfortunately, the Pearson suit reawakened the KKK.  The day after the case was filed in 
the U.S. District Court, the State newspaper ran a story on Levi Pearson and he faced 
swift economic repercussions.  White owned stores and banks refused to issue him credit. 
In the past, Pearson would find a white farmer with a harvester to help him gather his 
crops.  But this season, no white farmer would help him, and no black farmers had access 
to one.  That fall, he watched helplessly as his crops decayed in the fields.43 
The Clarendon movement recovered quickly. At 10:00 AM on March 12, 1949, a 
small meeting was held at the Palmetto Teachers Association building in Columbia. In 
attendance were Thurgood Marshall and his staff, PSTA officers, state NAACP branch 
officials, De Laine, Rev. J. W. Seals, Ravenel Felder, and several Pearson family 
members: Levi, Hammit, Willis, Jesse, Ferdinand, and Charlotte.44 De Laine was caught 
off guard when Marshall insisted that the NAACP would no longer support a case that 
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dealt only with bus transportation. Marshall told him that if Clarendon County blacks 
wanted the civil rights organization’s legal support, the case would have to be for school 
and education equalization. Clarendon County presented an ideal situation to challenge 
whether or not black and white schools were, in fact “separate but equal.”  Districts 9 and 
22 had in-district high schools for both black and white students.  Their case would be 
clear-cut.  De Laine had to find at least twenty parents to sue for equalization.45  
De Laine was frustrated, but from Marshall’s perspective, there was safety in 
numbers. Having one plaintiff was too risky because it was easy to find some 
disqualifying factor, as they did with Mr. Pearson.  If De Laine could not find twenty 
plaintiffs, Marshall planned on going somewhere else.  He needed a major case to test 
separate but equal. The Clarendon group “withdrew for coffee” to consider Marshall’s 
challenge and ultimately decided to pursue the case.46  They would find enough plaintiffs 
to file an equalization suit. They decided to bring some permanency to what had been a 
temporary NAACP branch. Levi Pearson was appointed President of the local branch and 
Seals was appointed Secretary and Treasurer.47  
The group quickly got to work in Clarendon County.    The first mass meeting 
was held on March 30, 1949, at Mount Zion AME Church, located in District 26, where 
Rev. Larry King was the pastor.  A second meeting was held on March 31 at Union 
Cypress AME Church in District 5.  An informational meeting was held the next month 
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on April 19 in Summerton, District 22, at St. Mark AME Church where Rev. Seals was 
the pastor.  Another informational meeting was held the following day in Manning 
(District 9) at Ebenezer Baptist Church. That these initial meetings were held at churches 
demonstrates how important faith and religion were to birthing a local protest movement.  
The fact that many were held at AME churches shows that this intra-church network was 
central to organizing efforts, and helps explain why someone like De Laine became so 
integral to the Clarendon movement.48 
De Laine recalled that this was when the “real work and sacrifice were made.”49  
But the repercussions not only directly affected black adults, but the very children De 
Laine and Pearson put themselves on the line to help.  In the failed legal case’s aftermath, 
school officials replaced the Scott’s Branch principal, Mr. Maceo Anderson, with Mr. S. 
I. Benson, a man who did not have a college degree.  Anderson, who had served 
effectively for eleven years, was active in the Progressive Democratic Party.  In fact, 
Anderson and another teacher named Mrs. White had recently attempted to register to 
vote.  The pretense for their denial—that they were not literate enough—was only further 
evidence that Clarendon County white officials were blatantly denying blacks’ right to 
vote. Anderson was dismissed because “[s]omebody had to suffer for the eyes of the 
people being opened.”50  His dismissal came at a critical time in the school’s history. 
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Scott’s Branch would now have its first senior class.  They needed an experienced 
principal to guide them through this process.51   
Teachers, students, and parents found Principal Benson’s performance 
unsatisfactory.52  The list of grievances against him was so long that one wonders why he 
ever became involved in education.  Benson was not particularly “skillful in judging the 
feelings and intelligence of others.”53  They asserted that he did not spend enough time at 
the school—a problem that was amplified by the fact that the students in the algebra and 
geometry classes he was supposed to teach had paid extra money for their textbooks.  He 
was unable and unwilling to properly supervise and discipline schoolchildren. His 
handling of teacher absences further compromised the school’s discipline issues.  Instead 
of calling in a substitute, he adopted the method of placing one of the older schoolgirls in 
charge of the classroom.  Such a policy was not wholly peculiar in a small, one room 
schoolhouse.  But Scott’s Branch was far from being a one-room schoolhouse.  Its large 
classes needed a trained teacher, not inexperienced teenagers. Moreover, he was soon 
assumed to be a thief. Parents who could afford to do so pulled their children from the 
school and either sent them to a boarding school or to the public school in Manning.  The 
De Laines were among the parents who did this.  They sent their son Jay to a private 
school.54 
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Summerton’s black adults were “slow to take up the fight.55  Students were the 
first to organize.  About thirty members of the Class of 1949 filed charges against the 
principal with the Board of Trustees, the District Superintendent, and the County 
Superintendent.56  The six complaints against Principal Benson were: 
1. Misappropriation of monies for equipment and books 
2. The Principal neglected his duty as a teacher 
unreasonably. 
3. The Principal is holding some certificates and charging 
some children $27.00 plus the $7.00 paid at the begging 
of the school term. 
4. Failing to show results from $800.00 raised in two 
rallies. 
5. Pocketing moneys raised in May as door fee for eight 
programs. 
6. Overcharging for certificates and threatening children’s 
transcripts.57 
When there was no response from school officials the students, along with their parents, 
organized a meeting to be held the first Sunday of the month, June 8, at St. Mark AME.  
This time they notified school officials by registered mail.  More than 300 African 
Americans, including parents, students, teachers, and Scott’s Branch faculty were in 
attendance.  They filled the pews, then stood in the aisles, and some were even forced to 
stand outside and observe the proceedings through the windows. Reverdy Wells, the 
student body president and class valedictorian, opened the meeting and asked other 
members of their class to share their complaints against Principal Benson. About thirty 
students presented their complaints to the group.  Later on at least two teachers—Mrs. 
Rosa S. Montgomery and Mattie D. Stokes—signed affidavits before Rev. De Laine 
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supporting the students accusations against Principal Benson.  But no school officials 
attended the meeting. 58  
The parents formed the Parent Committee on Action and chose Rev. De Laine as 
their formal leader and Rev. E. E. Richburg, pastor of the county’s largest A.M.E. church, 
to serve as secretary.   De Laine was hesitant to take on the leadership position.  He was 
in poor health and already had too many commitments.  Foreseeing the repercussions 
they would face, he was concerned that the parents would abandon him when things got 
really tough.  And he did not want to compromise Mrs. De Laine’s position at the 
school.59  But in the long run this meeting would became one of the most integral in 
cementing these rural blacks’ determination for true educational equality.  As De Laine 
recalled: 
This was the Psychological Meeting [sic] which conditioned the minds of 
the mass of parents in District 22.  This was the time when the effort 
shifted from Mr. Levi Pearson to Harry Briggs et al.  This acceptance of 
the chairmanship by Rev. J. A. De Laine was a deliberate act, understood 
by Rev. J. W. Seals and Levi and Hammit Pearson, to shift the struggle 
from District 26 to District 22.60 
 
Indeed, until this point, Richburg had refrained from formally engaging in the black equal 
rights movement.  But he was ideal for this role.  Richburg could bolster the people’s 
commitment to the fight.61  He was a Clarendon County native who could prove to be a 
powerful ally to De Laine.  Furthermore, Richburg may have been “a country boy who 
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hailed from Spring Hill,” but he possessed an urbanity that De Laine simply did not 
have.62  That this moment catapulted him into activism demonstrates the importance of 
education in the black community, and its power to mobilize the community and its 
leaders.   
The meeting also served as an important crossroads for local blacks.  It 
demonstrated that they were committed to ensuring their children had an adequate 
education. But equally important was that a full decade before the well-known 1960 
Greensboro sit-in, and the birth of SNCC, Clarendon County’s youth were engaging in 
organized direct action.  Incorporating the youthful fervor of the 1960s, and the litigation 
method of the 1930s-1950s, this case can be seen as a bridge between two generations’ 
civil rights activism. 
One June 9, 1949, the J. A. De Laine and the two other Committee on Action 
members—Robert Georgia and Edward Ragin (NAACP member who helped plan the 
church meeting and would later serve as Briggs plaintiffs—went to see Superintendent 
Betchman with a letter outlining the students’ concerns.  Betchman was on vacation, so 
they met with the school board clerk, J. D. Carson.63  Two days after that meeting, June 
11, De Laine received a registered letter from the Board of Trustees of Clarendon School 
District 30 informing him that his services as principal of Silver School were no longer 
needed.  Of course, De Laine knew that this was a possibility. He predicted the previous 
year that he went “out so far until I doubt anything can save me as a teacher next year.”64 
But it had been a risk he was willing to take.  The loss of income was certainly an 
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inconvenience, but the De Laines had a productive farm.  And Mrs. De Laine was still 
gainfully employed as a teacher at Scott’s Branch. They were in a better situation than 
most local blacks to weather financial repercussions.65 
The County Board of Education eventually agreed to dismiss Principal Benson 
from his position during a hearing on Saturday, October 1, 1949.66  The following 
Monday, Rev. De Laine met with Superintendent Betchman who handed De Laine his 
son’s transcript, which had been withheld in the melee, and said that except for books, 
students would no longer be charged school fees.  He then dangled a carrot stick.67  If De 
Laine ended the fight for better school facilities, he could have the Scott’s Branch 
principalship: 
Ninety percent of the people are following you, De Laine, and they 
deserve better leadership than to get into a fight with the white people.  
The whites provide the money and the jobs that keep them going.68 
 
Betchman’s threat was pretty obvious.  Either take the proverbial carrot stick and quell 
the growing local movement, or everyone who signed the petition will face economic 
repercussions.  Nonetheless, De Laine refused the offer and was unmoved by the threat.  
He could not ignore the interests of those who had chosen him as their leader.69  His wife, 
Mrs. Mattie De Laine, who had been serving as the assistant principal, was chosen to 
serve as the acting principal in “a transparent maneuver to compromise the reverend’s 
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protest activities.”70  Indeed, as Rev. De Laine remembered, the thought behind giving 
Mrs. De Laine the position was, “Old De Laine can’t fight his wife.”71  But by that point 
the plight of the black children in this rural, agricultural area was gaining more and more 
attention from the NAACP.  
The Clarendon County Branch definitely had their work cut out for them.  The 
Pearson case made finding twenty plaintiffs incredibly difficult.  After all, there was now 
a glaring example of what could happen to a person who openly challenged the racial 
status quo.  Farmers could look at the example of Levi Pearson to see their eventual fate. 
Teachers could look at the example of the Scott’s Branch principal who had been fired 
for the mere suspicion of supporting the bus case.  To combat this the newly formed 
chapter began having meetings in local A.M.E. churches.  After one of these meetings 
two NAACP Executive Secretaries—Lester Banks of Virginia and Eugene Montgomery 
of South Carolina—spent the night at the De Laine home and convinced them that they 
should shift their focus from School Districts 25 and 5, which bused its white high school 
students to different districts to Districts 22 and 9, which had white high school facilities 
in decidedly better condition than their black counterparts.  But one local minister warned 
De Laine that his work in that area would likely result in his murder, or his house being 
burned down.72  In hindsight, his warnings seemed more like a prediction. 
Ultimately De Laine met and surpassed Marshall’s demands.  The Parent 
Committee on Action submitted six local petitions to the trustee board.  Each petition was 
unsuccessful.  So on November 11, 1949, NAACP attorneys Harold Boulware, Thurgood 
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Marshall, and Robert Carter submitted a petition to the Board of Trustees for School 
District No. 22 with over 104 names (twenty-nine adults and seventy-five 
schoolchildren).  However De Laine did not sign the petition because Boulware warned 
him that it would make him a bigger target.  The petition asserted that the black school 
facilities—Scott’s Branch High School, Liberty Hill Elementary School, and Rambay 
Elementary School—were significantly inferior to the white school facilities.  The black 
school facilities were unsanitary, unhealthy, dilapidated, overcrowded, and did not have 
enough teachers.73 
The Board of Trustees did not respond immediately.  In fact, they did not respond 
for three more months.  And when they gave their decision on February 20, 1950, 
Clarendon’s activists found it unsatisfactory.  For, despite the overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary, the Board employed deceitful, misleading language to advance the idea that 
black school facilities were not only equal to white school facilities, but that they were 
often superior.  For example, the board said that the white school in Summerton was a 
forty-three year old, two story, eight room structure that was “improperly lighted” and 
old.  Its physical condition was “a source of dissatisfaction to both patrons and 
trustees.”74 On the other hand, Scott’s Branch was a forty-three year old, ten-room 
structure “built according to approved plans for educational buildings, taking into 
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consideration the proper lighting and protection from fire,” and that there were three 
recently built additional structures.75   
The board also excused the fact that white students had bus transportation while 
black students did not by asserting that the white population had “shifted” since the 
school was built, and that it was hazardous and inconvenient for white students to travel 
without bus transportation—therefore ignoring the hazards black children faced walking 
to school.76  They disregarded the unsanitary conditions black students faced with the 
excuse that the restrooms in the black schools fulfilled the State Health Department’s 
specifications.  And if those at the white school were admittedly better it was not 
intentional.  The town of Summerton had installed a new water and sewer system, and the 
Parent Teacher Association provided the better facilities.77   Although there was no 
municipal water system where Scotts Branch was located, the Board had “at a great 
expense to itself” laid a water line to the school that was “installed and terminated under 
the direction of the colored school authorities.78  They also denied unequal teacher pay, 
saying that it was based on school attendance and that white schools had greater 
attendance.  Predictably, the board did not rule in the petitioners’ favor.79 
 On May 15, 1950, NAACP attorneys Boulware, Marshall, and Robert Carter 
submitted a complaint to the U.S. District Court on behalf of Harry Briggs and other 
black students and parents in School District 22.  The plaintiffs alleged that school 
officials had a policy of providing and maintaining free bus transportation for white 
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children, and not providing the same to black children.  The school facilities for white 
children (Summerton Elementary School and Summerton High School) were superior to 
those provided to black children (Scotts Branch High School, Liberty Hill Elementary, 
and Rambay Elementary School).  Therefore, black children were being denied an equal 
education—a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  They asked the court for a 
permanent injunction to prevent the plaintiffs from providing unequal school facilities 
and withholding bus transportation on account of race.80 
 Attorneys for the defense asserted that this was a local issue, and therefore not the 
court’s jurisdiction.  The only issue of controversy, according to them, was whether or 
not the school facilities were unequal, and whether or not free bus transportation was 
provided to white children and not black children.  They asserted that the school facilities 
were equal, and that they were not the ones who provided bus transportation.81   
When the Clarendon County legal petition was filed, it marked an important 
turning point for the local movement.  Local black activists could not avoid the national 
spotlight that would soon shine on them—or the massive repercussions that would 
continue to descend on them.  But instead of suppressing the movement, the 
repercussions seemed to embolden many of Clarendon County’s blacks.  According to 
De Laine the economic pressure they faced opened a lot of people’s eyes to “the need for 
such an organization as the NAACP.”82 He encouraged Summerton blacks to join the 
NAACP as a response to the repercussions.  As a result, their membership grew from 
fifty, to five hundred.   
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Yet as the repercussions increased, morale began to fall.  Support for De Laine 
waned.  Someone attempted to kill Robert Georgia, Sr., a member of the Committee on 
Action, by running him down.  Two white men attacked and killed a black man named 
James McKnight, who had signed the equalization petition.  Mr. McKnight pulled over to 
answer nature’s call in the woods when the two men attacked him.  Despite the fact that 
his family, who were still in the car, witnessed the attack, his assailants were exonerated.  
Betchman threatened Rev. Seals’ teaching position if he did not stop allowing De Laine 
to have meetings at St. Mark.  Rev. Seals did not give in to the threat but it demonstrated 
how creative segregationists had to be when confronting economically autonomous 
blacks.83 
And the repercussions kept coming.  Bo Stukes, “perhaps the best mechanic in 
town,” was fired.84  Stukes tried to continue working from home, but he did not have the 
proper equipment and was tragically crushed to death trying to work under a car.   Hazel 
Ragin, the only housepainter in Summerton, stopped getting hired for jobs.  Mazie 
Solomon, who had not actually signed the petition, was dismissed from the Windson 
Motel after the supervisor told her to take her name off the list or be fired.85   
Unfortunately, Mazie Solomon’s troubles did not end at work.  When she returned 
home, the landowner told her and her family that they would have to move if they did not 
remove their name from the petition.  The landowner was facing pressure from other 
whites.  If he did not kick them off the land, he would not be able to get his cotton 
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ginned, or be able to sell his produce.  He gave them one month to move.86  A 
sharecropper named Elliott Richardson was also evicted from his land.87 Clarendon 
County’s white segregationists told local blacks to be wary of following “the radical 
leadership of those Methodist preachers.”88  To do so would be met with real and 
substantial repercussions.   
Summerton’s white leaders labeled the Reverends Seals, Richburg, Frazier, and 
De Laine as Communists.  They told local blacks that Russia was paying the AME 
ministers who were pocketing the money blacks gave to the NAACP.89  As hard as it was 
to be a black civil rights leader, it was “infinitely worse to be black and Communist.”90 
De Laine and the other leaders believed that the term “communist” was used as a way to 
distract people from the education inequalities they brought to the surface.  They believed 
that it was used to question their patriotism.91   
White officials also began telling the blacks they employed that they had to get a 
resignation letter from De Laine to prove that they were no longer in the NAACP.  For 
instance one man, named Elvin Walker, was forced to get a written statement from De 
Laine because he lived on S. E. Rogers’ property—a prominent pro-segregation attorney.  
Soon there was an influx of requests, sometimes from people who had never even been in 
the NAACP.  The requests, most often made in person, got so annoying that De Laine 
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began telling people go to attorney Rogers.  He could draw up that kind of papers they 
needed.92  
 Harry Briggs and William Stukes, both World War II veterans, were denied 
admission to the GI classes local black veterans had fought so hard to gain.  Officials said 
the classes were full, but Briggs and Stukes found out that that other veterans were 
admitted.  They ended up having to travel twenty-four miles to Manning in order to 
continue their coursework.93 
John Edward Black, a veteran of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, could not get financing 
for a tractor to farm his one hundred acres of land.  Lee Richardson’s outstanding debt at 
the McClary feed store, a regular part of doing business as a small farmer, was called in 
to be paid immediately.  Billie Fleming, owner of the Fleming-De Laine funeral home 
and J. A. De Laine’s nephew, was informed that black sharecroppers were being 
prohibited from doing business with him.  In fact, one family who had brought their 
infant son in for burial was forced to move their son’s body to another funeral home.94 
Many people lost their jobs.  Harry Briggs and Larry Stokes were fired from their 
jobs before the case reached the federal court.  Teachers suspected of sympathizing with 
the students or who Principal Benson accused were fired.  Two GI teachers, William 
Ragin and Rev. J. W. Seals lost their teaching positions.  Parents found these dismissals 
incredibly disturbing.  On the evening of July 25, over forty parents got together at St. 
Mark and signed a petition asking the district trustees not to dismiss any more teachers.  
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Similarly District 22 chose not to rehire three of the Liberty Hill elementary school 
teachers—Rowena Oliver, Carrie Martin, and Edyth Oliver—who had signed the 
equalization suit.  Once locals heard that the teachers had effectively been dismissed, 
sixty-six people signed a petition to the board of trustees citing how much the school 
improved during their tenure and asked that they be rehired.95  These types of reactions to 
teacher dismissals reiterate that they were seen as an integral part of improving black life 
for the next generation.  
 Harry and Eliza Briggs faced more repercussions than any of the other Briggs 
signatories because the case bore their name.  Mrs. Eliza Briggs was dismissed from her 
job as a motel chambermaid, after serving in that position for six years.  Her employers 
told her their suppliers would stop making deliveries unless they dismissed her and 
anyone else who had signed the petition.  Mr. Harry Briggs was fired from his job of 
fourteen years, and he was unable to find subsequent employment in South Carolina.96  
He remembered: 
There didn’t seem to be much danger to it.  But after the petition was 
signed, I knew it was different.  The white folks got kind of sour. They 
asked me to take my name off the petition.  My boss, he said did I know 
what I was doin’ and I said, “I’m doin’ it for the benefit of my children.”  
He didn’t say nothin’ back.  But then later—it was before Christmas—he 
gave me a carton of cigarettes and then he let me go.  He said, “Harry, I 
want me a boy—and I can pay him less than you.”97 
 
His boss may have been specifically referring to age, but it is just as likely that he was 
also referring to manhood/masculinity. When Harry Briggs insisted that his children had 
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a right to the same education and facilities as white children, he not only stepped out of 
his place as an African American, but away from the assigned role of boy.  His activism 
was, consciously or not, an assertion of his manhood and therefore a challenge to the 
racial, gendered status quo.  Like his Reconstruction era counterparts, Mr. Briggs’ 
assertion of his manhood was a way for him to “assume full patriarchal responsibility” 
for his family. Gaining access to the larger society’s patriarchal definition of manhood 
could grant the Briggs children greater educational and economic opportunities.  These 
discussions demonstrate that for some families, civil rights and black manhood were 
inextricably linked.  Mr. and Mrs. Briggs remained Clarendon County residents in name 
only.  Mr. Briggs relocated to Miami for twelve years.  His Florida employer, aware of 
his unfortunate situation, took advantage of him and forced Briggs to work off-the-clock 
or be fired.  With the NAACP’s assistance the whole family relocated to New York in 
1952.98    
 As the visual and vocal leader of this movement, De Laine faced unrelenting 
persecution.  S. E. Rogers—who would represent the state in the Supreme Court 
desegregation case and play an integral role in forming the White Citizens Councils—
came up with a legal way to punish De Laine.  He persuaded the outgoing Principal 
Benson to file a $20,000 lawsuit against De Laine.  The suit was filed on January 24, 
1950, and accused De Laine of fabricating the students’ complaints.99  Only days before 
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the March 6 court date, papers appeared all over town threatening the outgoing Principal 
Benson.   
WARNING BENSON: 
YOU HAD BETTER NOT APPEAR IN JUDGEMENT 
AGAINST ANY PERSON IN SC OR ANYWHERE.  
AND MAY WE EMPHASIZE THE FORTHCOMING 
COURT.  TOO, YOU BETTER BE TOLD THAT ANY 
SUBSEQUENCE COURT WILL BE JUST AS 
PERILOUS AS THIS ONE.  THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH 
CAROLINA WILL NOT ALLOW A CHARACTER LIKE 
YOU TO SERVE OF HANDLE PUBLIC AFFAIRS.  
TELL YOUR “DARKY’ SUPPORTERS THAT IF THEY 
WANT TO DIE WITH YOU COME AND WITNESS 
FOR YOU. –KU KLUX KLAN100 
To De Laine and his supporters, the badly worded “warning” was clearly the KKK’s 
creation.  They were trying to imitate De Laine trying to imitate them.  Indeed, the FBI 
did find the original stencil and mimeograph in a local white school attic.  The slander 
case not only put De Laine in a precarious position, but threatened to undo the whole 
school equalization suit.  De Laine was able to be an effective leader and withstand white 
persecution because he was far more financially autonomous than most local blacks.  He 
did not buy on credit, and owned his own land.  But if the suit was successful it would 
ruin him, and by default the local movement.  School officials even fired his two sisters 
and niece, who were all teachers.  None of these women were NAACP members.  Their 
dismissal was an effort to prevent them from giving financial help to De Laine during the 
lawsuit.101  Their goal was evident.  They wanted De Laine to be financially ruined. 
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De Laine rushed to get his land transferred to other people’s names.  He needed 
the help of an attorney and began contacting the area’s few black attorneys.  Boulware 
was unable to take the case because of a conflict of interest.  William James and Esau 
Parker, both located in Sumter, were unavailable.  A white lawyer agreed to take the case, 
but his $1,000 retainer was more than De Laine could afford, and De Laine did not fully 
trust him, especially when he found out the lawyer was related to one of the District 22 
trustees.  His friend, Dr. E. A. Adams of Columbia, had a real-estate license and began 
helping with the process of transferring property ownership.  Fortunately the two Sumter 
attorneys realized the predicament he was in and took the case.  But even though Mr. 
Parker drove from Sumter to the Manning courthouse to personally deliver the 
documents, not every thing was finished by the time the case started.102   
All of the witnesses in the slander trial were white men with ties to District 22.  
This included the local superintendent of schools, the county superintendent, members of 
the high school board, and the Summerton High School agricultural teacher.  All except 
the teacher were defendants in the equalization suit.  De Laine expected his accuser to be 
dishonest, but was shocked when McCord, the Presbyterian minister, lied under oath.103  
It was a short trial.  It lasted three days, and the jury deliberated four hours.  The 
$5,000 De Laine was ordered to pay was substantially less than what Benson had asked 
for, but still too high for De Laine to pay.  In this case, his forethought in having his 
property transferred to other people was extremely valuable.  Getting that money from De 
Laine would prove to be impossible.  De Laine’s fee was eventually lowered to $2,700 on 
appeal, but it remained unpaid.  Those who instigated the suit tried to attach his property 
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to the case, but the county sheriff confirmed that there was no property in his name.  
They then tried to contest the property transfers, but a judge ruled that the transfers were 
legal.  The slander suit was a financial and psychological blow.  De Laine, who had 
worked so hard to create a sense of financial security and prosperity under Jim Crow 
segregation, was “left financially at the mercy of others” for the first time in his adult 
life.104 
 From the very beginning of the equalization fight, there had been a rumor that 
local blacks wanted to send their children to school with whites.  At this point, there was 
no truth to this rumor.  The racial integration of schools was not the goal of the Clarendon 
County movement.105 De Laine went so far as to call this rumor as “a malicious lie.”106  
And yet, the NAACP’s official stance on education equality was changing.  In July 1950, 
a group of NAACP attorneys suggested that the Association no longer accept 
“equalization only” cases. 107   Instead, they would pursue cases that challenged 
segregation.   The recommendation was made an official rule during the October Board of 
Directors meeting.  So, when Judge Waring ordered a pre-trial hearing in November, 
Marshall indicated that their ultimate objective was to challenge segregation.  At Judge 
Waring’s recommendation, attorneys Boulware, Carter, and Marshall filed a new 
complaint in December, requesting that the state constitution’s rule requiring black 
students attend segregated schools be ruled a violation of the U.S. Constitution, but they 
quickly filed a motion to dismiss, which Waring granted without prejudice.  The NAACP 
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would bring the case again.  And the next time, they would have ample evidence that not 
only were black and white school facilities unequal, but that racial segregation was 
unconstitutional and damaging to black children. 
 When James F. Byrnes (known as Jimmie Byrnes) became South Carolina’s 104th 
governor in 1950 the southern Democrat already had extensive experience in public 
office.  He served in the U.S. Senate for ten years.  FDR named him to the Supreme 
Court, but Byrnes left after only one year of service; he preferred the wheeling and 
dealing innate to elected office.  He then served in FDR’s administration, helping the 
much-beloved president manage the conservative and liberal branches of the Democratic 
Party.108 During his inaugural address, the newly elected Governor Byrnes likely came 
across as a southern moderate, perhaps even as a progressive.  His speech demonstrated a 
deep awareness of the burgeoning school equalization movement and the Supreme 
Court’s changing attitude regarding racial equality.  Abandoning a language of vitriolic 
racial hatred, Byrnes positioned himself as a sort of rational segregationist—seeming to 
acknowledge that some social changes were necessary, yet insisting that no serious 
challenge to the southern racial status quo would be tolerated.   
Byrnes indirectly acknowledged black disfranchisement.  He recommended that 
the legislature approve a constitutional amendment to repeal a voting poll tax that had 
been approved during a recent election.  He renounced the KKK’s activities, but lumped 
the NAACP in with the terrorist organization.  The most important parts of his speech, 
for the purposes of this study, were that he upheld the white southern belief in state’s 
rights, but also conceded that the state had to fulfill its responsibility to educate all the 
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state’s children.  All children, according to the new governor, should be provided at least 
a grade school education.  Teacher salaries should be increased, and the school 
transportation system should be improved.109   
To address the state’s education inequalities, but remain true to the state 
constitution’s mandate on segregated schools, Byrnes introduced a school building 
program.  The state program would: supplement local government school building funds, 
span over twenty years, and provide an estimated $75 million for school construction.  
And while Byrnes declared that the program was the right thing to do, he also asserted 
that it was a wise choice.  It was a preventative measure to thwart desegregation.  He 
referred to the U.S. attorney general, who had urged the courts to declare segregation 
unconstitutional.  Understanding the importance of the Briggs case, and foreseeing the 
possibility of Supreme Court mandated desegregation, Byrnes noted that South Carolina 
was not the only state with a legal case questioning racial segregation’s validity.  He 
warned that if these cases went to the Supreme Court, they could very well be ruled in the 
plaintiffs’ favor.110  
As a former Supreme Court Justice, Byrnes had a broad enough understanding of 
the law and recent court decisions to conclude that school equalization would most likely 
become a legal mandate in both word and deed.  The courts could rule in favor of 
desegregation merely as the most effective means of ensuring school equalization.111 He 
hoped that if these cases made it to the court, the justices would take the school 
equalization program into consideration.  Using a mantra employed by other 
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segregationist politicians, Byrnes warned that desegregation could result in the complete 
destruction of the public school system.  Moreover according to him black South 
Carolinians did not support desegregation.  This movement was the work of “professional 
agitators.” 112 
 Later that month, in his address to the General Assembly, Byrnes spoke directly 
about the state’s education system.  Likely wanting to assuage the demands of the 
original Pearson case, Byrnes acknowledged that school transportation needed to be 
improved.  The best way to do this was for the state to take on the responsibility of 
providing and maintaining school transportation.  He spoke again of his statewide school 
building program, saying that it would be “one of South Carolina’s first objectives.”113  
Issuing bonds could help pay for the program.  The state would also need to institute a 
sales tax.  This would be new for the Palmetto State, but Byrnes insisted that it was not a 
revolutionary concept since there was already a sales tax on specific items, and twenty-
eight other states already had one.  To give the legislatures further incentive to approve 
the new sales tax, he claimed that it would actually grant relief to low-income taxpayers.  
He spoke directly to the Clarendon case when he said, “The education of every boy and 
girl in the rural districts is important to every man and woman in our cities.”114  And as 
he did with his inaugural address, Byrnes assured the members of the South Carolina 
legislature that local blacks were committed to segregation: 
The overwhelming majority of colored people in this State do not want to 
force their children into white schools.  Just as the Negro preachers do not 
want their congregations to leave them and attend the churches of white 
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people, the Negro teachers do not want their pupils to leave them and 
attend schools for white children.115 
 
And lest his audience start to believe that this school building program reflected a belief 
in true racial equality, Byrnes compared the contemporary desegregation efforts to 
Reconstruction era politics: 
The politicians in Washington and the Negro agitators in South Carolina 
who today seek to abolish segregation in all schools will learn that what a 
carpetbag government could not do in the reconstruction period cannot be 
done in this period.116 
 
The school building plan would enable South Carolina to avoid desegregation, but the 
state legislature and the citizens they represented should not confuse school facility 
equalization with social equality.  Black schools would be improved, but white power 
would not be challenged.  
 For their part, African Americans seemed to see the school building program for 
what it was—a ruse to avoid desegregation.  South Carolina was “making desperate 
attempts to put its house in order” before the desegregation case was decided.117  As the 
well-known black newspaper The Chicago Defender reported, “white people of 
Mississippi and South Carolina would rather support equalization programs than abolish 
segregation in their schools.”118   Mary McLeod Bethune, one of the most respected and 
well-known black educators to come out of South Caroline lambasted the program as 
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“another poorly disguised attack on [the] democratic practice.”119   McLeod expressed 
doubts that segregated schools could be truly equalized.  After all, “buildings do not 
spring up over night.  Remodeling is not done overnight.”120  The schools that opened 
that school year would be the same inferior schools they had been the previous school 
year.  McLeod was not alone in her doubts.  Other black leaders believed that while 
school equalization may have worked in the past, it was too late to use that remedy now.  
Desegregation was the only way to guarantee equal educational opportunities.  The 
Southern Regional Council, a biracial southern group, did not explicitly denounce 
segregation, but said school equality could not be accomplished unless African 
Americans were permitted to serve on policy-making positions.  But the Palmetto State’s 
segregationists not only supported the idea in the abstract, but had already spent over half 
a million dollars to get the school equalization program started.121 
The South Carolina NAACP was aware that Gov. Byrnes’ school building 
program could be detrimental to their challenge to racial segregation.  The association’s 
leaders also realized how important it was to maintain their positive relationship with 
black teachers, and make sure this group supported this new education objective.  Eager 
to find a powerful speaker who could assist in this goal, the NAACP tried to get Ralph 
Bunch, who had won the 1949 NAACP Spingarn award and would win a Nobel Peace 
Price in 1950, as the main speaker for that year’s PSTA meeting.  Such an endeavor 
suggests the importance of this alliance.  The two organizations remained “almost tied” to 
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each other after the 1940s teacher salary equalization campaign.122 Indeed, as Eugene 
Montgomery said in his letter requesting Bunche as speaker: 
This is a most important event because the Teachers Association and 
NAACP are so closely allied here in our fight and so many forces here 
operate against the Teachers [sic].  I am certain you understand the 
situation.  Please do your best to get Dr. Bunche to come. 
 
In hindsight, the focus on South Carolina’s schools was a long time coming.  The state 
had demonstrated its refusal to invest in the education of black children for some time.  
The Margold Report of 1931 showed that South Carolina spent ten times more on white 
students than on black students.  This was even worse than its southern counterparts of 
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Texas who were spending twice as much on 
black schoolchildren.  When esteemed civil rights attorney Charles Houston’s NAACP 
appointment as special counsel was announced, it was after he toured the segregated 
South. While in South Carolina, Houston filmed white and black school facilities.  It 
seems fitting, therefore, that challenging unequal educational facilities was one of the 
first things on his agenda.123   
Houston’s appointment signaled the shifting tides of the nation’s most powerful 
civil rights organization.  He once stated his preference for working in local and state 
courts since they presented more dramatic legal battles and could more effectively 
mobilize local black communities.  However, he and the NAACP were tiring of the 
limitations inherent in this approach.  They needed a faster method to dismantle racial 
segregation, so the federal courts became the legal campaign’s central focus.  That this 
shift was taking place at the same time that Charles Houston was emerging as the 
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foremost legal mind in black civil rights would prove significant in black Carolinians’ 
equal education fight.  It was Thurgood Marshall, Charles Houston’s most well known 
student, who argued the Pearson and Briggs cases.124 
De Laine was not initially happy about the switch to desegregation because he, 
Richburg, and Seals had been assuring local whites that they would not challenge 
desegregation. The NAACP’s change of plan made them appear dishonest.  De Laine and 
the Briggs petitioners had certainly faced their share of troubles already, but the move 
from equalization to desegregation was when “things got hot in the state” for Rev. De 
Laine.125   
Yet the Clarendon case was building momentum.  It seemed clear to everyone that 
either way, the case would be significant.  For instance, on May 22, the NAACP 
Membership Secretary, Lucille Black sent a special bulletin to everyone who worked 
with the South Carolina Conference of Branches.126  She alerted them that Thurgood 
Marshall, who could draw a large crowd for any occasion, would be arguing the Briggs 
case on Monday, May 28.  She emphasized the case’s importance, noting that it would be 
the NAACP’s “first all-out attack on segregated education in the State.  What happens in 
Clarendon County will affect the future of every colored citizen for generations to 
come.”127  Indeed, the Briggs ruling would technically be on one school district, but 
astute observers understood that it would have a “far-reaching effect on the entire 
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segregated public school system” throughout the state and entire South.128 For Walter 
White, who had been working with the NAACP’s national office since the 1910s, the 
Briggs case was a victory regardless of the outcome: 
Whatever the outcome of the Clarendon County, S.C. trial 
testing and challenging segregation at the lower school 
level it marks the beginning of a new and better era of race 
relations in the United States.  It marks the emancipation of 
the Negro from fear and appeasement.  It frightened the 
unreconstructed South into cringing confession of its 
monstrous sins of omission, forced them to admit there was 
no escape from eventual defeat…”129 
Indeed, the Briggs decision’s one guarantee seemed to be that the losing side would 
appeal to the Supreme Court.130  Such a certainty is what made this case so incredibly 
important.   
Briggs created an increased interest in the NAACP. National membership 
secretary Lucille Black encouraged branches to capitalize on the case as an opportunity to 
garner new members. She made it very clear that this was not the time for black 
Carolinians to sit on their laurels.  The association needed their support now more than 
ever: 
At any rate, don’t sit down now!  Back up Thurgood Marshall’s efforts by 
getting the memberships and the money to carry on the fight.131 
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Southern blacks did not disappoint.   
Counting the Pearson case and the former Briggs case, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et 
al. was the third case De Laine was responsible for bringing to federal court.  This was 
the first one, however, that would be heard.  The previous two were withdrawn.  After 
years of organizing and enduring severe repercussions, De Laine and the petitioners were 
finally getting their day in court.132  Ever devout, De Laine “fervently prayed nothing 
would go wrong.”133   
Local blacks arrived at St. Mark Church during the early morning hours of the 
first day of court and caravanned the seventy or so miles to Charleston.  Instead of being 
battle-worn the travellers were excited.  Something was finally happening.  
Unfortunately, they arrived to an already full courtroom.  Anticipating a big crowd, black 
Charlestonians had arrived early that morning and took most of the seats.134  The 
“determined crowd” of African Americans arrived from near and far to support Marshall 
and the NAACP.135  As Judge Waring remembered, there were so many people in the 
corridor that the marshal had to rope off a path so that he and the other two judges could 
get through the door and to their seats.136 
But South Carolina’s segregationists quickly “created quite a coup” when they 
abandoned their previous efforts to argue that black and white school facilities were equal 
and openly admitted that they were, in fact, unequal.137  The Board of Trustees insisted 
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that they “never intended to discriminate against anyone on account of race or color.”138  
They defended their earlier finding that black and white schools were equal, asserting that 
they believed the white school facilities were superior in some ways, but inferior in other 
ways.139  Yet despite defending their original argument, the defense said they had been 
satisfied as to the fact that the “educational facilities, equipment, curricula, and 
opportunities” for black and white students were unequal.140  They continued to defend 
their disproportionate funds allocation, opining that Clarendon was a rural school district 
reliant on agricultural pursuits, and that limited funds forced the trustees to spend their 
resources on “the most immediate demand rather than in light of an overall picture.”141  
They also referenced Byrnes’ inaugural address and his school building program to 
demonstrate that they would be taking advantage of the newly available funds.  The 
defense would not oppose an order acknowledging that schools were unequal, but asked 
to be given a reasonable amount of time to formulate an equalization plan, have said plan 
approved, and presented to the court.142   
Admitting that the schools were unequal was a brilliant move.  Initially, it took 
the wind out of the plaintiffs’ case because the NAACP had planned to spend that first 
day explicating in excruciating detail just how unequal those facilities were.143  It was a 
smart move, and the segregationists knew it.  As Judge Waring remembered: 
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The defense said, ‘’Well, it’s no use to put all those witnesses in.” They 
very smugly said, “We want to save the court’s time, and we’ll admit that 
the school facilities aren’t good, but we will have them good, and any 
court order should be reasonable enough to give you time if you’re going 
to do that,” which sounded rather plausible, but didn’t meet the 
constitutional issue.144 
 
Waring was correct.  Marshall and Boulware certainly had to regroup.  The ample 
evidence of the county’s long-term neglect of black schoolchildren could have garnered 
their case some much-needed sympathy from Judges Parker and Timmerman.  But the 
defense’s admission did not deal with the constitutionality of segregation—the true crux 
of Marshall’s argument.   
 To challenge the constitutionality of racial segregation in public schools they 
relied on expert witnesses David Krech, Helen Trager, and Dr. Kenneth Clark.  Krech 
was a professor of social psychology, and Mrs. Trager was a schoolteacher and a lecturer 
at Vasser College, Dr. Clark was a psychology professor at City College of New York 
and the associate director at New York’s North Side Center.  Krech testified that legal 
segregation was harmful to black and white children, but was undoubtedly more harmful 
to black children.  Racial segregation supported the idea that African Americans were 
different and inferior to whites. Black children were being taught this harmful lesson at 
an age when they were forming their view of the world.  According to Krech, most 
children who grew up under legal segregation would never be able to recover from its 
harmful effects.145   
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Dr. Clark argued that segregation hurt “the discriminating and the 
discriminated.”146  Segregation not only gave African American children low self-esteem, 
but caused hostile feelings toward people in their own group.  Among whites, segregation 
created “increased hostility, guilty feelings, generalized deterioration of moral values and 
a callousness of conscience which expresses itself not only in reference to the Negro but 
in other things.”147 
 Mrs. Trager had similar findings in her research.  She found that children as 
young as age five were aware of racial difference.  Black children paradoxically 
expressed that they wanted to be black and that they wanted to be white.  Similarly black 
and white children understood that to be black meant that others would not want to play 
with you, and that you were not allowed to do the same things as white children.  So 
forced racial segregation influenced a child’s perception of their self-worth and 
stigmatized them.148 
Yet, despite their expert credentials and valid research findings, the defense’s 
attorneys relied on the age-old argument that these were outsiders; they did not 
understand the ways of the South; they may have had a lot of book learning, but they did 
not have practical experience.  The defense’s main witness was E.R. Crow, director of the 
newly established State Education Commission that was tasked with allocating the funds 
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created by the new sales tax.  While Marshall cross-examined him, Crow admitted that 
his opposition to school desegregation was based on his personal racial prejudices.149   
The defense also held up Plessy v. Ferguson to defend segregation’s 
constitutionality.  Clarendon County’s school superintendent, L. B. McCord, admitted 
that Clarendon County’s black children attended decidedly inferior schools.  Likewise 
their attorney, Robert McFigg Jr., admitted that Clarendon County schools were unequal.  
But he insisted that Byrnes’ new equalization program would deal with the inequalities.  
The county simply needed time.  But Marshall found McFigg’s assertion highly 
questionable.  He doubled down in his argument that segregation itself was 
unconstitutional.  And he reminded the court that “South Carolina has had 80 years” to 
equalize schools.150 
Ultimately the Briggs decision came down to Judge Parker.  Waring was 
staunchly against segregation, and Timmerman was an unwavering segregationist.  
Parker was an able judge who followed the law.  In the end, he decided that they could 
not overrule Plessy.  Judges Parker and Timmerman decided that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to a declaration that school facilities were unequal.  How school equalization was 
acquired was the local school board’s prerogative, but it had to be accomplished 
promptly.  The court would issue an injunction that the schools be equalized and schedule 
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times to follow-up on their progress.151  But they did not grant the plaintiffs’ request that 
segregation be ruled unconstitutional: 
We think, however, that segregation of the races in the public schools, so 
long as equality of rights is preserved, is a matter of legislative policy for 
the several states, with which the federal courts are powerless to 
interfere.152 
According to Parker and Timmerman, segregation was not unequal as long as the 
facilities and opportunities were equal.  Referring to expert testimony, the judges 
believed that the present case was not “hypothetical situations or mere theory.”.153  They 
also found testimony that desegregated schools were better for all children unconvincing, 
and said there was also testimony that it would result in “racial friction and tension.”154  
They believed it was in South Carolina’s best interest to keep schools racially 
segregated.155  
 For his part, Judge Waring seemed to think the defense’s case was all a ruse.  
Citing the fact that only five months prior the defense denied the presence of any 
inequalities, Waring urged the court to see through the defense’s method of avoiding the 
segregation issue.  He also questioned how racial segregation could be truly upheld by 
challenging the very idea that race and ancestry can be clearly defined.156  Noting the 
reliance on “blood and taint of blood” Waring said that there were only four kinds of 
blood—A, B, AB, and O—and that these are found in people of European and of African 
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ancestry.157  Furthermore, Waring questioned whether or not Parker and Timmerman’s 
legal arguments had a proverbial leg to stand on, noting Plessy was about intrastate 
transportation.  Cases that dealt directly with education, Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma, conclusively decided that segregation was unconstitutional.  He doubted 
that the defense—which openly admitted that schools were presently unequal and that 
they were unsure exactly how much money it would take to equalize them—would truly 
equalize schools.  Moreover, unlike the other two judges Waring found testimony 
regarding segregation’s negative social and psychological effects convincing.158  Perhaps 
more poignantly, he demonstrated an understanding of the huge challenges the plaintiffs 
faced in getting this case to court, and how unfortunate it was that all their hard work 
would be for naught: 
And in addition to all of this, these sixty-six Plaintiffs have not merely 
expended their time and money in order to test this important 
Constitutional question, but they have shown unexampled courage in 
bringing and presenting this cause at their own expense in the face of the 
long established and age-old pattern of the way of life with the State of 
South Carolina has adopted and practiced and lived in since and as a result 
of the institution of human slavery.159 
Timmerman and Parker signed a decree which had two central points: 1) South 
Carolina’s state constitution did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and 2) schools 
for Clarendon County’s African American children were significantly unequal to those 
provided to white children.160  This was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
defense was ordered to “proceed at once” with providing “educational facilities, 
equipment, curricula and opportunities equal to those furnished white pupils,” and report 
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back in six months.161  Waring, however, did not sign the decree.  Instead he wrote at the 
bottom “I do not join the decree for the reasons set forth in a separate dissenting 
opinion.”162 
 While the Briggs decision seemed to reaffirm segregation, some of the South’s 
“more thoughtful” segregationists feared that “it may be only a reprieve.” 163 
Desegregation was still a looming threat. The Briggs decision stymied equalization 
efforts throughout the South.164  With the help of Governor Byrnes’ equalization program 
white school officials throughout South Carolina began making a real effort to provide 
some semblance of “separate but equal.”165  A list of approved school building projects 
noted that black school facilities accounted for seventy-three percent of the total amount 
spent.  In Clarendon County, $516,900 was approved for black school facilities, while no 
funds had been approved for white school facilities.  In fact, although funds were 
approved in nine counties, only one county would be spending more on white facilities.  
Additionally, a bill was submitted to the legislature that would authorize the county 
treasurer and the school district board of trustees to issue and sell bonds.  The proceeds 
were to be used on school facilities and properties.  Scott’s Branch, the school at the 
center of the Briggs case, was receiving over $262,000 in updates, and would be ready as 
of September 1952.166 
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 De Laine’s daughter, Ophelia De Laine Gona, remembered that the school 
equalization program did bring about substantive changes for Clarendon County’s black 
children and teachers.  Two new elementary schools were approved.  Scott’s Branch was 
converted to an elementary school.  A new district high school for black children was 
constructed.  Teachers’ salaries in Clarendon County were finally equalized through a 
local supplement.  Bus transportation was provided to all school children.  The youngest 
Pearson children now rode the bus to a school with indoor toilets and water fountains.  
Fleming went so far as to say that some of the black school facilities built during Byrnes’ 
school equalization campaign were actually superior to the white school facilities.167  
Some people referred to the sales tax that funded the new school buildings as the “Jimmy 
tax.”168  But Clarendon County’s whites blamed it on the AME minister, calling it “De 
Laine’s tax.”169 Indeed, even the town’s black schoolchildren credited De Laine with the 
changes—though with a far more positive perspective.  They referred to “Rev. De 
Laine’s busses,” and the “De Laine building.”170  The governor’s school building 
program may have been an effort to dodge desegregation, but for Clarendon County’s 
poor black children, it was truly revolutionary.  And it was De Laine’s and their own 
activism that pushed the governor into action.  Unfortunately, De Laine would never have 
the opportunity to teach in one of the new equalization schools.  And only their youngest 
child attended one.  Ophelia and Jay were both already in college.171 
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 In February 1952 the NAACP moved for an early hearing and final deposition, 
and judgment in their favor.  The reasons for this motion included: 1) the defense 
admitted in court that facilities were unequal, 2) the “Report of Defendants” dated June 
21, 1952, showed that facilities remained unequal, 3) the aforementioned report only 
addressed school facilities.  It did not address what the defense considered indisputable 
proof that enforced segregation was detrimental to children, and 4) the plaintiffs could get 
no “permanent relief” unless the state constitutional requirement for racial segregation in 
schools was overturned.172   Judge Parker suggested to Timmerman and Waring that they 
grant the motion.  Waring declined to serve, on the basis that they still were not 
addressing the issue at hand—segregation.173  Besides Judge Waring, “the South’s most 
controversial public figure,” and “the man they love to hate,” would be retiring soon.174  
Judge and Mrs. Waring planned to move to New York where they would continue to 
fight for human rights.  But Waring tired of southern race relations, and he believed he 
had done all he could from the bench: 
There’s nothing more for me to do here.  I would not sit 
down again just to consider a report and I am not interested 
in blueprints showing how separate but equal toilets should 
be built.175 
 
Moreover, the elite white community Waring was born into had turned against him.  The 
Warings’ home was stoned, they received incessant threatening phone calls and letters, 
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and a petition calling for Judge Waring’s impeachment was circulating. 176  The 
progressive couple was “avoided like lepers.177”   News of his retirement was devastating 
to South Carolina blacks, but white Carolinians “seemed elated.”178 Mrs. Waring put it 
best when she commented that “the ostracism” in Charleston had “taken its toll.  They 
could remain in the city, “but what’s the point?”179 The Warings’ sentiments reveal that 
no one, not even privileged white elites, were safe from the repercussions that followed 
taking a public anti-segregation stance.  Waring would never move back to the South 
Carolina. 
Armistead W. Dobie replaced Waring, and along with Timmerman and Parker, 
the new judge followed the lead of their previous ruling.  The judges were more than 
satisfied with defense’s progress.  Referring to the governor’s equalization program, they 
expressed no doubts that equalization in Clarendon County would be realized by 
September 1952.  Therefore, they denied the request to abolish segregation.180 
As the Clarendon County desegregation battle moved to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
the repercussions against local blacks only heightened in severity.  The teacher who led 
this struggle—J.A. De Laine—noted in one of his sermons at Bethel A.M.E. Church that 
there was no secret behind why these repercussions were being levied: 
Negroes are being fired from their jobs and there is no 
denying as to the reason.  Banks are refusing to lend money 
to farmers and in some instances even refusing to cash 
government checks for them.  Negro and white 
businessmen who are sympathetic cannot buy supplies or 
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merchandize [sic] to carry on their day to day trade.  They 
are literally trying to starve us out.181 
Rev. Seals faced economic repercussions so intense that his wife was forced to move to 
Brooklyn to find gainful employment.  Threats against the family forced his thirteen-
year-old son to do the same.  On October 4, 1956, Seals’ home was burned down.  Billie 
Fleming’s funeral home became a focus of home grown terrorists.  Allen Fleming, 
Billie’s brother and business partner, came close to being burned inside the funeral parlor 
in January 1950.  He had burns on his back and hands, and half his hair was singed off.  
His funeral home was burned down in November of 1954.  He was able to resurrect his 
business, but it continued to be a target.  On September 17, 1955, it was peppered with 
sixteen-gauge gunfire.  In 1957 it was shot into twice during the middle of the night.  
Then on July 30, 1957, a twenty-eight car Ku Klux Klan caravan parked in front of that 
same business.  One of the people in the caravan was T. K. Jackson, the Clarendon 
County sheriff.  Even in 1960—twelve years after Pearson case, ten years after the first 
Briggs case, nine years after the second Briggs case, and six years after the Brown 
decision—Manning’s whites continued to target Fleming’s place of business. On 
February 27, he returned to the building that served as both his home and business to find 
that someone had shot a bullet through the front door.  Fleming suspected that the 
shooting was in retaliation to the recent student sit-in movement.182 
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 Even at the dawn of the 1960s, when the black civil rights movement would take 
on an increasingly youthful fervor, Clarendon County blacks continued to face 
unrelenting reprisals. In 1958, eight Clarendon County parents filed petitions requesting 
that their local school boards comply with the 1954 Brown decision.  The parents argued 
that, especially since Clarendon was one of the five original counties involved in the suit, 
four years was more than enough time for school officials to comply with the Supreme 
Court decision.  The school boards (Districts 2 and 3) replied two weeks later that the 
schools currently operated in everyone’s best interest and that they had no intention in 
complying with the law.183 
 Clarendon County’s African Americans were also seeking unfettered access to the 
vote.  During his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights on 
April 16, 1959, Billie Fleming testified that there was “a definite distinction” between 
how blacks and whites that went before the voter Board of Registration were treated.  Yet 
it remained impossible for local blacks to change this dynamic because they were 
purposely prevented from serving on the Board.184  
In an unfortunate bit of irony, Fleming and his family faced further repercussions 
for his audacity to testify about the economic reprisals he and other local blacks faced.  
Immediately after his testimony, South Carolina Sen. Olin Johnston confronted him with 
Clarendon County banker Charles Plowden’s testimony that his brother had a $4,000-
$4,500 outstanding loan from the bank.  The threat was clear, back down or your brother 
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will become the next victim of economic reprisals.  When Billie Fleming was a few days 
late in paying the mortgage on his business, the bank took advantage of the situation and 
insisted that he pay off the mortgage in full.185  He was able to pay off the loan, but only 
because local blacks had started their own self-help organization—the Clarendon County 
Improvement Association.186 
 Despite the mass black community support for Briggs, it is important to bear in 
mind that the move from equalization to desegregation represented “a deviation from the 
usual pattern.”187  Acquiring equal opportunities had always been at the center of black 
cultural values.  Black southerners had a history of petitioning for equal facilities, equal 
teacher salaries, and equal school terms.  But desegregation had not been a primary 
objective.  Indeed, differing opinions regarding whether or not desegregation was the 
right method served as a contributing factor to W. E. B. Du Bois’ departure from the 
organization he helped found.  While the NAACP was becoming more rigid in its support 
for desegregation, Du Bois was becoming less sure that it was feasible, or always in 
African Americans’ best interest. Virgil Clift warned that there could be negative, 
unforeseen consequences to desegregation. 188  
Despite the participation of black teachers on the local level in Clarendon County, 
plenty of black teachers feared that desegregation could prove detrimental to their 
careers.  These fears were partly perpetuated by school desegregation cases in other parts 
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of the country.  In Indiana, where racial segregation was abolished by the state 
legislature, one city was dismissing black teachers before they gained tenure and 
effectively became impossible to fire.  Moreover, black teachers were not being hired in 
the new teaching positions that were created when black students’ transferred to 
previously all-white schools.  The superintendent used this to push the city’s black 
teachers into urging their students to continue attending segregated schools.189 
 Southern segregationists promised their undying support to maintaining 
segregation.  The state was moving forward with Governor Byrnes’ $75 million public 
school building program.190 During an address to the State Education Association, the 
white teachers’ professional organization, on March 16, 1951, Byrnes said that the state 
would “abandon the public school system if it cannot continue to separate white and 
Negro pupils.”191  No matter what happened, South Carolina was prepared to avoid 
school desegregation.  During a radio address on October 30, 1952, Lieutenant Governor 
George Bell Timmerman, Jr., whose father served as a judge on the Briggs case, warned 
the public that, in the coming election, they had an important decision to make regarding 
the state’s public education system.  Timmerman somewhat contradicted Byrnes’ claim 
that the state would close its public schools rather than desegregate them.  For, unlike 
many other states, South Carolina’s state constitution required that it provide a public 
school system for all children.  So if the Briggs’ United States Supreme Court case was 
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ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor South Carolina would have to either provide “mixed 
schools” or violate its own constitution.192   
The solution was to find a way around such a ruling beforehand.  And the 
Palmetto State’s segregationists were thinking ahead. The state legislature approved two 
bills that directly addressed the issue. One established a committee “to study and 
recommend a course of action” should the Supreme Court rule racial segregation 
unconstitutional.  The second put a measure on the ballot repealing the state 
constitutional requirement to operate a public school system.  Timmerman urged his 
listeners to go to the polls and vote in favor of the amendment.193  Without the 
amendment’s passage, the state would have “no legal avenue” to continue racially 
segregated schools if the court decided in the plaintiffs’’ favor.194 
 Despite the fact that the NAACP lost the Briggs case, it continued to serve as an 
effective mobilizing tool in preparation for the Supreme Court case.  Thurgood Marshall 
arrived in Sumter, South Carolina in September of 1951 to attend the 13th annual meeting 
of the South Carolina Conference of Branches.195  Along with South Carolina’s own 
Harold Boulware, Marshall would “map the state’s legal program.”196  His presence at 
the meeting demonstrated that the association continued to see the Palmetto State as a 
vital part of its national movement.  It is also evidence that black Carolinians remained 
committed to racial advancement.  Indeed, local blacks saw the battle for equal education 
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as part of a whole cadre of important contemporary issues, including employment 
discrimination, and political participation. 197 
 Unfortunately for the people of Clarendon County, just because the highest court 
in the land ruled that schools across the country had to desegregate did not mean that the 
white power structure would comply with the law, nor that they would relent on using 
reprisals against those who had dared to challenge the racial status quo.  As Billie 
Fleming recalled: 
When they gave the terminology “with all deliberate 
speed,” there was no timetable set.  Now this gave way to 
new thinking in the white community. . . During this time, 
it gave them a chance to revamp.198 
 
Moreover, black parents may have felt ill at ease with sending their children to formerly 
white schools because the first black children to attend those schools had “a very 
unpleasant experience.”199  
A decade after Brown, Summerton’s schools remained racially segregated.  As of 
1963, 300 white children and 2,700 black children in Summerton were still attending 
segregated schools. Movement leaders like Billie Fleming found that they had to tread 
this path carefully because they also had to contend with the likelihood of a state-aided 
private school system that would be created in desegregation’s immediate aftermath. And 
if they took on the private school system directly, they risked Summerton’s school 
officials closing the public schools in retaliation.  According to State Rep. Joseph O. 
Rogers, the town’s white residents were committed to a segregated private school system.  
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an order for immediate desegregation.  As a 
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result, five black students were able to attend previously all white schools.  But the 
following year, the desegregated school was closed down and Scott’s Branch High 
School remained open.  All the district’s white students were either sent to an integrated 
school in Manning or their parents removed them from public school altogether, opting to 
send them to a newly opened private school.  When a desegregation plan was created for 
the 1970-71 school year, a private school named Salem School was founded.  Local 
whites claimed the timing was just a coincidence, but the absence of any black students in 
the school seemed to prove otherwise.200   
Repercussions against Clarendon blacks continued more than fifteen years after 
the Briggs cases ended.  De Laine and other northern supporters worked hard to get the 
word out regarding what Clarendon County’s people were going through.  The AFL-CIO 
loaned the Clarendon County Improvement Association more than $40K to buy a 
combine.  But in a move that demonstrated how petty and ill-willed local whites were, no 
merchant in the state would sell them the equipment unless they could prove that the 
buyer was not from Clarendon County.  They eventually had to buy the combine from 
another state.  Reverdy Wells, the Scott’s Branch student leader and class valedictorian 
who had initiated the petition against Principal Benson, was never able to receive a 
college degree.  He had been accepted to SC State on a conditional basis, but was drafted 
into the military.  When he applied to another school he was refused admission.  The 
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valedictorian’s grades were altered to all F’s.  His transcript was not fixed until 1991.  He 
died in 2007.201 
 Reprisals against the De Laines became hyper-intensified in the years following 
Briggs and Brown.  After it became apparent that Rev. De Laine had no intention of 
paying the slander suit, a “very suspicious” thing happened. 202   The De Laines’ 
Summerton home burned to the ground.  The town’s firemen arrived in time to intervene, 
but chose not to because the home was located twenty to sixty feet outside the city limits.  
An official report confirmed it was arson.  The fire provided a way for De Laine’s 
enemies to finally get to him.  The property was no longer in his name, but the insurance 
was.  The local insurance agent had refused to transfer it to Dr. Adams.  As a result, the 
court was able to attach the whole insurance payment to the case, despite the fact that it 
was substantially higher than the fine.203   
Perhaps if their persecution stopped there, things would have turned out 
differently for the teacher and preacher.  But after the Brown decision, whites in Lake 
City started to hear that the man responsible for desegregation was their very own Rev. J. 
A. De Laine. The De Laines became an even bigger target.  Eggs and bricks were thrown 
at the parsonage. On August 20, 1955, nightriders drove by and broke a living room 
window. Six days later someone threw an orange at their window.  Then on August 30 
someone drove by and threw bottles at the house, breaking four windows.  On September 
3 several cars drove by making a lot of noise.  A two-toned Buick returned a few minutes 
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later and unloaded a barrage of rocks. The De Laines had been reporting all these 
incidents to the local police, but it was pretty clear they were not taken seriously.  They 
asked him if he was a NAACP member, which he affirmed.  Rev. De Laine actually got 
in his car and followed the young men who broke the window.  He wrote down their 
license plate and reported it to the police who initially told him that he must be mistaken.  
The police did finally follow up on the incident, but they said the plates belonged to a 
dealer and it was impossible to know who was driving the car at the time.  The police 
chief told him that next time he should “mark” the car by shooting it.  That way they 
would know which car the nightriders were in.204   
The next month things came to a head.  On October 3, 1955, Mrs. De Laine’s 
neighbor, Ms. Eaddy, woke her up to inform her that the church—which was located 
across the street—was on fire.  The Lake City firemen got the fire under control and 
completely put out. But the fire bore a striking resemblance to the one that destroyed their 
Summerton home.205  The insurance investigator said that the electrical wiring was in 
good shape and there was no evidence of fire before or after the incident.  He concluded 
that it was clearly arson because “the fire had to start somewhere.”206 Apparently, 
gasoline and kerosene were poured down the aisle and around the pulpit and choir stand.  
At the time, Rev. De Laine was in Charleston at a statewide AME conference. He 
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returned to Lake City as soon as he could, but there was not much he could do.   He 
returned to Charleston to wrap up his obligations at the conference.207  
 On Friday, October 7, Mattie De Laine arrived home to see an oddly addressed 
letter to her husband and, uncharacteristically, decided to open it.  What she saw inside 
scared her.  It was an unveiled threat on his life.  The letter told the De Laines to leave 
Lake City voluntarily or be killed.  Mrs. De Laine’s friend told her that she needed to go 
to Charleston to notify her husband.  So the following day, she dressed as if she were 
going in to work so that anyone who saw her would think she was on the way to the 
school.  But instead, she found a friend to take her to Charleston where the local police 
chief provided Rev. De Laine with twenty-four hour protection and forwarded copies of 
the letter to the state and federal bureaus of investigation.208   
Bishop Reid, who had insisted the De Laines move to Lake City for their own 
protection, now offered Rev. De Laine a position in Hamilton, Bermuda.  At this point, 
De Laine was being pressured on all sides to leave.  Local blacks were sincerely fearful 
that his life was at risk.  And Bishop Reid made more than a few offers for De Laine to 
be transferred somewhere else. He could go to New York, or New Jersey.  But De Laine 
did not want to be run out of town.  He insisted on being reinstated in the Lake City 
church circuit.  He and Mattie were southern, country folk.  They did not want the bustle 
of the city.  On the final day of the conference Bishop Reid announced to a shocked 
congregation of ministers that Rev. De Laine would remain in the St. James Circuit in 
Lake City.  Referencing Emmitt Till, Bishop Reid said, “I don’t think Lake City is 
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Mississippi.”  De Laine would be fine, “I don’t think they will bother the Rev. De 
Laine.”209  The St. James delegation travelled back home in a caravan, with De Laine’s 
car in the center.210 
On Monday morning, October 10, more than one person approached Rev. De 
Laine, advising him to leave Lake City.  One individual even told him that the Klan held 
a rally with the goal of killing him.  Mrs. De Laine repeatedly begged him to leave.  They 
could at least to go Sumter for the night and stay with friends.  But he was resolved to 
stay.211  
 On the evening of Wednesday, October 12, a number of cars that rode past their 
home.  Around 11:30p.m. Mrs. De Laine, who was up grading papers, peeked out the 
window to see barrels sticking out the windows of two cars.  Then she saw a flash of light 
and heard what sounded like firecrackers.  She rushed to wake up her husband.  He was 
in the middle of reassuring her that she was overreacting when he heard the sound of 
gunfire.  He immediately became alert, turned out the lights and grabbed his gun.  He 
went outside and saw a man near his garage.  He initially thought it was the shooter, but it 
was his neighbor, Mr. Web Eaddy.  Eaddy agreed to take Mrs. De Laine to his home and 
about ten minutes later a car came back and shot into the De Laines’ home again.  
Following Chief Hines’ directive, De Laine returned two shots and “marked” the car.  
Mrs. De Laine wanted to go check on her husband when she heard him shoot back, but 
the Eaddys insisted she stay put. The car drove off, disappearing into the street.  One of 
the bullets De Laine shot hit the car and shattered into pieces that hit the two riders, Harry 
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Gause and Donald Graham.  De Laine later expressed regret that Gause and Graham were 
hit, but maintained that he was aiming at the car, not its occupants.212 
De Laine was initially going to wait the night out.213  He had marked the car.  A 
policeman was supposed to drive by his home every fifteen minutes for his protection.  
But the policeman that came by was Mr. Gray, a black man who had to tow the line 
between ingratiating himself to his white employers and keeping peace with his black 
community members.  That night Mr. Gray told De Laine that he needed to leave 
immediately.  His life depended on it.  De Laine had been looking for a sign that he 
needed to leave and this was it.  With his wife safely ensconced in the Eaddy’s home, he 
grabbed his bag and his gun and got in his car to leave town.214   
On his way out of town another group of riders saw him and a high-speed chase 
ensued.  He floored the accelerator as fast as he could.  He lost his pursuers when he 
finally had to stop for gas.215  An arrest warrant was issued the next day against Rev. De 
Laine for “assault and battery with a deadly weapon.”216  The two nightriders, Gause and 
Graham, were reportedly “painfully but not seriously injured.”217 
The next morning, Mattie De Laine’s mother sent Mattie’s two brothers to Lake 
City to pick her up and bring her home to Columbia.  At this point both Rev. and Mrs. De 
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Laine had presumably gone missing.  Authorities knew Mrs. De Laine was in Columbia.  
Florence County Deputy H. S. Myers said he spoke with her the day after the shooting, 
but he did not know where she was staying.218  Bishop Reid, who had reappointed De 
Laine to the Lake City church, told the newspaper that De Laine’s life was in danger and 
“he had to run for his life.”219  By October 14, their belongings were being moved out of 
their Lake City home.  Law officials contacted some of De Laine’s family members, but 
no one knew where he was.  Her husband’s absence gave Mrs. De Laine anxiety.  She 
was reportedly “in a terrible condition” and in a physician’s care.  But law enforcement 
had an inkling that he had gone North.  His relatives were ignorant of his whereabouts 
but seemedunworried about his safety; and several northern congregations had invited 
Rev. De Laine to join them.220   
From here, their movements become even more convoluted.  The De Laines 
wanted to see their daughter, Ophelia, who was in school in Charlotte.  So they had a 
family dinner with her there. Their next stop was New York and they arrived separately.  
Mrs. De Laine went by train.221  Rev. De Laine went by plane, first arriving in D.C., then 
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rode to Trenton, and finally arrived in New York.222  De Laine said he felt “the hand of 
God guiding me.”223 
Over the next year, the De Laines made numerous public appearances through 
John Sivera, a public relations specialist the Bishop assigned to work with them.  The 
money they raised through these appearances was supposed to help the family get back 
on their feet, with a portion also going to help the movement.  But the De Laines noticed 
that Sivera gave them a flat fee of $50 to $75.  The amount did not seem to correlate with 
how much was raised. The fundraising effort seemed to foretell what their life in New 
York would be like and the type of relationship they would have with the AME church 
hierarchy.224   
But the AME hierarchy did not place him there.  Instead they gave him an open 
appointment in Buffalo, with a promise that financial assistance would be forthcoming 
once he established a new congregation.  He did, in fact, establish a new church in 
Buffalo.  Always cognizant of the struggle and thankful for its few white allies, he named 
the new church the De Laine-Waring AME Church, in honor of federal district judge 
Waties Waring.  Although he did not receive financial backing from the AME hierarchy, 
De Laine was able to successfully mobilize his South Carolina connections to get the 
church started.  Fellow minister and activist Rev. E. E. Richburgh sent him some money 
from himself and dozens of other Liberty Hill members including Mazie Solomon and 
Annie Gipson.  He encouraged De Laine, “don’t become discourage[d], God will 
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provide.”225 De Laine felt that the church hierarchy’s treatment of him during this time 
was no different than the economic reprisals he faced in South Carolina.226 
On top of all these issues was the threat of De Laine’s extradition.227  But De 
Laine had some of the AME’s machinery advocating on his behalf. New York AME 
Bishop D. Ward Nichols told the press that the South Carolina authorities would have get 
an extradition order because De Laine was a refugee. He was giving “him asylum in the 
same way we give refugees from Europe asylum.”228   He also helped De Laine retain a 
lawyer.  South Carolina officials inquired with the Justice Department regarding a federal 
fugitive warrant, which would enable federal authorities to arrest De Laine.229  But a U.S. 
District Attorney said that De Laine was living openly in New York. He was not on the 
run and therefore it was unnecessary to grant a federal fugitive warrant.  Gov. 
Timmerman charged the department with “discriminating in the administration of 
justice.”230  According to Timmerman, De Laine was a “fugitive from justice” and the 
attorney general was using his office to promote integration and the Republican agenda. 
De Laine did surrender to the police in New York on November 25, 1955.   He was 
booked as a fugitive from justice, but paroled in felony court.  Timmerman then called on 
President Eisenhower to explain the Justice Department’s refusal to grant a federal 
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extradition warrant.  But De Laine’s supporters were already petitioning New York 
governor Averell Harriman not to sign an extradition order.  They asked him to consider 
not only the legal issues, but the human cost—the certainty that De Laine would be 
sentence to the chain gang and likely be killed at the hands of the Klan.231   
All of Timmerman’s outrage must have been bluster because his office failed to 
take any action to secure De Laine’s extradition and his parole was continued.232   Instead 
Timmerman changed his tune.  The Palmetto State was “well rid of this professional 
agitator”—a title De Laine took as “a great tribute.”233  The state did not pursue De 
Laine’s extradition.  Although he was unable to return to his home state, De Laine 
became a free man in 1956 when a New York felony court magistrate dismissed the 
fugitive charge against De Laine due to South Carolina’s failure to come through with a 
warrant.234  He missed home but his escape from South Carolina was cause to “rejoice in 
God’s deliverance of me, to a place where I can wage a greater battle for the cause of 
JUSTICE.”235 
In 1958 Rev. De Laine was finally assigned to Calvary AME Church in Brooklyn, 
NY.  The De Laines purchased a home in Queens where they lived until retirement.  In 
1971 Rev. De Laine submitted his resignation letter and asked to be transferred to the 
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Western North Carolina Conference where he would connect with local church folk, but 
did not want to be appointed to a pastorate. He moved to Charlotte, North Carolina, in 
1971.  Mrs. De Laine remained in New York until she retired from her teaching position 
in 1973 and joined her husband.236 
Rev. De Laine died on August 3, 1974.  Mrs. De Laine lived twenty-five more 
years, passing away in 1999.  She had been a schoolteacher in New York for seventeen 
years.  With so little support from the church, Mattie De Laine’s income was essential to 
their survival.  It gave them a certain amount of financial security.  Mrs. De Lane’s career 
not only demonstrates how important women’s work was to black families, it reiterates 
the fact that black women not only provided emotional support for their families; they 
were often an important source of financial security.237 
The De Laines were never able to return home to live in Clarendon County, or 
anywhere else in South Carolina.  He still had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and 
authorities refused to dismiss it.238  The move to New York certainly caused economic 
problems, but the biggest sacrifice was being away from their family. Despite the fact 
that South Carolina had become “a land of terror and violence,” the De Laines were 
“homesick and lonesome” for their family.239  They were never able to truly reunite their 
family unit.  As Mrs. De Laine remembered: 
Our feeling was not good.  And we did not feel welcome 
back in the state.  We knew we weren’t welcome.  He 
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wasn’t welcome and I felt if he wasn’t welcome then I 
wasn’t welcome.  Yet all of our people—most of our close 
relatives—were in the state.  And everybody wants to visit 
their relatives.240 
In 1968 some of his South Carolina friends began efforts to safely bring him back to 
home.  They reached out to noted Charleston activist J. Arthur Brown and South Carolina 
governors Robert E. McNair and John West.241  De Laine was getting older and “wanted 
to spend the remainder of his life in his home state.”242  John Bolt Culbertson, one of 
South Carolina’s most liberal attorneys, even offered to represent De Laine pro bono in 
the event he chose to return to South Carolina and face the charges.243  But De Laine was 
unwilling to return if it meant being “humiliated…arrested and mistreated by race 
haters.”244 In 1971 Rev. De Laine wrote the newly formed South Carolina Governor’s 
Advisory Council on Human Relations and asked to be allowed to return home.245  De 
Laine pointed to irony of his predicament—he had been prevented from returning home 
while the “night riding criminals” who shot into his home “enjoyed the protection of the 
state.”246  The Council did appoint someone to investigate the matter, but they quickly 
ended their efforts on behalf of De Laine after they were unable to get the charges against 
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him dropped.  As one reporter put it, De Laine’s Lake City accusers were still 
“determined to punish” him.  In 1994—twenty years after his death—when a sympathizer 
requested the warrant be removed, South Carolina authorities refused with the pitiful 
excuse that in the event he applied for a job, employers deserved to know his history.247 
Rev. De Laine finally received some recognition for his activism posthumously.  
Mrs. De Laine received several invitations to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of Brown v. Board of Education.  She was invited to the South Carolina NAACP 
Conference of Branches’ program in Columbia, South Carolina; the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund’s commencement in Washington, D.C., and a reception at 
the White House with President Carter.  The NAACP Legal Defense Fund invited her 
again for the thirtieth anniversary of the historic decision.  On September 9, 2004, Rev. 
De Laine was posthumously awarded the Congressional Gold Medal—that body’s 
highest award.  Congressman Clyburn, the first African American to be elected to that 
position since 1897, was the one who pressed for the award. Ironically, Sen. Ernest F. 
Hollings, who had been unabashedly segregationist, first introduced the idea.  De Laine 
was also posthumously awarded by the University of South Carolina’s Museum of 
Education in 2006 when he was inducted into their Hall of Honor.248   His official papers 
are how housed at the South Caroliniana Library on that same university’s campus—a 
school which did not desegregate until 1963, nearly a decade after the Brown decision. 
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CHAPTER 4: “HELL IS POPPING HERE IN SOUTH CAROLINA:” 
ORANGEBURG COUNTY BLACK TEACHERS AND THEIR COMMUNITY IN 
THE IMMEDIATE POST-BROWN ERA 
 
On the morning of May 15, 1956, Cecil Williams, a young photographer from 
Orangeburg, South Carolina, traveled to the Elloree Training School (ETS) to photograph 
twenty-one faculty members. The neatly dressed group of sixteen women and five men 
assembled in the front of the building, where the name of the school appeared above their 
heads on the brick facade. As she moved to the front of the group so that her petite frame 
would be visible Elizabeth Cleveland, a newlywed and recent South Carolina State 
College graduate, wore a polka dot dress, white shoes, and carried a matching white 
clutch. On the far right of the group stood the school’s principal, Charles Davis, who 
arranged the photograph session. He had one arm wrapped around the shoulders of his 
wife, Rosa Delores Davis.  Although many of the teachers smiled as Williams 
photographed them, the moment’s seriousness weighed heavily upon them. Days earlier, 
when the ETS teachers received their contracts for the upcoming school term, they 
noticed new questions that asked if they were members of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and if they aspired to teach an integrated 
class. When the twenty-one African American teachers refused to distance themselves 
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from the leading civil rights organization and refused to endorse prevailing segregationist 
practices, white school officials refused to rehire them for the upcoming school year.1   
The collective defiance of those black teachers in the spring of 1956 was just one 
of a growing number of civil rights protests that aimed to challenge and dismantle social 
and racial inequity in the American South.  Two years earlier, on May 17, 1954, the 
NAACP won its most historically significant legal victory when Chief Justice Earl 
Warren announced the United States Supreme Court’s decision regarding Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka, Kansas. When the highest court in the land ruled that the South’s 
long-held doctrine of “separate but equal” had no place in the public school system, it 
dealt a powerful blow to segregation’s legal and intellectual defenses. In the immediate 
post-Brown years (1955-1956), South Carolina continued to be an influential 
battleground. Even as the courts deliberated, the state’s champions of white supremacy 
worked in advance of the decision to circumvent desegregation and to shore up 
ideological, political, and intellectual support. For black Carolinians, those immediate 
post-Brown years were simultaneously full of promise and despair.  The Supreme Court’s 
vague instruction to implement desegregation with “all deliberate speed” gave South 
Carolina’s segregationists the opportunity to avoid compliance with the ruling.  In the 
face of a strong civil rights organization, powered by a mass of seemingly powerless 
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people, South Carolina’s segregationists would have to attack the NAACP, its members, 
and its supporters in order to evade the law.2  
Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, argued that many white southerners, even 
“right here in South Carolina,” not only wanted to follow the new law of the land, but 
that many were “ashamed of the injustices that have occurred under the separate but 
equal system.  They know, deep down in their hearts, that never, never will there be 
equality until segregation is abolished.”3  State NAACP president, Rev. James Hinton, 
seemed to agree with Marshall and Wilkins when he said, “Negroes foresee no trouble 
ahead, unless it is suggested, or led by those instructed with the administration of the 
law.”4   In fact, while at a Georgia State NAACP Conference Rev. Hinton seemed 
confident that state officials would eventually comply with the Brown decision. He 
dismissed segregationists’ claims that they would avoid desegregation.  He argued that 
they had made similar claims regarding maintaining an all-white primary, but that after 
the court made its decision, and the judge made clear that he would uphold that decision, 
African Americans did, in fact, gain access to the ballot.  According to Hinton, as long as 
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African Americans had “the courage to stand up,” they would find that they had “all the 
necessary support” to make desegregation a reality.5 
For their part, South Carolina’s black educators seemed in favor of the historic 
decision.  The Palmetto State Teachers Association (PSTA) voiced their open approval, 
saying that it was consistent with their belief in democracy and pledged one thousand 
dollars to support the implementation of “universal public education within the 
framework of the recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court.”6  Local teachers also 
became desegregation activists.  In Charleston, Septima Clark and Henry Hutchinson, 
already seasoned activists, helped lead the city’s desegregation campaign.  Hutchinson 
was a history teacher at Burke Industrial School (whose teachers had been at the center of 
the Charleston teacher hiring campaign) and an advisor for the NAACP youth chapter.  
When Charleston NAACP president J. Arthur Brown submitted a desegregation petition, 
Hutchinson and Clark organized a number of workshops to help shore-up support.7 
Only seven days after the initial Brown decision, SC NAACP leader James 
Hinton travelled to Atlanta to serve as chairman of a quickly organized conference that 
would draft a desegregation program. The conference urged all branches in the Jim Crow 
South to begin submitting desegregation petitions to their local school boards.  The 
association projected confidence that desegregation would become a reality due to both 
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the United States Supreme Court decision and a growing African American electorate.8  
As NAACP executive secretary Walter White said: 
Already our branches and state conferences are hard at 
work in a region-wide campaign to get 3,000,000 Negro 
voters registered by 1956 . . . with this vote plus that of 
enlightened white citizens we can look forward to 
elimination from political life of some of the present 
demagogues who plague the region.9 
 
On the surface such rhetoric projected confidence reassured local activists, like the 
parents in Clarendon County who had put their lives on the line for the sake of bettering 
their children’s education.  But that the NAACP paired desegregation’s success with the 
growth of the black vote may also demonstrate that its leaders foresaw a path that would 
be, at best, difficult to traverse.  
Sensing the refusal of southern white leaders to implement desegregation, the 
NAACP drafted a resolution that asked Congress to make federal education aid available 
only to states that complied “fully with the spirit and purpose of the Constitution.”10  The 
NAACP wanted Congress to ensure that any federal aid reserved for education contained 
protective measures, which would prevent such funds from being used in segregated 
schools.   Furthermore, they requested that preexisting legislation be amended to include 
the same restrictive measures.11 
Unsurprisingly, many white Southerners saw desegregation as an impending 
doom.  One federal judge in South Carolina, Ashton H. Williams, compared the NAACP 
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to the KKK, implying that it was an extremist organization whose departure from the 
Palmetto State would only better race relations. Bob Jones, founder of the religiously 
conservative Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, wrote Roy Wilkins a 
lengthy letter condemning the NAACP and the Supreme Court.12  According to Jones, 
both had irrevocably harmed southern race relations.  He compared integration to the 
Tower of Babel:   
He fixed those boundaries between races.  After the flood, 
God told the people to go out and scatter and replenish the 
earth; and they went out and built the Tower of Babel and 
said they were going to have one world and one race.  But 
God said that was not His will, and he scattered them.13 
 
In short, desegregation was un-Christian, and cast African Americans out of favor with 
“conservative Christians” who had been “the best friends the colored people have” and 
were “doing everything in the world we could to help them.”14  Desegregation would be a 
failure because “the omnipotent God [was] against it.”15  But it was Jones’ assertion that 
African Americans should “teach their own children” which revealed that despite the fact 
that he was trying to make a biblical argument, his fears were the same as any other 
segregationists.16  If schools were truly desegregated, would white teachers be forced to 
teach black children?  And, likely more important to someone like Jones, would black 
teachers be allowed to instruct white children?  
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 Yet, it was not the integration of black teachers that provoked the greatest sense 
of anxiety among white segregationists, but the oft-employed fear of miscegenation and 
interracial marriage.  Orangeburg segregationists declared that the NAACP’s whole 
objective was “intermarriage and the mongrelization of the white races.”17  Yet the 
NAACP made clear that it “was not a marriage bureau.”18  Its primary concern was 
education, not marriage. To allay these fears they noted that even in states that had 
integrated schools, interracial marriage remained low.19  Moreover, the NAACP argued 
that the “if you let the Nigra do thus and so, he’ll marry your daughter” argument was a 
discredit to white women, as if they would have to be “restrained by law from choosing 
Negro mates.”20  In fact, Roy Wilkins argued that the “social association between the 
races” simply was not part of the NAACP’s program.21   
 Southern politicians used the Brown decision as a rallying cry.  It became a 
central issue throughout the South, but especially in Georgia and South Carolina, where it 
became the issue as politicians, in an effort to prove that they were more devoted to 
segregation than their running mates, “maneuvered frantically to occupy the extreme 
segregationist position.”22  In the 1954 gubernatorial primary, race and desegregation 
became a central factor in the South Carolina Democratic Party’s factionalism.  The race 
was between Lester Bates and Lt. Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr.  Both 
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candidates were decidedly against integration, with Timmerman proposing a three-school 
system—one for whites, one for blacks, and one for those seeking integration.  Bates 
opposed Timmerman’s plan as well as any other that permitted any form of integration.  
However, Bates lost the election, partly because Timmerman charged him with being a 
NAACP member.  The accusation, as ludicrous as it may have been, was enough to sink 
Bates’ campaign.23 Timmerman turned out to be no less committed to segregation than 
Bates.  In his inaugural address he stated that even gradual desegregation would be 
“cowardly because it seeks to minimize opposition by careful selection of a few victims 
from time to time.”24  Yet in his farewell address to the state legislature, the soon to be 
former governor, James F. Byrnes, was certain that white Carolinians had nothing to 
worry about.  He asserted that “the great majority” of black parents wanted their children 
to attend “modern schools for Negroes and be taught by Negro teachers.”25  Such an 
assertion contradicted the NAACP’s belief that what black parents truly wanted were 
competent teachers, regardless of their race.26  
 Even before the Supreme Court gave its Brown decision, an initial reaction to 
desegregation was a threat to close public schools. The NAACP tried to call 
segregationists’ bluff:   
If, which is not likely, the public school system were 
abolished, who would educate the poor white child?  He 
could not pay to attend private schools.  Only professional 
and business classes and skilled laborers could afford an 
education for their children.27 
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Southern states could not close down public schools without loosing their investment—a 
valid point in South Carolina where, in an effort to avoid desegregation, the state had 
increased its education budget by millions of dollars.28  Yet, southern segregationists’ 
assumption that the Brown decision was a ruling in their favor was not without merit.  
Even Roy Wilkins acknowledged that when southern political leaders heard the Supreme 
Court’s language of “with all deliberate speed,” they were “hollering happy,” viewing the 
ruling as a victory for the South.  The decision of when (or if) to desegregate schools 
would be left up to the local courts, who would be sympathetic to the segregationist’s 
plight.29   When Brown was argued for the third time in 1955, NAACP lawyers stressed 
to the court the need for definite methods and time limit to institute the court’s decision.  
However six states (Arkansas, Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas) 
submitted recommendations that stressed that desegregation should be implemented 
gradually and with as little interference from the federal government as possible.30  So, 
while the second Brown decision said that desegregation should happen “with all 
deliberate speed,” the Supreme Court basically sided with the southern position.  The 
court acknowledged that desegregation could look very different from one school district 
to another.  They could not “easily venture beyond the executive department’s position in 
a case involving such complex enforcement problems.”31  The court chose to recognize 
the “varied school problems” and gave no specific time limit for desegregating schools.32 
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 South Carolina’s segregationists had a distinct advantage over their counterparts 
in other southern states because they laid the groundwork for resistance years before 
Brown.  Argued in 1951, the Briggs v. Elliott case put the state in the spotlight and made 
both black and white citizens aware that changes in the public education system were a 
legal imperative.  Adamant that these changes would not result in school desegregation, 
Governor James Byrnes turned to the state legislature to start “preparedness measures.”33  
In 1951 he appointed a fifteen-member committee comprised of five state senators, five 
state representatives, and five laymen representing the state at-large.  The purpose of the 
committee was “to study and report on the advisable course to be pursued” in the event 
federal courts mandated desegregation.34  Yet, despite the fact that the committee was 
formed to study an issue that would directly impact the lives of black children, “not one 
Negro (not even one of the favorite Uncle Toms…)” was asked to serve.35  L. Marion 
Gressette, a state Senator from Orangeburg County, was the chairman of the newly 
established committee, which became known by his name—the Gressette Committee.36  
The Gressette Committee’s solutions offered “as much of a threat to the public schools in 
general as it did to desegregation.”37  So when the Supreme Court announced its decision, 
South Carolina was ready.  It had a well-established, state-mandated agency explicitly 
designed to protect racial segregation. Two months after Brown, the Committee began 
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holding special sessions.38  During those meetings, committee members concluded that 
the Supreme Court’s decision did not apply to the state of South Carolina: 
Time has brought some clarification of just what the United 
States Supreme Court did decide.  It is becoming plain that 
the Court did not intend to force integration on an unwilling 
people. It is the considered opinion of your Committee that 
there is nothing in the Constitution or the decision which 
compels the State of South Carolina to deliberately mix the 
races in the public schools.39 
 
At the start of the 1954-55 school year, the Committee recommended that schools open 
“according to the present pattern of pupil classification and assignments in keeping with 
previously established policy.”40  They argued that the Supreme Court had purposely not 
made “any order or decree which might have the effect of forcing an immediate change 
in local school policy or procedure.”41  Governor George Bell Timmerman agreed with 
this assertion.  During a 1955 statewide radio-television address, he stated: 
There is one current misunderstanding about the Supreme 
Court opinion that we should clarify in our minds.  The 
Court did not say that school children must attend racially 
mixed schools.  It did not say that all public schools must 
be racially mixed. . . What the Court has said, and all that it 
has said, in this respect, is that no child can be denied 
admittance to a school of his choice because of his race.42 
 
																																								 																				
38 Katherine Mellen Charron, Freedom’s Teacher: The Life of Septima Clark, (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 209-220; News Statement by Senator L. 
Marion Gressette, 12 June 1954, Workman Papers, Box 32. 
39 Interim Report of South Carolina School Committee, 14 December 1955, Gressette 
Papers, Box 5. 
40 Interim Report of South Carolina School Committee, 18 July 1954, Workman Papers, 
Box 32. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Address of Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr., 3 November 1955, Box 2, George 
Bell Timmerman Papers, South Carolina Political Collections, University of South 
Carolina, Columbia. 
 
	 169 
Timmerman and the Gressette committee’s rhetoric was clear.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision was merely an “opinion,” not a ruling.  By the time the Elloree teachers made 
their stand, the Gressette Committee had already established intimate relationships with 
local school boards. Parroting the “separate but equal” doctrine, the committee also 
employed a rhetoric of equality.  They reported that their goal was to provide better 
educational opportunities for all South Carolina children.43 The Committee downplayed 
black Carolinians’ efforts to desegregate schools, saying that both blacks and whites were 
“to be commended for their attitude of calmness” in the aftermath of the 1954 decision.44  
They claimed that this calmness was proof that “sentiment in favor of separate schools 
and against integrated schools has crystallized in recent months.”45  According to them, 
African Americans were not attempting to integrate schools.46  Therefore public opinion 
was clear.  The people of South Carolina wanted  “better schools, but separate schools.”47   
Even as the 1950s came to a close, when there had been vibrant integration efforts across 
the state and the whole South, the committee continued to assert that South Carolinians 
were—and would continue to be—happy with segregated schools.48 
An act was approved on March 27, 1956 that extended the committee’s existence 
and scope.  They would not only study the public school system, but also higher 
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education and “all phases of segregation affecting the state government and the citizens 
of South Carolina.”49  That year the Gressette Committee had been especially busy, and 
persuaded the General Assembly to pass fourteen new laws.  These included permitting 
local school boards to sell or lease school property, the repeal of the compulsory-
education law, and—most importantly to this study—a series of anti-NAACP statutes 
designed to stymie the organization’s progress.50  So even as Brown provided the 
groundwork for black Carolinians to challenge segregation, it also mobilized southern 
leaders to protect the South’s racial mores. 
Although many African Americans were vocal and unwavering in their support of 
desegregation, African American teachers conveyed varied, and sometimes contrasting, 
outlooks about the goals and timetables of racial integration. Many of them had 
significant and well-grounded doubts about the merits of ending segregated schools. Only 
months after the 1954 Brown decision was handed down, U.S. News and World Report 
published an article predicting that desegregation would cause thousands of black 
teachers to lose their positions. According to the article, displaced southern teachers who 
hoped to find employment opportunities in the North would be disappointed.  A black 
teacher was statistically more likely to be employed in the South, where one out five 
teachers were black, than in the northern and western states where one out of seventy-
three teachers were black. According to this article, one of the lessons of northern 
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desegregation was that if white parents objected to black teachers in the classroom, the 
result would be black teachers’ wholesale dismissals.51   
Such reports undoubtedly created concerns among southern black educators.  
Those concerns were skillfully explored in a 1955 study of 150 black South Carolinian 
schoolteachers—104 women and 56 men—published by the Journal of Negro Education..    
Howard University professors Hurley Doddy  and  G.  Franklin Edwards conducted the 
study and found that one-fourth of the respondents expressed “some apprehension” 
regarding desegregation.52  The teachers voiced three pressing concerns surrounding job 
security. First, they believed that they would be saddled with more requirements and 
certifications to maintain their professional positions. Second, they feared that integration 
would make it more difficult for married couples to continue working together in the 
same school. Finally, many expressed concerns that the desegregation campaign would 
exacerbate racial inequities in the salaries and benefits afforded black and white teachers.  
Indeed, seventy-three percent of respondents felt that desegregation would result in large-
scale job displacement.53   
Even African American educators who endorsed desegregation strongly feared 
that increased antagonisms would emerge between themselves and white superintendents, 
teachers, and students.  Some principals raised concerns about the possible administrative 
problems they would likely encounter if they supervised white teachers and staff. Since 
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desegregation plans could lead to temporary or long term financial hardship, black 
teachers did not take possible job dismissals lightly.  Unlike their white counterparts who 
could pursue other professional positions, educated blacks had few career options outside 
of the school system.54 Southern, college educated African Americans regarded teaching 
as a very attractive occupation.  It was even more appealing for black women because 
there was “no prestige ful [sic] vocational area other than teaching.”55  Educated black 
men had the option of “other white collar jobs such as in insurance, as salesmen, and in 
self-employment.”56  Consider Cecil Williams’ parents.  His mother was a teacher, but 
his father maintained his own successful tailoring business.57   
Confounded by a potential loss of income and status and by the perceived 
tensions of working with white colleagues and students, half of Doddy and Edwards’ 
respondents preferred teaching in segregated schools.  Despite those reservations, the 
PEA and NAACP continued to push for desegregation.58  The PEA acknowledged that 
job loss among black teachers was possible, but the group’s leaders argued that 
desegregation could serve as a weeding out process in which “unprepared teachers” were 
removed while “teachers who are prepared” would have no problem maintaining their 
positions in the public schools.59 
The NAACP sought to allay teachers’ fears.  During that NAACP conference 
James Hinton attended only days after the May 17 Brown decision, the association gave 
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its assurance that the full power of its educational specialist, legal, and research staff 
would be used to “insure that there will be no discrimination against Negro teachers as a 
result of integration.”60  The organization made a similar promise the following year 
during a conference for southern branches.  They would protect current and future 
African American teachers and “offset any program on the part of those school agencies 
which seek to frighten Negro teachers and principals.”61  In a statement to the NAACP 
Legal Defense and Education Fund’s Board of Directors Dr. John W. Davis, the West 
Virginia State College president, admitted that there was “a growing sentiment in the 
South and in other parts of the country not to permit Negro teachers to teach white 
children.”62  Black teachers’ fears were growing, and that fear was well grounded as more 
and more of them were losing their jobs. The NAACP received several reports 
confirming these dismissals.  Fifteen black teachers in West Virginia’s small towns were 
reportedly dismissed.  Twenty-six teachers in Missouri did not have their contracts 
renewed.  And in a move reminiscent of what would happen in Elloree, Virginia 
introduced new contracts which included a possible 30-day termination notice and 
assignments to work in specific schools.  And whereas teachers had always pledged their 
allegiance to the Federal Constitution, they now also had to pledge their allegiance to the 
Virginia State Constitution.63 
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Roy Wilkins may have represented African American teachers as having more 
confidence than they really did.  According to him, black teachers had “a measure of 
assurance stemming from” a shortage in black teachers and that, furthermore, black 
teachers had a certain amount of job security based on the fact that they often had more 
experience and training than white teachers.64  Perhaps most incongruous with teachers’ 
fears, Wilkins asserted that they knew that because white women had once left their 
infants in the care of black women, white mothers would eventually be willing to allow 
black women to teach their now older children.65  A section in the 1955 SC NAACP 
Conference program seemed to echo this assertion: 
Throughout the South there has been widespread 
bemoaning of the fate of the Negro teacher who is expected 
to pass out with the end of the segregated Negro school.  
The colored teacher’s new “friends” are now extending 
profuse and premature condolences, unmindful of the 
traditional practice of southern whites of entrusting their 
children to the care and training of Negro women.66 
  
As evidence that these fears were unrealistic, the author noted that black teachers in 
Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Missouri, New Mexico, and West Virginia were instructing 
white pupils.  Moreover, the author used New Jersey—where the number of black 
teachers rose from 479 before desegregation to 645 after desegregation—as evidence that 
not only would desegregation not bring about the black teacher’s demise, it would bring 
increased employment opportunities. There was a general shortage of teachers, after all, 
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and not enough white teachers to fill all the positions.  In such circumstances, black 
teachers were to become a necessity, not disposable.67    
 But despite Wilkins’ seeming nonchalance, there is evidence that the NAACP 
took these concerns seriously.  Gloster B. Current, the Director of Branches, sent 
NAACP officers questionnaires asking if any teachers in the local school districts had 
lost their positions, or if any had been reassigned. Current announced that the NAACP 
had hired Dr. John W. Davis as Special Director of their Department of Teacher 
Information.68  The new department was part of a longer, pre-Brown struggle to protect 
black teachers from “discriminatory loss of employment.”69  The department’s explicit 
purpose was to protect qualified African American teachers who lost their positions as a 
result of southern school desegregation.70 In a 1955 memo, Davis aptly described why it 
was so difficult to convince African American teachers to fight for desegregation: 
Dispelling fear among Negro teachers is not an easy task.  
Fear is an emotional and psychological factor yet a very 
real one when food for the family, the loss of a job, 
economic pressures and ugly threats constantly haunt the 
teacher every minute in the “place called home” and when 
away from home.71 
 Indeed, as the Elloree community and its teachers would soon find out, threats of 
economic reprisals were not empty, and could have long term negative effects.  Even as 
Davis contended that there had not been widespread teacher dismissals, he admitted that 
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those numbers would likely rise in the future.72   While the NAACP had tried to allay 
black teachers’ fears, the formation of John W. Davis’ department suggested that those 
concerns were, in fact, valid. 
 Despite teachers’ anxieties regarding how desegregation would affect their jobs, 
they continued to join the NAACP in large numbers.  Even as the fate of Brown hung in 
the balance, thirty-two teachers joined the Richmond, Virginia branch. The 110 teachers 
in Brunswick County, Virginia branch comprised over fifty percent of the membership. 
The entire faculty at a Tallahassee high school joined.73  In South Carolina, where the 
battle for southern school desegregation started, the NAACP had been receiving “a 
steady flow” of teacher memberships.  According to membership secretary Lucille Black, 
This would seem to indicate that Negro teachers in the 
South have not been taken in by the scare propaganda that 
they will lose their jobs if the NAACP wins its fight to ban 
segregation in education.74 
In the small town of Elloree African Americans were, perhaps unknowingly, gearing up 
so that they would be able to take a stand against the severe economic reprisals that came 
after they pursued school desegregation.  Four new members—two adults and two 
youth—joined and one person renewed their membership during its regular monthly 
meeting in April 1954.75  Those numbers may seem small compared to the previously 
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mentioned reports but under L.A. Blackman, who intended to increase the branch’s 
membership to 200, the branch had been “very active.”76  
 Throughout South Carolina African Americans filed school desegregation 
petitions, therefore contesting the segregationist notion that they were satisfied with the 
racial status quo.  And although urban centers such as Columbia and Charleston 
continued to play an important role in the Palmetto State’s black freedom struggle, the 
Clarendon County example of a small rural area coming to the forefront of education 
politics continued to be emblematic.  The small town of Cheraw had plans to submit a 
desegregation petition as of August 1954. The Florence branch submitted its 
desegregation petition in June 1955. Black Carolinians in Georgetown drafted a petition 
as of July 1955. African Americans in Orangeburg and Elloree also joined the school 
desegregation effort.  The Elloree NAACP sent their school petition to each member of 
the school board of trustees on August 31, 1955. It was a petition to desegregate the 
Elloree Training School, the same school which would later be at the center of the state’s 
anti-NAACP efforts.77  
In reaction to the slew of school desegregation petitions, Governor Timmerman 
announced that the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) was investigating the 
NAACP.78   It was not entirely clear what SLED was allegedly investigating, but 
Timmerman asserted that the investigation’s purpose was to establish “the manner” in 
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which the names were secured.79   However state and local governments were not the 
only, or even the most powerful, organized efforts to silence desegregation petitioners.  
On July 11, 1954 the first chapter of the White Citizens Council (WCC) was founded in 
Mississippi, and quickly spread across the South.80  In South Carolina county seats such 
as Orangeburg, Charleston, and Sumter became “bastions of Council strength.”81  They 
experienced significant growth during the summers of 1955 and 1956.  These growth 
spurts were triggered by school desegregation petitions, and at its height, there were as 
many as 40,000 members in the South Carolina Councils. The WCC made no secret that 
their main purpose was to protect segregation in schools and all matters of public life.82 
Desegregation petitions triggered the establishment of local Council chapters.  
The first two South Carolina chapters were founded in the summer of 1955 in Elloree and 
Orangeburg after African Americans in Orangeburg County School Districts 5 and 7 filed 
school desegregation petitions.83  Yet while the desegregation petitions were certainly 
central to the WCC’s decision to begin their operations in Orangeburg County, the choice 
could most likely also be attributed to the fact that the county was the home of a black 
community so committed to racial uplift that Jet magazine once referred to it as “the 
home of the militant Negro intelligentsia.”84   
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The WCC did not officially employ physical racial violence.  Instead, they 
recommended “the application of economic pressure to ‘trouble-makers.’” 85   A 
Mississippi Council leader’s comments illustrated how these economic repercussions 
could have long-term effects on black activists: 
If I had a Negro working for me and he belonged to the 
NAACP . . . I’d do the same thing I’d do to any Negro 
working for me who wanted to cause trouble. . . I’d just let 
him go.  When the Negro tried to obtain work elsewhere in 
the region, he would find no jobs available.86 
Signing your name on a desegregation petition not only meant that you were risking 
temporary financial hardships.  The decision to assert you child’s right to equal 
educational opportunities could mean financial ruin, and little chance of fully recovering.  
Still, to long time activist like J. A. DeLaine, the WCC was cut from the same 
cloth as other white supremacist terrorist organizations: 
There is little doubt but that the Ku Klux Klan has been 
born again—the use of a new name and the dropping of the 
hood is only a sham.  The White Citizens Councils and the 
K.K.K. have a common objective. . . Their methods are 
different and have been modernized to the extent that 
television, radio and daily newspapers are regularly used to 
recruit members and to put white against Negroes.87 
Thurgood Marshall expressed similar sentiments: 
They intend to use every means, lawful and unlawful, to 
prevent the inevitable. . . They will also give aid and 
comfort, as well as support to the un-American 
organizations dedicated to white supremacy who are no 
more or no less than revised, revamped and renamed 
groups of the old Ku Klux Klan.  These groups with the 
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support of state officials will use every economic pressure 
possible against Negroes who insist on being full 
Americans.  They will use this pressure against laboring 
men as well as the professional men such as doctors, 
businessmen and lawyers.88 
 
One southern newspaper referred to the Councils as “a ‘manicured’ Ku Klux Klan” and 
another as “an ‘uptown’ KKK.”89  And although the Councils feigned non-violence, even 
its own members admitted that violence was an essential to maintaining segregation.  As 
one Mississippi Council member said, they would make sure that “no Negro who 
believes in equality has a job, gets credit, or is able to exist in our community. ‘Is able to 
exist’—that means agree and knuckle under, or flee, or die.”90  
South Carolina’s black intellectuals knew that the WCC coordinated its efforts 
with state officials.  One such intellectual was Walker E. Solomon, Executive Secretary 
of the PEA.   As an ally of both teachers and the NAACP, Solomon used national black 
media outlets to bring attention to local blacks’ struggles for equal rights. He believed the 
Councils were “[c]ooperating with the legislature for a last ditch stand against 
desegregation.”91  For example, a principal founder of the WCC was S. Emory Rogers, 
who served as the state’s lead attorney in the Briggs v. Elliot case.92  In yet another 
example, in January 1956 the Gressette Committee held a conference with the executive 
committee of the state association of WCC to discuss the their program. And it appeared 
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that the idea to have SLED investigate the NAACP originated with the WCC.93 For their 
part, the NAACP attempted to turn the SLED investigation on its head when they asked 
that the Governor have the same agency “investigate the pressure that may have been 
used on signers of petitions to withdraw their names or to make contrary statements.”94  
It is important to note that, at least in the short term, the WCC’s efforts were often 
successful.  The number of NAACP branches fell from eighty-four to thirty-one between 
1955 and 1957.95  It was the largest dip in branches “since the organization began its 
rapid expansion in 1943.” The pressure on the NAACP was so concentrated that, most 
likely out of fear that their mail was being tampered with, the Orangeburg and Bethesda 
chapters asked that the national office refrain from sending communications to them.96  
One person suggested that, if and when it was absolutely necessary to send 
correspondence via mail, the national NAACP office should use plain rather than 
letterhead envelopes.97 
Orangeburg and the neighboring small town of Elloree serve as apt examples of 
how white segregationists were able to leverage their political and economic power to 
squelch the local school desegregation movement. Both political and business leaders in 
the area did all within their power to target the desegregation petition signers and those 
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who were identified as movement leaders.  At the forefront of the white reactionary 
movement were the Citizens Councils, who had “thrown a boycott so effectively that few 
Negro businesses in the two progressive counties [Clarendon and Orangeburg] get as 
much as a shoe lace.”98  
Two people who epitomized the WCC’s ability to leverage economic and political 
power were businessmen Robert Jennings and W.J. Deer. Jennings was the Orangeburg 
mayor and was credited with organizing the boycott.  He was also the president of the 
local Coca-Cola Company and the owner of several businesses including Orangeburg Ice 
and Fuel (Paradise Ice Cream) and Palmetto Bakery (Sunbeam). Mayor Jennings was at 
the forefront of targeting black businesses.  He stopped Coca-Cola deliveries to 
businesses if the owner or one of its personnel had signed a desegregation petition.  For 
example, deliveries had been discontinued to a barbershop, even though the owner 
himself had not signed a petition.  One of the barbers who worked there had. He 
circulated a list containing the names and addresses of African Americans who the 
Council selected as its economic reprisal targets.  All the Orangeburg branch officers 
were on the list.99   
H.O. Harvey, who owned a successful Shell station located on a busy highway, 
found that his gasoline was not delivered in time for him to take advantage of Labor 
Day’s busy traffic. Approximately 2,000 African Americans, some of whom were merely 
suspected of being NAACP members, found their credit withdrawn at all the downtown 
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stores.  The Council provided a list of African Americans to white business leaders and 
essentially forced them to fire or evict everyone on the list.100  As one newspaper 
correspondent noted, the local Council practiced little restraint in “forc[ing] Negroes into 
economic submission.”101   Instead, they sometimes became “suicidal maniacs in their 
fanatic zeal to ‘squeeze’ Negroes.”102 
W. J. Deer was the mayor of Elloree, and seemed to be largely responsible for 
organizing the town’s boycott of black businesses.  Mayor Deer openly declared that the 
Council would “fight the leaders of the NAACP from ditches to fence posts to keep the 
Negroes out of white schools.”103  Not only were black businesses targeted, but also 
schoolteachers.  Orangeburg NAACP branch president Rev. McCollum, whose activism 
resulted in the revoke of his credit and threats against him, remembered that the 
desegregation petitions put schoolteachers and their families in an awkward position:104 
There were some members of the NAACP who could not 
participate because their wives were school teachers [sic].  
My wife, who was an assistant to the principal at Bowman 
Elementary School, was fired in the spring of 1956 for no 
stated reason.  We remained in Orangeburg until the 
summer of 1962, but no principal in the county called on 
her for as much as a day’s substitute work during those six 
years.105 
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Job loss was a very real possibility for black teachers who openly supported 
desegregation.  As Mrs. McCollom’s experiences demonstrate, being dismissed from 
your job because of your activism did not represent a temporary loss of income.  That 
loss could be long-term.  Yet, income was only one part of their loss.  For schoolteachers, 
and black teachers especially, teaching offered accessible, professional, respectable work 
that helped cement their status in the community. 
 Of course, teachers were not the only ones who faced repercussions for their 
activism.  A Charleston newspaper published the school petitioners’ names, and one 
editorial told white citizens that they should study the list of names carefully.106 In one 
instance, a segregationist used a certain amount of creativity in his/her efforts to extract 
information from the NAACP.  S/he tried to impersonate an uneducated African 
American, and wrote a letter to Walter White asking for a list of NAACP members so he 
would know “who is my friens” and “who is i supposed to buy from.”107  John Morsell 
informed him that poor, uneducated blacks did not, in fact, speak “in that bad imitation of 
Uncle Remus.”108  The bad imitation, combined with their line of questioning only 
proved that “no one knows less about southern Negroes than the southern whites who 
claim they know most.”109  
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A number of other Orangeburg County African Americans faced job 
dismissals.110  In the small town of Elloree, the school desegregation effort brought about 
such a coordinated and concerted effort on the part of local white supremacists that one 
state NAACP leader, A.C. Redd, was prompted to announce, “Hell is popping here in 
South Carolina.”111  In response to Ruby Hurley’s inquiries regarding the conditions of 
Elloree’s black community, L.A. Blackman told her, “I don’t see how these poor people 
are going to make it.”112 At least fourteen people lost their jobs for signing the 
desegregation petition, most of whom were domestics, laborers, and sharecroppers. Mrs. 
Roselee Easterling wrote the NAACP desperate for help because, as a result of the 
economic squeeze, she and her sons were finding it impossible to find employment. A 
law firm sent John Hagler a letter demanding that he pay his mortgage in ten days or face 
foreclosure.113  In fact, calling in someone’s mortgage became common practice, even 
though as Blackman noted, “[i]t wasn’t like that before this thing (economic campaign) 
started.”114    Mrs. Helen Thompson was dismissed from laundry job in Orangeburg, 
leaving her unable to support her ill husband. Two municipal employees were dismissed: 
a ten year employee named James Shivers, and a twelve year employee named Andrew 
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Glover. Their dismissals likely felt like a slap in the face as Mayor Deer, who had 
received the black community’s electoral support, not only fired Shivers and Glover, but 
forced Shivers out the house he was renting from the mayor.  For the previous eight 
years, Shivers had been paying $8 month to live in the home.  Suddenly, in addition to 
losing his job, the mayor raised the rent to $10 a week. Bennie Brown was fired from his 
city job with the public utilities department allegedly because fifty cents had gone 
missing and a wall was not clean.  He was the father of five small children.115   
Deer did offer Shivers a way out of his predicament.  All he had to do to get his 
job back and have his rent reduced was take his name off the school desegregation 
petition.  But Shivers refused, “I want to stand up for my rights.  I don’t want to take my 
name off.”116  With limited educational and employment opportunities, activism may 
have offered men like Shivers an opportunity to grasp what had been, for them, an 
inaccessible form of manhood.  Someone like Shivers may have seen this as an 
opportunity to lift his children out of the working-class.  Perhaps more importantly to his 
sense of manhood, this school desegregation campaign provided a way for him to grasp 
the manhood that eluded him due to his economic dependence on whites.117   
What local blacks likely found most horrific was Coble Dairy’s refusal to deliver 
milk to the homes of people who signed the petitions.118  “[T]he vicious ‘squeeze’” was 
																																								 																				
115 “South Carolina’s Plot to Starve Negroes;” John McCray, “2 Men Lose Jobs in 
Elloree for Signing School Petition,” Afro-American, August 20, 1955; A.M. Rivera, Jr., 
“Big Corporations Exerting Pressure 
116 “2 Men Lose Jobs in Elloree for Signing School Petition.”  
117 “South Carolina’s Plot to Starve Negroes.” 
118 “Big Corporations Exerting Pressure.” 
 
	 187 
“denying milk and bread to countless children.”119  African Americans in the counties of 
Orangeburg and Clarendon were forced to leave their area to purchase essentials like 
milk and bread. For the Lewis family, whose son required regular blood supplements, this 
act had the potential to be especially detrimental.  Milk was an essential part of their 
son’s high protein diet.  Mr. Lewis confirmed that they were able to purchase the milk 
elsewhere, but that his real concern was whether or not his son’s specialist would refuse 
to continue treatments.120  Lewis’ physician assured him that "my first obligation is to my 
God and my second is to my profession.”121  The Lewis’ were fortunate that their son’s 
doctor had high ethical standards.  For, as the continued economic squeeze would prove, 
many segregationists did not.   
The lack of a healthy, complete diet was clear to black teachers.  As Elizabeth 
Cleveland recalled: 
In Elloree . . . we had to do so much for them. . . you know 
a child cannot learn anything if they have not had 
something to eat.  And so oftentimes, we would take food. . 
. You would ask them if they had anything to eat and they 
would say they didn’t have anything . . .You wanted them 
to be alert to be able to learn. . . I don’t think people realize 
how much money teachers spent of their own, not making 
anything, to help their children be able to succeed in class 
because the parents didn’t really have anything . . . Years 
ago, you did whatever you had to do to help your students 
and to help the school.122  
 
Cleveland would have found herself facing these challenges teaching a rural, working-
class group of students regardless of whether or not there was a boycott, but since some 
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of the parents who signed the desegregation petition had children at ETS, it is certain that 
their financial straits were exacerbated.  Cleveland’s comments reflect that she 
understood the community in which she worked.  Like many other African American 
teachers Cleveland acquired middle-class status through her profession, yet empathized 
with her constituency because of her own working-class background.123 
Even Christmas was not off limits to the economic squeeze.  Customarily during 
the annual Christmas parade, Santa gave all the children little bags of candy, fruit, and 
nuts.  But during 1955’s Christmas parade, the Santa handed out gift bags to the white 
children, but ignored the little black boys and girls.124  Blackman said, “they ran our 
children off the street.”125  Yet even in this, Blackman and Simkins were able to work 
together to soften the blow.  Simkins used NAACP funds to buy oranges and tangerines; 
and Blackman had two hundred pounds of candy that a northern church donated in 
response to the economic squeeze.  Blackman gathered a group of Elloree women to put 
together the children’s Christmas bags.126 They turned out so well that when a little white 
boy saw a little black boy’s bag, he ran up to his mother and told her, “the colored people 
had a better Christmas than we had.”127  
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Most local African Americans demonstrated a serious commitment to seeing the 
school desegregation through to the end, but the Councils, who James Hinton pronounced 
were “acting like jackasses,” were sometimes successful.128  For instance, one Elloree 
man asked that his name be removed from the petition after his white employer 
threatened him. In Orangeburg, twenty of the original fifty-eight desegregation 
petitioners asked that their names be withdrawn. A Standard Oil Esso representative 
instructed brothers James and Roy Sulton, who owned a gas station and mechanic shop, 
to remove their names from the desegregation petition. The Standard Oil representative 
told them to claim that they did not understand what they were signing.  Mr. Sulton 
asserted that to say he did not know what he was doing would amount to claiming to be 
illiterate.  He argued that not only did he know what he was doing, but every person who 
signed the petition knew what they were signing.129   
Roy Wilkins expressed similar sentiments, asserting that such ignorance was 
impossible.  According to him, any literate man had to know what was going on. Several 
of these school petitions had been signed at public meetings wherein the petitions’ 
purpose had been adequately explained. Wilkins was confident that names were not being 
removed due to a misunderstanding.  African Americans removed their names because of 
economic pressure.130   But, removing their names would not guarantee that they got their 
jobs back.  The Pittsburgh Courier reported that there was “no record of a Negro getting 
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his job back after taking his name off a petition.”131  Even worse, taking such an action 
would ruin a person’s standing in their community.  Not only did they remain 
unemployed, but they were “looked upon with contempt by both whites and Negroes.”132 
 But the economic squeeze taught Orangeburg County’s African Americans some 
valuable lessons that had been in practice since the early activism of the 1910s and would 
become signature characteristics of the burgeoning 1960s movement: 
(1) no one should be permitted to sign petitions who can be 
pressurized; (2) quality, not quantity, of petitioners is most 
valuable, and (3) you can’t do business with Citizens’ 
Councils.133 
Indeed, the WCC’s victims were just as likely to be the petitioners’ family members as 
they were to be the individuals who actually signed the petition.  But it was the last 
point—not supporting WCC owned businesses—that turned the Elloree and Orangeburg 
struggle on its head. 
African Americans began “planning boycotts of merchants known to be members 
of the Citizens’ Councils.”134  As James Hinton argued, “‘economic reprisals’ can be 
two-way streets as well as sharp two-edged swords.”135  He called for not only a local 
boycott, but a national boycott against the companies local WCC members 
represented.136  And at least some African Americans seemed to heed his advice.  The 
March 1956 issue of The Crisis magazine featured a full-page photo of a medical center 
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in New York City having its Coca-Cola machine removed from the facilities after reports 
surfaced that “a Coca Cola distributor in South Carolina is spearheading the White 
Citizens Council boycotts of Negroes who signed desegregation public school 
petitions.”137  “The white folks,” said long time activist and NAACP member John 
Felder, “want to run us out but we’re trying to hold our land.”138  If such a boycott meant 
that they had no local merchants to buy from, African Americans were willing to 
purchase all their goods via mail order catalog. In Orangeburg, black college students at 
Claflin and South Carolina State College were encouraged to ask their parents to send 
clothing from home rather than shopping in the local stores. The students readily agreed 
to boycott Mayor Jennings’ products (Coca Cola, Sunbeam Bread, and Paradise Ice 
Cream) and to stop shopping at the WCC-owned downtown stores.  Women teachers and 
other prominent community women closed their accounts at Beckers Department Store, 
and used their status to encourage other black women to do the same.139   
The Beckers store example helps demonstrates that, in their quest to punish 
African Americans, Council leaders also hurt white merchants.  When one of the women 
called the owner and told him why she and other women would not be doing business 
with him anymore, he expressed remorse and said that he had been pressured into joining 
the whites’ boycott.140  White businessmen who did not join the WCC’s boycott “face[d] 
the threat of being called ‘scalawags’ as well as being cut from the list themselves.”141  It 
mattered little if he wanted to join.  Every white man in the Elloree/Orangeburg area 
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“was pressured into joining the WCC or face a WCC led boycott of his business, as well 
as social isolation.”142  One white farmer, who dismissed his black farm hands at the 
Council’s behest, was left with only he and his wife to do the farm-work.  When he went 
to the bank for a loan to help remedy his problem, the loan officer denied his loan and 
told him that he should present his problem to the Council.143   
Indeed, although the economic squeeze was directed mostly against African 
Americans, it is important to acknowledge that being white did not automatically protect 
one from the Council’s wrath.  White Carolinians who had the audacity to support 
desegregation were also subjected to threats and economic reprisals. One Orangeburg 
County Methodist minister, Rev. J.B. Murray, found himself transferred to a different 
church after members of his flock found out that he co-authored a resolution denouncing 
the use of economic reprisals to maintain segregation. A Camden man was attacked for 
reasons that remained unclear.  A Mr. Guy Hutchins was beaten and accused of 
advocating desegregation before a Lions Club group and a women’s group.  Hutchins 
denied these accusations, and said that the only thing he could think of that would incite 
such violence towards him was that he helped some of the students at Mather Academy, a 
black school, with their music lessons.144   
The person often operating in a social space somewhere in between the black and 
white southerner was the southern Jew who felt “their economic and social status 
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threatened by the segregation controversy.”145  Like the owner of Beckers, Jewish 
merchants fell between a rock and a hard place as they were pressured by the Council and 
would lose the business of the black patrons.  One third of South Carolina’s Jewish 
congregations were Council members, so there were certainly some who sincerely 
believed in the stated goal of preserving racial segregation.  But others were simply wary 
of becoming the Council’s next victim.146  
The boycott of WCC owned businesses proved to be effective.   In Elloree, the 
absence of African American patronage left Main Street, normally bustling with business 
on Saturdays, “ominously barren.”147  As one unnamed Elloree man said, “The NAACP’s 
done put the white man out of business around here.”148  One company (most likely 
Sunbeam) had been forced to return almost 800 bread loaves from a white store. Most 
African Americans were buying their groceries from one of three black-owned stores in 
the area, who were pooling their resources to stock their shelves with food purchased in 
towns as far as fifty to seventy miles away. They traveled to the neighboring towns of 
Holly Hill, Orangeburg, St. Matthews, and even as far as Columbia.149  After all, black 
grocery store owners were also victims of the economic reprisals. They “found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to get supplies from wholesalers.”150  One of the most 
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successful signs of the boycott was that it did cause some white merchants to close up 
shop.151 
A likely unforeseen consequence of the economic squeeze was that it positioned 
the NAACP—the very organization Carolina’s segregationists endeavored to destroy—
“in the role of savior.”152  Indeed, it mobilized the black community to action.  When 
Rev. Hinton attended an Orangeburg NAACP meeting at a local church, he found a 
packed house.153 Levi Byrd told Thurgood Marshall that the Council’s persecution of him 
increased his status in the community and made “more Negros [sic] stick with The 
N.A.A.C.P.”154  One Elloree man said, “T’hell with the white man now.”  Another 
argued, “we are closer together here now then ever before.  In one way I think the White 
Citizens Council’s economic pressure campaign was the best thing for unifying us.”155 
Epitomizing the long-held black tradition of self-help, the Palmetto State’s black 
community and the NAACP took special measures to assist those in need.  After the 
Shivers and Butler families were kicked out of their homes, they were able to secure 
housing in black-owned homes. When John Hagler’s mortgage was called in, the state’s 
successful black-owned bank, Victory Savings Bank, took up his mortgage. In fact, the 
Victory Savings Bank proved to be an essential part of the movement’s success. When 
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the WCC targeted the Sulton brothers, the men transferred their bank account to Victory 
Savings.156   
The bank provided a safe space where local and national entities could provide funds 
for local use. The national NAACP deposited $1,000 into the bank for the local relief 
fund, and had $20,000 total on deposit there. But the needs of local blacks were so great, 
and the economic reprisals they faced so harsh, that they soon had to deposit another 
$10,000 to help farmers in Clarendon and Orangeburg counties. Two years later, the 
NAACP was sending funds directly to Blackman to be dispersed to those in need. 
Victory Savings Bank itself made loans to several reprisal victims, sometimes beyond 
what was good collateral.157   
Elloree’s seventy-four year old branch president, L.A. Blackman, used his skill as a 
building contractor to build homes and provide work for those facing economic reprisals.  
Snack bar owner George Mack kept “a stream of chickens headed for distressed 
families.”158  Decisions on how to help reprisal victims were made on a case-by-case 
basis.  Some people received outright gifts, and others received loans. James Hinton later 
boasted that through monetary donations and loans, the SC NAACP had been able to take 
care of each individual who faced reprisals as a result of the desegregation petitions in 
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Clarendon and Orangeburg counties.159 He declared, “people are very happy and satisfied 
over the entire matter.”160  
According to one unnamed NAACP official, there were several black and white 
national organizations “just waiting” for the signal to place funds in the Victory Savings 
Bank.161  Such a willingness to help would prove to be fortuitous since, according to 
NAACP assistant John A. Morsell, “[t]he greatest need for clothing, food, etc., appears to 
be in South Carolina.”162  At least part of the reason the official’s statements turned out to 
be true was because of the work of long-term SC NAACP secretary, Modjeska Simkins.   
Simkins and well-known black journalist Simeon Booker came up with a genius idea.  
They put a small add in Jet magazine encouraging people to send assistance to South 
Carolina.163  In less than two weeks clothing, money, and canned goods began to arrive 
“by the ton.”164  Fifteen churches in Wilmington, North Carolina pooled their resources 
to make a contribution. William H. Boone of the Portland Urban League told Wilkins that 
his colleague could secure at least $1,500. The Denver NAACP branch sent in $20 to be 
applied to the South Carolina Fund, and expressed interest in sending food and 
clothing.165  The Berkshire County, Massachusetts NAACP branch donated $10 and were 
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“very anxious” to know if they could donate clothing.166  The Public School No. 2’s PTA 
in the Bronx contributed shoes and clothing. Despite the outpouring of support from 
people across the nation, the economic reprisals placed insurmountable hardships for 
some local blacks.  Some in Elloree’s black community were forced to leave the area to 
find work.167 
The events also emphasized a pre-existing sense of distrust between the national 
NAACP office and the local branches.  When Roy Wilkins found out how successful 
Simkins had been in recruiting outside assistance for the squeeze victims, he informed 
her that the NAACP was not a relief organization.168  He told her to return any funds she 
received to the people and organizations who sent them.  Simkins was incensed.  She told 
him that she would do no such thing: 
Now Roy, I am not going to send back a damned cent to 
anybody.  These people are under pressure.  You all asked 
us to get these petitions signed, and that’s what we’re 
doing.  We have an obligation to these people. . . Now, you 
all sit up there and drink all the Bloody Marys and eat all 
your big sirloin steaks and drink your scotch and milk, but 
we are down here under pressure.  And we’ve got the load 
on us, and we’re going to handle it.169 
So largely under Simkins’ leadership, the SC Conference continued its assistance 
campaign. 
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Still, the Council’s economic squeeze may have helped build a sense of trust between 
the NAACP and the local black community who learned to rely on the civil rights 
organization for help rather than trying to find the assistance of sympathetic whites. 
If we need money now, we go to the NAACP to help us 
borrow it.  If we need food and clothes, the NAACP gives 
them to us, and we don’t have to say ‘yowsuh’ for it.  I tell 
you, that NAACP is the best thing that’s ever come to 
colored folks.  I ain’t never heard of no white man around 
here treating us like the NAACP is doing. T’hell with the 
white man now!170 
The NAACP’s financial assistance helped blacks in Elloree/Orangeburg reclaim a sense 
of ownership of their community.  It prevented them from feeling as if they had to 
disgrace themselves in order to provide for their families.  Therefore, the school 
desegregation petitions, the WCC’s boycott, and the black community’s counter-boycott, 
proved to be an empowering experience for a disfranchised community. 
It is possible that no one in all of Orangeburg County received more severe 
reprisals than L.A. Blackman who was targeted for his zealous, and often successful, 
efforts to organize the black community against the segregationist’s status quo. He was 
known as “the most hated man” in Elloree and “the most feared by whites and most loved 
by his own people.”171  On Saturday, December 10, 1955, Blackman was in Orangeburg 
visiting his bed-ridden wife in the hospital.  Yet back home in Elloree, he became the 
center of attention for the sixty people “in full regalia” attending a local Klan rally.172  It 
was announced over the loudspeakers that Blackman’s fellow African Americans should 
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see to it that he leave town.173  Blackman actually went to the rally and said he drove as 
close to the speakers as possible to hear what was going on.  It was almost over but he 
remembers the speaker asking him if he would like to say anything.  Blackman said that 
he would, and announced, “I’m here in Elloree.  I’ve been here for seventeen years.  And 
I have no idea of leaving here.  I want to stay here.”174  Blackman joked that after that, 
“then I had my own people to face.”175  Regardless of his positive attitude, he knew to 
take the Klan’s threats against his life seriously.  He was aware of the violence faced by 
other South Carolina activists. When a reporter asked Elloree’s mayor, W.J. Deer about 
the rally, he claimed to know nothing about it.   His ignorance, however, was quite 
unlikely in light of the fact that the rally attendees staged a parade through town.176 
Blackman was also a victim of the WCC’s malicious economic reprisals. The 
Holly Hill Building Supply Company wrote the successful contractor—who had largely 
come out of retirement for the express purpose of helping other people in his 
community—to let him know that they would no longer sell him the goods he needed to 
build homes: 
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We do not want to carry on business transaction[s] with 
people that support the advancement of colored people.  So 
do not ask for any more materials.177 
Likewise Burgess Butler, the father of three children and an Elloree resident, was 
instructed by his white landlord to leave the home he had been renting. In 1955 he was 
also charged with assault to kill for an incident that happened a year prior.  His friend, 
Rev. McCollum, believed that he never would have been charged if he had not signed the 
school desegregation petition. Butler did shoot a white man in the leg, but only after the 
man knocked him down, and threatened him and his family.178 
The events at South Carolina State College most directly foreshadowed the 1960s 
student-let movement.  The students had already been participating in the black boycott 
of WCC owned businesses when the South Carolina legislature targeted them.  In March 
1956, a committee was established to investigate the NAACP’s activity at the university.  
Governor Timmerman signed a joint resolution which asserted that: 1) the NAACP’s 
main objective was to create “a bitter feeling of unrest, unhappiness and resentment” 
among African Americans, 2) the NAACP ruined the “amicable and friendly relations” 
between black and whites that had been “so common in the past,” and 3) the NAACP had 
“mislead” the faculty and staff into becoming active members.179  The newly established 
committee would investigate the NAACP’s on-campus activity, discover who was a 
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member and/or sympathizer, and whether said activities were “detrimental” to the college 
and its students.180   
The university faculty and staff were among the first to react to the General 
Assembly’s actions.  They released a resolution of their own in order to “save the General 
Assembly any undue expense or difficulty in securing” their viewpoints.  The 
faculty/staff: 1) affirmed their belief in academic freedom, 2) proclaimed that education 
was intended for the good of all, not to “further the interests of any individual or group,” 
3) asserted that pressure and intimidation negatively effected their ability to teach, 4) 
asked that the Assembly provide any information from the U.S. attorney’s office which 
suggested that any organization subversive, and 5) suggested that if the legislature was so 
convinced that South Carolina State faculty/staff were not working in their students’ best 
interest, they should dismiss the entire faculty/staff and admit the entire student body into 
the state’s other institutions of higher education.181  
 The students, however, engaged in direct-action protests.  They went on strike 
from their classes.  Using skills he learned under Principal William H. Grayson’s tutelage 
while a student a Burke Industrial High School in Charleston, Fred Moore, now the 
student council president, helped organize the strike. Moore, reported that he suspected 
most students would stay away from campus as long as the school was under 
surveillance.182  One newspaper reported that in a “quiet, 20-minute demonstration” 
																																								 																				
180 Joint Resolution, 16 March 1956, Papers of the NAACP, Part 20, Box A-279. 
181 Resolution, 23 March 1956, Papers of the NAACP, Part 20, Box A-289. 
182 R. Scott Baker, “Pedagogies of Protest,” 2794; “Students Hit Surveillance,” The State, 
April 12, 1956. 
 
	 202 
students hung the governor in effigy.183  And although the timing suggest that their 
activism was in direct response to the legislature’s resolution, the college students linked 
their activism to the economic squeeze which was having such a devastating effect on the 
surrounding community.  As one student, S. E. Gamarekian, noted in a letter to the New 
York Times’ editor, the persecution of SC State was only one of several factors.  They 
were concerned about the plight of teachers at colleges, universities, and public schools.   
They were also concerned about African Americans “at the lower economic levels, such 
as laborers, and maintenance and service personnel” who had already been dismissed 
from their jobs because of their relationship with the NAACP.184  In reaction to their 
protest and strike, the college’s president, Dr. Benner C. Turner notified some of the 
students by mail that they should not return to school for the next semester.  Such an 
action had the potential to cause irreversible damage to a group of students who did not 
always have the financial opportunity to attend another school.  Charleston’s most well-
known teacher-activist, Septima Clark, wrote Roy Wilkins regarding four Charleston 
natives who Turner kicked out of school. The students, two boys and two girls, were 
bright and had earned four-year scholarships from the County.  They now needed the 
NAACP’s legal and financial assistance.185 
Orangeburg’s segregationists expressed confidence that the college students had 
been “duped” into “supporting the Red-sponsored NAACP” and were now aware that 
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“the organization was not benefiting the Negro race.”186  But South Carolina’s black 
college students would continue to prove that they knew exactly what they were doing, 
and that they were just as dedicated to desegregation as their adult counterparts.  In 
Columbia, Fred Moore, who South Carolina State College expelled for his activism, was 
now attending Allen University where he and other students decided to test the city’s 
segregated bus system.187  
As African Americans engaged in protests, boycotts, and petitions, state authorities 
and agencies renewed their effort to ensure state-sponsored segregation remained in tact. 
The Crisis magazine reported, “State after state is using its legislature or its court, or 
both, in efforts to bar the NAACP from operation.”188  Demonstrating that the fight to 
preserve segregation was not only a multi-state fight, but that southern segregationists 
leaders were willing to work together in this fight, four southern governors met in 
Richmond, Virginia in January, 1956 to formulate a cooperative plan.  Governors J. P. 
Coleman (Mississippi), Marvin Griffin (Georgia), Thomas Stanley (Virginia), and 
George Bell Timmerman (South Carolina) agreed to ask their legislatures to: 1) adopt a 
resolution asserting that school desegregation was a violation of their states’ rights, 2) ask 
U.S. Congress step in to protect the state’s from the federal government’s 
“encroachment”, and 3) establish new laws to protect state sovereignty. The southern 
governors were clearly employing the oft-used states’ rights argument.  And the NAACP 
did not hesitate in questioning the legitimacy of their claims.  Roy Wilkins wrote the 
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governors soon after their meeting and argued that the U.S. Constitution did not grant the 
states any right to violate people’s civil rights. Moreover, while the segregationist 
governors asserted that they were protecting their citizenry, they certainly did not 
represent African Americans’ interest. Nonetheless, South Carolina’s legislators 
proceeded to draft and pass a joint resolution the following month, and Timmerman 
signed it. In addition to the demands the four governors originally made, Timmerman and 
the South Carolina General Assembly also requested that the U.S. Attorney General place 
the NAACP on the subversive list.189  Such an action would enable the state to essentially 
outlaw the active civil rights organization and guarantee that it would be consumed with 
defending itself before Senator Joseph McCarthy’s House Un-American Activities 
Commission.  
As black Carolinians increased their protest efforts, it was in this political 
environment that anti-NAACP legislation gained increased support.  Indeed, it was the 
WCC’s inability to effectively and decidedly stymie the black community’s 
desegregation efforts that led the state legislature to enact a law that would result in the 
removal of professors, teachers, and students who had the audacity to support 
desegregation and/or the NAACP.190  As the national NAACP office acknowledged, 
there was “a mounting crescendo of legal efforts to stem NAACP activities.”191  In order 
to deal with the integration issue, an act was approved on March 17, 1956, which 
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extended both the Gressette Committee’s existence and its reach.  Moving beyond the 
public school system, the committee turned its attention to higher education and “all 
phases of segregation affecting the state government and the citizens of South 
Carolina.”192  That year the Gressette Committee had been especially busy, and persuaded 
the General Assembly to pass fourteen new laws.  These included permitting local school 
boards to sell or lease school property, the repeal of the compulsory-education law, and—
most importantly to this study—a series of anti-NAACP statutes designed to stymie the 
organization’s progress.193  The meaning of the legislation was not lost on attentive 
educators like PEA leader Walker E. Solomon.  He wrote that the Gressette committee’s 
life had been extended in order to prove the state’s “determination to defy the court.”194    
The new legislation that most directly affected black teachers was H-1998, which 
became known as the anti-NAACP oath. Passed on March 17, 1956, this law made it 
illegal for local, county, or state government employees to be NAACP members and 
required them to disclose said membership, whether personal or through family ties.195  
Employing the same rhetoric white segregationist leaders had been using for generations, 
the new law accused the NAACP of disrupting “the peace and tranquility which has long 
existed between the White and Negro races.”196  And in a line that would play a vital role 
in the Elloree case, the legislators not only established that NAACP members would be 
dismissed from their jobs, but also that anyone “refusing to submit a statement as 
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provided herein, shall be summarily dismissed.”197  So even if someone was not a 
NAACP member, if they refused to make a statement one way or the other, they would 
lose their job. In the event local white officials felt inclined to be sympathetic, 
repercussions could also fall on them. If they did not report these cases, they were subject 
to pay a $100 fine for each violation.198   
African American leaders were sure that black educators were the anti-NAACP 
oath’s real targets. Georgia passed a similar law the previous year that explicitly named 
teachers as its sole target. Any teacher there found to be a NAACP member would have 
their teaching license revoked in perpetuity unless they renounced their membership and 
pledged an oath to the same effect.199  According to Solomon, the South Carolina 
legislation was passed in order to “make sure no teachers join [the] NAACP.”200  He 
observed that the oath stemmed largely from the legislature’s incorrect assumption that 
“most, if not all, of the 7,500 teachers” in black schools were NAACP members.201  Soon 
after the law’s passage, Roy Wilkins and Reverend Hinton denounced the new law as an 
effort to “intimidate teachers as they are the only large group of public employees from 
which the NAACP membership is recruited.”202  The anti-NAACP oath was not just a 
vague swipe at the organization.  It was meant to hit them hard.  As one editorial noted, 
the new law was “simply another in a series of moves by the White South to break up the 
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NAACP.”203  Cheraw branch leader Levi G Byrd agreed when he said that the state was 
doing all it could to “kill off” the NAACP.204  Black Carolinians would need to “stand 
firm and fast.”205  
 Ten days after the new law was passed Byrd wrote Lucille Black in the national 
office to update her of the situation in South Carolina.  He told her he received word that 
white officials in the area planned to ask him for the chapter’s membership roster in order 
to find out how many teachers were in their NAACP branch.  He was giving Black his 
word that he would not give them the information.  He wrote, “I Am telling you if thay 
[sic] do I will not tell them, I will go to Jail before I tell them any thing [sic].”206  
Likewise, when he heard a rumor that the Governor would force NAACP officials to 
disclose their membership, he promised Simkins, “I will never do so.”207  Instead, he 
planned on referring them to Black. Requests for membership were not only being made 
of the NAACP, but also of the PEA.  The PEA gave responses like Byrd’s and local 
NAACP branches replied that they did not keep track of their members’ occupations.  
Solomon attributed these requests to white officials’ and reporters’ desire to find out how 
many teachers were NAACP members.208     
While it would be easy to assume that all African American teachers would stand 
in support of the NAACP, or at least oppose the anti-NAACP oath, P.B. Mdodana, an 
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A.M.E. minister, principal of Chesterfield County’s Pine Forest High School, and former 
teacher at Camden’s Jackson High School, demonstrates that black Carolinians were far 
from being a monolithic group. Mdodana may initially appear to be a proponent of equal 
rights.  A short Jet Magazine article said that the South African born educator believed 
black teachers should “appreciate equal facilities and oppose integration.”209  But a 
deeper look into Mdodana’s past reveals a more nuanced understanding of race and the 
meaning of equality.  In April, 1956, the PEA refused to permit Mdodana to introduce a 
resolution at a PEA conference in Columbia that strongly criticized the group’s support 
of integration.  While accused of racial disloyalty by some members for his purported 
defense of segregation, the language of Mdodana’s resolution and its accompanying letter 
reveal a different and largely understudied motivation for his support of separate black 
institutions.210  Reminding readers that African Americans were “proud of our heritage 
and God-given racial distinctions,” Mdodana wrote:  
 I, for one, am proud of my Negro heritage and wear my 
God-given color with dignity and display my racial traits 
without shame.  I envy no man who has been endowed by 
our Creator with characteristics differing from my own.211 
 
With a direct nod to black nationalism, Mdodana encouraged the PEA to go on record as 
“declaring our racial pride.”212  He resented the assertion that black education—and 
educators—were inferior. 213   Mdodana did not dispute the fact that blacks had 
substandard resources, but he did not see integration as the cure.  His hesitancy mirrored 
the uncertainties of other black Carolinians.  Indeed, the case that sparked the 
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desegregation battle in South Carolina, Briggs v. Elliott, began as a fight for improved 
and equal educational resources.  It was changed at the behest of the national NAACP 
office.  As Mdodana asserted, maintaining “separate but fully equal public school 
facilities” was the “well known desire” of most African Americans.214  For individuals 
like Mdodana, civil liberties could be better acquired through equalization, than with 
integration. 
The new legislation was effective in persuading some teachers to distance themselves 
from the NAACP.  Levi Byrd and the Cheraw Branch, understanding that teachers who 
did not quit the civil rights organizations would most likely be losing their livelihood, 
responded to these resignations with official letters acknowledging teachers’ resignations. 
Still, he hoped that the teachers would continue to offer financial support.215  Lucille 
Black understood that the deadline for teachers in the NAACP to either leave the 
organization or lose their jobs was fast approaching.  But she was confident that “a 
number of test cases” would arise, and the matter would eventually have to be settled in 
the courts.216  Roy Wilkins must have been equally confident because he telegraphed the 
South Carolina conference to offer the NAACP’s legal assistance should they wish to 
challenge the new law.217 
The opportunity to take advantage of this offer soon presented itself. On May 11, 
1956, Elloree school district superintendent M. G. Austin, gave Principal Davis a set of 
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applications to distribute to each teacher.218  Their employment contracts for the 1956-
1957 school year were significantly different from their past contracts. This time school 
superintendent M. G. Austin included the following questions:  
Do you belong to the NAACP? Do you support the 
NAACP in any way (money or attendance at meetings)?  
Do you favor integration of races in schools?  Are you 
satisfied with your work and the schools as they are now 
maintained?  Do you feel that you would be happy in an 
integrated school system, knowing that parents and students 
do not favor this system?  Do you feel that an integrated 
school system would better fit the colored race for their 
life’s work?  Do you think that you are qualified to teach an 
integrated class in a satisfactory manner?  Do you feel that 
parents of your school know that no public schools will be 
operated if they are integrated?  Do you believe in the aims 
of the NAACP?  If you should join the NAACP while 
employed in this school, please notify the Superintendent 
and Chairman of the Board of Trustees.  Do you desire a 
position in the Elloree Training School for the 1956-1957 
session?219 
 
The teachers were required to complete and submit the applications in order to have their 
contracts renewed for the following school term. When the teachers met with 
Superintendent Austin a few days later most of the dissenting teachers informed him that 
they would not be completing the new application.  Austin told them that they would 
have to sign a resignation form. But three teachers—Bee A. Fogan, Essie M. David, 
Rutha Ingram, and Frazier Kitt—also refused to sign the resignation forms Austin 
supplied them with. Two of the dissenting teachers, Leila M. Summers and Robert D. 
Carmichael filled out the application, but refused to answer the questions regarding 
NAACP membership and school integration. In short, they completed the information 
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regarding their qualifications, but only answered the questions regarding their desire to 
teach at ETS.  On May 17, 1956, the national office sent out a press release that was 
intended to bring attention to the twenty-one Elloree teachers who effectively lost their 
positions as a direct result of the anti-NAACP oath.  Eighteen resigned and three refused 
to sign. Ultimately, only seven of the Elloree Training School’s thirty-one teachers 
submitted applications on May 11.220 
 
The questionnaire set the small, rural town of Elloree apart from the rest of the 
state.  All South Carolina school districts required black teachers to reveal or terminate 
their NAACP membership, but only superintendent Austin included what one African 
American commentator described as “none-of-their-business” questions that “no self-
respecting, truthful, 100% American Negro” could answer.221  With Elloree as a model 
for other South Carolina school districts, similar questionnaires were executed in 
Charleston and Jasper counties where active WCC chapters operated.222   
The ETS teachers’ stance may have looked like a staged protest, but there was no 
planned collective action in place. Before superintendent Austin arrived at the school on 
May 11 to have the new contracts signed, Charles Davis met with each teacher to review 
the stipulations of the new questions.223  With as much objectivity as he could muster, he 
told each teacher to “only do what you think you have to do. . . You do what you feel that 
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you want to do in your heart.”224  That advice meant something different to each teacher.  
For some teachers, it meant not answering the questions at all, for others it meant 
resigning from their positions, and for certain teachers it meant answering the questions 
honestly and openly.  To someone like Elizabeth Cleveland, it was simply a matter of 
standing up for herself.  She said, “I felt like I had gone to school and felt I could teach 
any child.”225  Some of the ETS teachers answered the questionnaire in a satisfactory 
manner and their contracts were renewed for the next school year.  Cleveland remembers 
being surprised that her roommate signed the contract.  But she also understood the 
reasons why others went ahead with signing it: “The others, I knew—it was a mother and 
daughter—but they lived there and so I could understand why they weren’t gonna leave, 
you know.226   
Despite expected repercussions, some black teachers continued their affiliation 
with the NAACP.  Orangeburg County’s Dantzler School principal Reverend E.E. 
Richburg, who played a vital role in the Clarendon movement, seemed ready for the 
inevitable battle when he told a reporter with the New York Post, “I hope they fire me 
then.  I’d like to meet them in court.”227  Out of fourteen teachers at his school, he was the 
only one who admitted to being in the NAACP. But this current battle was nothing new 
to him.228  He was already firmly entrenched in the movement.  In 1955 the KKK 
kidnapped him and threatened to “horse-whip” him and was dismissed from a teaching 
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job because of his role in the Briggs case in Clarendon County. 229  Richburg serves as an 
excellent example of the far-reaching implications of one individual’s activism.  Not only 
was he dismissed from his teaching position, but so were his daughter, his son, and their 
spouses.230   
Other teachers around the state also lost their positions.  At least five teachers in 
Charleston did not have their contracts renewed because of their NAACP affiliation. 
Among them were Henry Hutchinson and Septima Clark who were dismissed after 
helping to shore-up support for a desegregation petition.  Hutchinson taught at Burke 
Industrial School, and Clark taught at Henry Archer School.  Both refused to renounce 
their NAACP membership.231  Clark remembered, “I refused to overlook my membership 
in the NAACP, as some of the teachers had done, and listed it.”232  Teachers like Clark 
were well aware of the fact that their activism would have repercussions and 
consequently many did not feel comfortable following her example.  As Cecil Williams 
recalled regarding black teachers, “It was rare for teachers to really take any anti-
establishment kind of attitude or any activity.”233  For her part, Clark tried to mobilize 
black teachers in Charleston to fight the anti-NAACP oath, which she saw as a blatantly 
unjust law.234  She was largely unsuccessful in this endeavor and regarded it as one of her 
greatest failures.  She remembered: 
[T]here were such a few jobs that they didn’t see how they 
could work against the law. . . I signed my name to 726 
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letters to black teachers asking them to tell the state of 
South Carolina that it [the anti-NAACP oath] was unjust . . 
. I don’t know why I felt that black teachers would stand up 
for their rights.  But they wouldn’t.  Most of them were 
afraid and became hostile.235 
 
Clark did get a response from twenty-six teachers.  Eleven of them agreed to go with her 
to talk to the superintendent, but only six of them showed up for the meeting.  The 
superintendent did not say much to them, only that they were living far ahead of their 
time.236 
 The wholesale dismissal of black teachers and hyper-focused negativity towards 
the NAACP was by no means exclusive to South Carolina.  In 1956 North Carolina threw 
out its state tenure law and requested that all teachers reapply to their positions.  Teachers 
who were known to support integration were unlikely to be rehired.237  A few years later, 
1959, Little Rock, Arkansas not only threatened to close its public schools but also to fire 
forty-four teachers, most of whom were black, for their “mild support of school 
integration.”238  And in one of the most troubling incidents of massive white resistance, 
every teacher in Prince Edward County, Virginia lost their job when the county closed it 
public schools rather than comply with the law.239  Clearly, the ETS teachers, and anyone 
else who was unwilling to bow to the demands of powerful white segregationists could 
find themselves unemployed. 
All of these dismissals for breach of contract had the potential to culminate into a 
court case.  The NAACP and the PEA stood by various teachers around the state, but they 
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homed in on the Elloree case because their lawyers thought the circumstances presented a 
better opportunity to challenge the anti-NAACP legislation.240  Correspondence from the 
national office shows that it had a deep interest in the Elloree case.  Indeed, it was their 
“moral obligation” to offer whatever help they could.241  Roy Wilkins and Thurgood 
Marshall exchanged memos about the case between each other.242  The NAACP made 
strategic efforts to ensure that the teachers would stay the course by offering legal and 
financial assistance.  Roy Wilkins wrote to Reverend Hinton that the national office was 
“very anxious” to offer the Elloree teachers as much support as it could muster.243  Even 
as Wilkins acknowledged that his organization’s “financial resources are not 
inexhaustible,” he pledged to help the teachers find other jobs and “to give assistance in 
these outstanding cases.”244  The NAACP also endeavored to help the teachers in their 
path towards financial recovery by helping them go to graduate school, find immediate 
employment, or in taking the New York City teachers exam. They sent $2400 to the 
South Carolina conference to assist the interested Elloree teachers with their graduate 
studies.245  
 As the NAACP and black newspapers publicized the plight of Orangeburg 
County’s black teachers other organizations lent financial and logistical support. Charles 
Davis was invited to attend a citizen’s organization in Minneapolis called the Campaign 
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for Courage where he received a five hundred dollar award on behalf of the Elloree 
teachers. They agreed to turn the sum over to the NAACP.246  Similarly when Thurgood 
Marshall contacted Fred Fuges, the Director of the Rights of Conscience Program of the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), he said they had some money set aside to 
provide “relief of conscience victims” and that the teachers could qualify for aid.247  The 
aid was intended to help its recipients pay court costs and legal fees, demonstrating that 
Marshall and the NAACP were laying the groundwork for its next legal battle. The AFSC 
also helped pay for Ms. Floyd’s graduate work as well as Robert Carmichael’s. The 
NAACP also offered to help people relocate.  Such assistance was not their usual method 
of assistance, but they were willing to do so in this case.248  
With growing funding, NAACP leaders believed that the Elloree case presented 
great possibilities for their legal efforts to undermine segregation and racial inequity.  The 
release of twenty-one teachers by the same school board and the unique questionnaire 
made it blatantly clear that the teachers’ dismissals and forced resignations had nothing to 
do with their performance and everything to do with their affiliation with the NAACP.  
By July 1956, the national NAACP office communicated with the local chapter and 
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Columbia attorney Lincoln Jenkins regarding the most effective legal strategy on behalf 
of the Elloree defendants.249 
The Elloree teachers’ legal case began in the Federal District Court in August of 
1956.  In a bit of irony, John J. Parker and George Bell Timmerman, who ruled on the 
Briggs case alongside J. Waites Waring would hear the case: Ola L. Bryan et al. v. M. G. 
Austin, Jr., as Superintendent of School District No. 7.  The plaintiffs, all ETS teachers, 
were: Ola L. Bryan, Robert D. Carmichael, Essie M. David, Charles E. Davis, Rosa D. 
Davis, Vivian V. Floyd, Bee A. Fogan, Hattie M. Fulton, Rutha M. Ingran, Mary E. 
Jackson, Frazier H. Keitt, Luther Lucas, James B. Mays, Laura Pickett, Howard W. 
Shefton, Betty Smith, Leila M. Summers, and Clarence V. Tobin. In their initial 
complaint, the plaintiffs repeatedly pointed out that they had refused to answer the 
questions that appeared on the new application because the questions were 
unconstitutional and violated their rights as American citizens. The NAACP attorneys 
took on the anti-NAACP oath directly, asserting that it not only violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, and the right to petition. Jenkins and Marshall asked the Court to instruct the 
defense that it could not use personal beliefs or associations as a condition of 
employment, and likewise to instruct the defense that it could not refuse to hire/rehire 
someone because they refused to answer these intrusive questions.250   
The defense asked for more time to review and prepare for the case, so it was 
postponed until mid-October. When the defense submitted its answer to the plaintiffs’ 
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complaint their attorney argued that the federal court had no jurisdiction in the case, an 
argument segregationist attorneys had been making since the teacher salary equalization 
cases. The defendants also tried to argue that the plaintiffs had not completed their duties 
in a satisfactory manner, but this was easily disproved by the fact that the school district 
had re-hired some of these teachers over and over again.  They also noted that the 
teachers who refused to sign the new applications did not give a reason for their refusal.  
Moreover, they argued that none of the teachers, save Luther Lucas, expressed an interest 
in being rehired.  But since Lucas did not fill out the application, they alleged that they 
could not hire him.  And while the NAACP’s attorneys attacked the anti-NAACP 
legislation, the defense used it as evidence that they were within their rights to require the 
teachers to complete the new application.  The defense’ sixth defense—that the Briggs 
case did not outlaw racially segregated schools—revealed South Carolina segregationists 
true fears. After all, the plaintiffs were not making a desegregation argument.  They had 
not even brought the issue up.251 
During the trial, the Attorney General’s office submitted a brief for the defense. The 
attorney general used arguments that mimicked those used during the teacher salary 
equalization cases to prevent the defense from being held responsible for their actions. 
For example, the attorneys stated that the case was not really the court’s prerogative 
because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all the administrative remedies that the General 
Assembly laid out. Ignoring precisely why the ETS teachers’ lost their positions, the 
attorney general also argued that the case was null and void because the plaintiffs were 
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no longer employed, had been replaced, and waited months to file the case.  And 
although they claimed that the teachers had not been dismissed because they were 
NAACP members—after all, none of the teachers volunteered whether or not they were 
members—they positioned the NAACP as the source of the state’s racial woes and 
defended the legislature’s attack on the organization.252 
In its decision, the court largely chose to avoid the issues most central to the 
NAACP’s case. The judges chose not to rule on whether or not the anti-NAACP statute 
was unconstitutional.  Instead, they posited that a state court had to make a ruling before 
the U.S. district court could render a decision.  The case was not dismissed outright, but 
remained pending until and if the plaintiffs had “a reasonable time for the exhaustion of 
state administrative and judicial remedies.”  On the surface (and perhaps in the judges’ 
perspective) this was a non-ruling.  But their assertion that the teachers should exhaust 
the administrative options was, in fact, a ruling in the defendants’ favor.253 
It was Judge Parker, whose opinion in the Briggs case had been decidedly against the 
NAACP, who issued an opinion dissenting parts of the court’s order.  He disagreed that 
the three-judge panel needed a lower court’s ruling in order to make an appropriate 
decision.  He also disagreed that the teachers needed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies because such remedies did not address the issue of unconstitutionality.  Most 
important to the NAACP’s case, Judge Parker asserted that the association was not a 
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subversive organization engaged with overthrowing the government.254 The NAACP was 
unpopular, but that was not a justifiable reason to deny its members their constitutional 
rights: 
The right to join organizations which seek by lawful means 
to support and further what their members regard as in the 
public interest or in the interest of a particular part of the 
public, is protected by the constitutional guarantees of the 
free speech and freedom of assembly; and such right is one 
of the bulwarks of liberty and of social progress.  The fact 
that organizations may render themselves unpopular with 
the majority in a community is no reason why the majority 
may use its power to enact legislation denying to their 
members the fundamental rights of constitutional liberty.255    
Judge Parker believed that court should declare the anti-NAACP oath unconstitutional 
and enjoin the defense from enforcing it as it was “unambiguous and clearly 
unconstitutional.”256  The National Education Association agreed with Judge Parker.  
They released a joint resolution with the Palmetto Education Association which stated 
that although applications were an appropriate prerequisite to hiring teachers, if those 
applications asked questions that “can be answered only in a manner that prejudices the 
teacher’s professional integrity and unjustly eliminated the teacher from further 
consideration for employment,” it was imperative for “professional organizations and 
individual citizens alike” to “oppose the use of the forms.”257  Unfortunately, the state’s 
white teachers’ association, the South Carolina Education Association, refused to stand 
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with the NEA and PEA.258  The Palmetto State’s black teachers found that, once again, 
they could only depend on their own professional association and the NAACP. 
 The NAACP did not go to a lower court as the three-judge panel recommended 
and instead filed an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.259  But they would not get their 
day in court.  South Carolina, realizing that it was unlikely to win the case if it went 
before the U.S. Supreme Court, repealed the statute.260  The case was remanded back to 
the U.S. District Court where it was dismissed.  
But the anti-NAACP oath’s repeal did not mean that the South Carolina General 
Assembly was abandoning its effort to dismantle the organization, or that it would stand 
idly by while schools were desegregated.  In its stead were two new anti-NAACP laws.  
Governor Bell Timmerman signed what was known as the barratry law.  The law, which 
was intended to prevent the NAACP from starting and filing school desegregation 
petitions, was quickly condemned by James Hinton who argued that it would “have little 
or no effect” on black Carolinians’ effort to acquire full citizenship.  Furthermore, even if 
the law managed to hurt the organization, the NAACP would “move right on.”261  The 
second law required teachers to list all of their organizational associations. Having 
learned a valuable lesson from the Elloree case, state segregationist lawmakers did not 
make it illegal to employ a NAACP member, but gave state agencies the option to not 
hire someone on the basis of their organizational affiliations. The new law bore the 
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appearance of being less overtly unconstitutional, but its supporters were not secretive 
about its intent to stymie the NAACP’s progress. These new laws were in some ways 
worse than the anti-NAACP oath.  Not only did they accomplish the same goal, but 
amidst the Red Scare’s oppressive atmosphere they bore the appearance of being legally 
defensible.262   
The fact that the NAACP had become a target for the state legislature and other 
elected officials was quite blatant.  Additionally, black Carolinians’ heightened activism 
reinvigorated the reactionary white resistance movement.  The Citizens Councils, which 
had already grown to nearly sixty local councils, launched a new membership drive at the 
start of 1957.263  They had been so effective in their methods, that Senator Englehardt of 
Birmingham, Alabama made a pilgrimage to the state so that he could “swap ideas” with 
the state’s council leaders.  He heard how well-organized the South Carolina councils 
were and believed that his campaign, which he asserted was “based on white supremacy,” 
could learn from South Carolina’s well-organized Councils.264   
Under these circumstances, it is less surprising that Clark had such a difficult time 
rallying Charleston’s black teachers.  The Elloree situation was a bit of an aberration.  
Perhaps in that moment, they did not truly realize what they were risking.  Elizabeth 
Cleveland recalled that she was not worried about the risk of not being able to find 
another job. 
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I guess some people were afraid that they weren’t ever 
going to work again or something like that, but I didn’t. . . 
that didn’t dawn on me.  That didn’t bother me.  I felt like 
all of us would be able to work wherever we applied, even 
if they found out that we did do that.265 
 
But unfortunately, while Cleveland’s confidence in her and her colleagues’ abilities was 
more than justifiable, her confidence in their capacity to find work in a post-Brown 
political environment proved to be misplaced.  Cleveland was able to find work.  But that 
was largely due to the fact that her husband was in the military, and they moved away 
soon after this incident. For the majority of the ETS teachers, their audacity to pose a 
direct challenge to the anti-NAACP oath earned them a place on the state’s black list.266 
And as Cecil Williams recalled, the ETS teachers simultaneously risked their livelihoods 
and their community status: 
The bravery these people had to give up their livelihood.  
And jobs are hard to come by during those days. So, this 
meant everything.  This meant that if they owned a house 
and had a bank loan, they had no income coming. . . Many 
of them, when they did that, they were ostracized by the 
rest of the educational community.  Not many of them were 
able to find jobs in the state.  Many of them traveled out of 
state. . . There was an effort by the NAACP to get 
employment and also to have fund drives to give them 
money to pay them and that went on for a while.  But, 
many of them never regained gainful employment and lived 
a life of poverty for the rest of their lives.267 
 
Black teachers received widespread support among local community members in their 
goals of educating black youth.268  This strong backing was readily apparent among the 
ETS parents.  After word of the teachers’ dismissals got around town, some of the parents 
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released a statement that characterized the teachers as “sympathetic, admirable, and 
respected” community members.269  In local black citizens’ eyes, the teachers’ activism 
only heightened their professionalism.270  Segregationists were correct to fear the possible 
implications of black teacher activism.  If they became activists in large numbers, their 
efforts, in concert with the unceasing work of the NAACP, could bring about their worst 
fears.  It could completely break down the architecture of Jim Crow segregation. 
And the Elloree teachers did not necessarily receive an unqualified support.  After 
the ETS teachers’ contracts were revoked, the school trustees received fifty-four 
applications, including some from out of state.  Blackman said community members 
would refuse the new teachers because they did not feel the new teachers “should have 
taken the jobs of other teachers who had taken a noble stand.”271  He quoted one trustee 
as saying that “anything can teach a nigger.”272     
The reprisals local NAACP members faced were so pronounced that tensions 
between local and national leadership rose, as local residents did not feel the national 
office did enough to support them and compensate them for their struggles.   Blackman 
most likely felt forgotten by the very organization he risked so much for and which he 
worked so hard to mobilize the community’s support.  When Blackman wrote the state 
NAACP leader James Hinton in February of 1957, asking for additional support for 
Elloree’s black farmers, Hinton told him that they did not have any funds available that 
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year and that the NAACP “cannot become a relief agency.”273  Likewise when Rev. H.C. 
Demore who noted that he had been unable to borrow money because he was the 
president of his NAACP branch, and an “ardent worker” for the organization, John 
Morsell advised him that they had no funds to help him, and told him to go to Victory 
Savings Bank for a loan.274 But Demore had gone to the bank the previous year.  And 
while they furnished him with a $200 loan, the amount was insufficient to run his farm.  
 Wilkins assured Blackman and Simkins that the NAACP would try to help with 
specific cases immediately connected to NAACP activism, and noted that he recognized 
that Elloree had become a “punishment area.”275  But he also repeated the assertion that 
they were not a “general relief agency.”276  Simkins remained one of Blackman’s most 
ardent supporters.  In February 1958, she wrote him, seemingly heartbroken about the 
continued hardships he and the people of Elloree were facing. She wanted him to stay in 
the small, rural town and maintain his leadership role. 
Now, I do not want you to leave Elloree.  You have been 
the patriarch there, the leaven that has held the lump 
together.  I know that more attention could have been given 
to you in your struggle there, and God knows I have tried to 
walk with you every step of the way—as well as it was 
possible without being there constantly as you are.  Now, I 
want you to stick a little longer.  Where would the people 
be without you.  What semblance of branch activity would 
there be without you.  You have gone on a thankless job, 
apparently.  But your influence is there—your immortality 
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is there.  You will never die as long as there are Negros 
who have lived in Elloree and in South Carolina.277 
Enclosed in the letter was “a little cash for you to use personally and to show you that I 
care and to inspire and hearten you.”278  She advised him to get a truck and come to 
Columbia.  There were still some food and clothing donations remaining that he could 
take back to Elloree. Simkins later sent his letters to Roy Wilkins in the hopes that he 
could help her find children’s clothing to send to Elloree. The NAACP did continue to 
offer some aid, but Elloree’s black citizens remained financially devastated.279  
 In truth, the state’s and White Citizens Council’s laser-focused efforts to diminish 
the NAACP may not have been completely successful, but they certainly made an 
impact.   The NAACP did experience a decline. The number of branches dropped 
drastically between 1954 and 1957 from eighty-five to thirty-seven.  The membership 
dropped from 7,889 to 2,202.280  Yet while the state legislature and the Council were 
certainly to blame for much of this decline, people on the local level and in the national 
office believed that it was also “indicative of the weak organization which has resulted 
from absentee leadership and incidentally about program and activities to be effected.”281  
After all, the Elloree NAACP branch—which suffered a loss of membership but 
continued to have active participants—proved that repercussions alone were not enough 
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to completely destroy a local movement. Internal discord among its leaders worked to 
worsen the leadership problem.282  It was “imperative that something be done.”283 
 The person at the center of this dissatisfaction with “the South Carolina situation” 
was James Hinton.284  During the last years of his leadership, the state organization 
remained in a state of disarray as, by all accounts, he all but abandoned his duties as 
president.285   One NAACP member, clearly irate regarding his most recent interaction 
with Hinton, wrote Ruby Hurley in February of 1958.  Hinton, who the author referred to 
as “His Highness,” had already been spending most of his time out of the state when he 
arrived a half hour late to their meeting.286  The group was meeting with Hinton to speak 
about recent activism among students at Allen University.  The author and his delegation 
believed that the NAACP should offer the students legal assistance. Hinton provided 
what most likely seemed like a series of excuses about why he and the NAACP could not 
offer their support: 1) the students’ academic standing was unknown, 2) their moral 
character was unknown, 3) none of the students had attempted to meet with him 
beforehand.  But the author and his delegation felt that if the NAACP did not offer the 
students legal assistance, they would lose their standing throughout the state’s black 
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community.  Hinton did finally support the students, but his hesitancy revealed a man that 
may have grown out of touch with his community and the ever changing black civil 
rights movement.287   
It was growing more and more apparent that Hinton’s time as leader of the SC 
NAACP was coming to a close. Hurley said that she received complaints regarding his 
lack of leadership during her visits to Greer, Oconee County, Rock Hill, Spartanburg, 
Sumter, and Union. She admitted that the situation caused her to avoid visiting the state 
more than absolutely necessary.288 Things got so bad that people began to wonder why he 
would not simply “retire gracefully.”289  On the one hand Hinton was not doing the 
NAACP’s work, but on the other hand it was difficult for other leaders within the state 
organization to move the NAACP’s agenda forward without Hinton because he had a 
close relationship with the national office. On March 28, 1958, a meeting was called in 
Columbia wherein some thirty-five to forty branch leaders met to discuss the issue.  
Hinton, in a move that seemed to demonstrate growing disinterest in the NAACP, did not 
attend.290  
As the South Carolina NAACP approached its annual Conference of Branches, 
Hinton expressed that he was ready to formally retire from the position he had held since 
1940.291  The NAACP gave the outgoing president a proper banquet in his honor where 
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Current praised him as a “tough, courageous, resourceful and brilliant” state president.292 
During his farewell speech, Hinton reviewed the SC NAACP’s major accomplishments 
of the previous nineteen years.  He acknowledged that reprisals/repercussions had 
impacted membership numbers, but encouraged members to actively campaign for 
increased membership and to purchase life memberships. He dismissed the organization’s 
internal problems and instead argued that “the fight and the organization are greater than 
any of us.”293  The state NAACP “must not become divided, but must move ahead in 
unison.”294  They had accomplished much, but those accomplishments were not enough.  
He, like so many others, maintained the belief that in the end, they would win.  They 
were “ON GOD’S SIDE, and HE cannot fail, so we cannot fail.”295 
The ouster of one of its most stalwart and dedicated leaders perhaps best 
exemplified the NAACP’s decline. Simkins, whose lifelong activism reflected a 
commitment to her community rather than to any particular organization, ruffled feathers 
when she served as the South Carolina delegate at the Conference on Voting Restrictions 
in Southern States and several newspapers identified her as being a NAACP 
representative.   The NAACP had not sent her.  And the assertion that it had upset both 
Hinton and Wilkins.296  Wilkins was further upset that an Amsterdam News article on 
black leadership criticized him and the NAACP Board for its “alleged failure to carry on 
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a vigorous fight for students” who wanted to desegregate the University of South 
Carolina.  He was convinced the information came from Simkins.297   
By the time Edwin G. Washington wrote the South Carolina NAACP in July, 
1958—asking Simkins if she supported the NAACP, how the community felt about her 
leadership, and if they would endorse something she co-sponsored—she was no longer 
serving as the SC NAACP secretary.298  Hinton informed Williams that Simkins was 
“very efficient and militant.”299  He noted that although he did not know of her 
participation in any subversive organizations, she was currently under investigation by 
the House UnAmerican Activities committee.  Regarding her leadership Hinton said, “I 
do not care to state any portion.”300   
NAACP leadership tried to make Simkins’ ouster appear to be her idea.  She 
found out that she had allegedly declined reelection as secretary in a newspaper article. 
Simkins wrote a letter to all the officers and local branch members assuring them that she 
had not “turned my back on my people and our cause in this needy time.”301  She 
expressed confidence that her fellow South Carolinians knew her well enough to know 
that she would never “be bought and that I WILL NOT be sold.”302  Her willingness to 
take the state NAACP to task proved her assertion.  She argued that the NAACP still had 
much work to do; and that it was important for the organization to not look backwards 
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and “bask in reflected glory.”303  Adding to her inability to serve as a leader in the 
organization was a recent bout with influenza that had left her debilitated, and the death 
of her mother. Longtime NAACP member and dedicated civil rights activist Rev. I. 
DeQuincy Newman replaced Simkins.304 
 The NAACP continued to actively engage teachers.  In March of 1959, the South 
Carolina NAACP received a $400.00 loan to help fund their “Teacher Mailing campaign” 
which they hoped would help with membership and funding.305  They mailed 8,000 letter 
to South Carolina’s black teachers ahead of the Palmetto Education Association’s annual 
convention, asking teachers to support the NAACP.  The Field Secretary followed up 
these letters during the convention with an art exhibit, a booth where they handed out free 
literature, and welcome signs at nine public locations where teachers were known to 
visit.306  
As the nation entered into a new decade that brought about some of the most 
striking moments of social unrest, the SC NAACP Conference of Branch’s new 
president, I. DeQuincy Newman, wrote John Morsell in the national office regarding the 
continued hardships Elloree’s black citizens faced due to a “systematic program of 
economic pressure foisted against Negroes who have been a part of school desegregation 
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and NAACP activity” in the area.307  To make matters worse, a recent hurricane had 
devastated the largely agricultural economy.  The combination of no crops because of the 
hurricane, and the inability to receive credit due to economic reprisals meant that “hunger 
and general want” was a more than likely outcome.308  In this case, the national NAACP 
responded by calling an emergency conference in their office and sending $1,000 to 
South Carolina.  Morsell told Newman that the NAACP had a similar fund in Mississippi, 
and advised Newman to model this South Carolina fund the same way their Mississippi 
administrator, Medgar Evers, did.309    
Ultimately, the plight of Elloree and its teachers proved that the subjects of Doddy 
& Edwards study were right to fear that integration could negatively impact black 
teachers.  The mere threat of integration turned out to be enough to displace them. 
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CHAPTER 5: “WE FIGURED YOU’D CAUSE TROUBLE:” GLORIA RACKLEY 
AND THE 1960S CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
 
On August 5, 1956, almost three months after the Elloree Training School’s 
teachers were effectively dismissed from their positions, educator  Gloria Rackley 
received her Master of Science degree during South Carolina State University’s summer 
convocation.  Speaking on the subject of “The Responsibility of the Individual in a 
Democracy,” Dr. R. B. Atwood, Kentucky State University at Frankfort’s president and 
the day’s commencement speaker, congratulated the 101 degree candidates, and told 
them that their contemporaries were in great need of responsible leadership.1  Rackley, 
already a young wife and mother, seemed to take Dr. Atwood’s words to heart.  Over the 
next decade she emerged as one of the most committed and prominent members of the 
Orangeburg civil rights movement.  Her roles as mother, teacher, and NAACP member 
converged to make her a charismatic leader and sympathetic activist.  Drawing upon the 
NAACP papers, court documents, oral histories, and newspaper and magazine articles, 
this chapter uses Rackley’s life as a lens to examine the 1960s black civil rights 
movement on the local and national level. 
Born in the “comfortable town” of Little Rock, South Carolina, on March 11, 
1927, Gloria Blackwell Rackley became one of Orangeburg’s most prominent civil rights 
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activists during the early 1960s.2  That activism was largely framed by her family’s 
background.  She inherited a deep relationship to the church from her grandfather, a 
Methodist minister. Rackley took on leadership roles within the church from an early age; 
she attended national and international Methodist youth meetings, and she served as 
president of the Methodist Youth Fellowship for South Carolina. That spirituality carried 
into her adulthood when she obtained her bachelor’s degree in 1953 from Claflin, a 
Methodist college, and joined Trinity United Methodist Church—which served as the 
local movement’s unofficial headquarters—in Orangeburg.3   
Rackley’s mother, Lurline Olivia Thomas Blackwell, and father, Benjamin 
Harrison Blackwell, played pivotal roles in their small town community.4  Benjamin 
Blackwell was the only barber in the area, and Mrs. Blackwell was “the teacher, with a 
capital T-H-E.”5  Rackley’s father, an active NAACP member, began taking her to 
meetings in Columbia where she became familiar with the state’s most well-known civil 
rights leaders—people such as Modjeska Simkins, James Hinton, Levi Byrd, and S. J. 
McDonald.  She even began collecting NAACP memberships as a child. But she based 
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her transition from teacher, mother, and wife to full-fledged activist on her mother’s 
example.6  She remembered,  
You know, there was really no big transition.  My mother 
was always a community serving person.  She was a 
teacher. And she was the teacher in the community. People 
came to her for all kinds of things.7 
 
Although Mrs. Blackwell did not engage in the same type of activism as she did, 
Rackley’s words demonstrated that for her, the connection between teaching and activism 
was not particularly exceptional. For Rackley and other teacher-activists activism served 
as another type of community work—an extension of their daily work in the classroom.  
This perspective would become pivotal as Gloria Rackley became increasingly active in 
Orangeburg’s 1960s civil rights movement.   
 The 1960s civil rights movement’s birth is typically tied to February 1, 1960, 
when four Greensboro, North Carolina, college students sat down at an all-white 
Woolworth’s lunch counter, asked for service, and were denied.  This moment of direct-
action protest then sparked a youth-led movement that spread across the South. But in 
South Carolina, this youth-led movement began in 1950s Orangeburg, and was marked 
by a protest on New Year’s Day in 1960.  The incidents surrounding that January 1st 
protest began in October 1959, in Greeneville, South Carolina, where baseball legend 
Jackie Robinson was a speaker at the annual NAACP State Conference.  Gloster B. 
Current, who also attended the conference, and a few other locals, arrived at the 
Greeneville airport on Sunday morning, October 18 and sat down in the whites-only 
waiting room while they waited for Robinson’s plane to arrive.  They were told to leave.  
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They refused and were threatened with arrest.  Current and the others insisted that they 
had every right to be there. Robinson’s flight arrived, and they left without further 
incident.  When Robinson came back to that same airport for his departure the following 
Sunday, October 25, they received the same treatment.  Current and a few others sat 
down in the whites only waiting room. The manager arrived and told all of them, 
Robinson included, that they could not sit in that area.  He told an officer to arrest the 
group if they refused to move.  Current and Robinson reminded the manager that they 
were interstate travellers, and therefore under the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Current also told them that he had no problem going to jail.  But he later 
noted that they “made no attempt to prolong the discussion,” and “remained standing in 
that area which was forbidden to colored passengers.”  Current and Robinson were able 
to board the plane and leave.8   
As of November, neither the airport nor the airline had made any effort to rectify 
the situation.  Responding to comments from Herbert Harris, Eastern Air Line’s public 
relations manager, that he had not heard of the incident, Robinson wrote that he was 
“amazed.” It was “inconceivable” that the company’s public relations department had no 
information.  Robinson was further unsatisfied with Harris’ assertion that he was merely 
the airport’s “tenant.” To Robinson, it was Harris’ job to ensure all the airline’s 
passengers received fair treatment.9   
By the end of the year, local black residents wanted full desegregation of the 
airport’s waiting rooms. On January 1, 1960, African Americans gathered at Springfield 
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Baptist in Greeneville where they prayed, and listed to over a dozen speakers.  Three 
hundred African Americans proceeded to the Greenville airport through the “chilling 
rain, snow and sleet.”10  Traditionally observed as Emancipation Day, it was the ideal day 
to stage their “protest pilgrimage.”  Once there, 265 people entered the facilities, but the 
manager cited fire safety regulations and prevented any more protestors entrance.  The 
protestors proceeded to gather in front of the building and sing hymns, while a fifteen 
person delegation went inside and presented a resolution calling for the end of racial 
discrimination and segregation in South Carolina. 11   Rev. M. D. McCollum—the 
Orangeburg NAACP branch president whose 1950s activism resulted in severe reprisals, 
including his wife’s dismissal as an elementary school principal—was the one who read 
the resolution.12  McCollum’s presence demonstrates that Orangeburg activists were 
leaders both on the local and state level, and that they believed their well-being was 
interconnected with all black Carolinians’ plight.   
The following two years placed Orangeburg’s college and high school students at 
the forefront of the youth-led 1960s movement.  Gloria Rackley, a schoolteacher, mother 
to two teenage daughters, and NAACP Youth chapter organizer, would find that the 
many hats she wore often placed her at the center of these struggles. 
 The early 1960s witnessed a seemingly unstoppable student movement.  The 
home of two black colleges, several black public schools, and a historically politically 
engaged black population, Orangeburg turned into a hotbed of activism.  Students from 
South Carolina State and Claflin colleges began consistently staging direct-action protests 
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in March 1960.  On March 2, approximately 400 students marched through downtown 
Orangeburg.13  Their walk was slow and silent, but their signs with slogans such as 
“Segregation is Dead,” and “We Want Liberty,” voiced their discontent.14 
 Of course, South Carolina’s student movement was not an exclusively 
Orangeburg phenomenon.  In Columbia, Benedict College and Allen University students 
were planning a march to the State House when Governor Hollings went out of his way 
to thwart their plans.  He announced that their protest, which would include saying a 
prayer and singing freedom songs, would not be tolerated.  The attorney general’s office 
backed up Hollings’ threat when it confirmed that law enforcement had the authority to 
arrest demonstrators.15  Although these threats were directed towards the Benedict and 
Allen students, it set the tone for how state and law enforcement officials would react to 
the direct-action protests of the coming years.  Mass demonstrations were now 
guaranteed to result in mass arrests.   
On March 15, 1960, between 350 and 450 students were arrested in Orangeburg. 
The arrest came after 1,000 college students from nearby South Carolina State and 
Claflin colleges marched to downtown. Local authorities were somehow alerted to the 
students’ plans because state police, sheriff’s deputies, and the fire department were there 
to boost the local police force. They used fire hoses and tear gas to break up the 
demonstration. The sheer number of young men and women meant that Orangeburg’s 
jail, with a capacity of fifty-eight, was insufficient.  So the students were herded, like 
animals, into a nearby stockade where they waited in forty degree weather and sang 
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songs—like “God Bless America” and “The Star Spangled Banner”—that simultaneously 
demonstrated a love for their country and asserted their right to full citizenship. After 
waiting in the stockade for hours, the students were released on $10 surety bonds posted 
by local black businessmen and NAACP members.16 
 March 15 witnessed protests activities across the state.  In Rock Hill seventy 
black college students from nearby Friendship Junior College were arrested after 
picketing at City Hall against segregated lunch counters. Five to nine students from 
Benedict and Allen colleges were arrested in Columbia. In Sumter, Morris College 
students were able to avoid arrest after singing on the steps of the Sumter County 
Courthouse.17 
 The March 15 protests and subsequent arrest were part of a much larger 
collaborative effort across the South to confront racial segregation.  March also witnessed 
seventy-seven African Americans arrested in Atlanta, seventy FAMU students arrested in 
Tallahassee, three out of seventy protesting Savannah State College students were 
arrested in Savannah, and one hundred twenty Wake Forrest College faculty members 
signed a petition asking the local Woolworth’s to serve all customers regardless of race 
after the manager signed trespass warrants against twenty-two in-store demonstrators.18  
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But, the largest number of arrests took place in Orangeburg, demonstrating the important 
role local activists played in the national movement.  
 Orangeburg’s African American college students continued to engage in direct-
action protests that coincided with protests across the state and the South.  On July 21, 
1960 sit-ins were staged in Columbia, Greenville, and Orangeburg.  On February 11, 
1961 ten people in Orangeburg were arrested and jailed during a lunch counter sit-in 
while African Americans in Sumter passed out handbills encouraging people to boycott 
city buses.19 
  The youth-centered movement of the 1960s was mostly comprised of black 
students, but there were a few white students who also got involved.  Orangeburg police 
detained two young men from Wofford College’s (located in Spartanburg, South 
Carolina) all white student body in May of 1961.  The two students, Daniel Reed Lewis 
and Scott Barnes Goeway travelled to Orangeburg and participated in anti-segregation 
protests alongside local blacks. Their plight demonstrated that the audacity to so blatantly 
disregard the South’s long-held social mores came with consequences and that whiteness 
could not protect you.  For after their detainment they returned to college to find a student 
body enraged by their actions.  Clearly inspired by the Ku Klux Klan, a group of 200 
Wofford students dressed themselves in white bed sheets, burned Lewis and Goeway in 
effigy, and then set fire to a wooden cross.20  Despite their obvious visual references to 
the KKK, one student insisted that they were not “protesting against their beliefs.”  
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Instead they “just don’t like the way they’re dragging down the name of Wofford College 
with them.”21  And while the college’s administration declined to say exactly what 
happened, it was pretty clear that they did not support the students.  Within days, Lewis 
and Goeway were no longer enrolled in school.22  
 The seemingly non-stop student activism of the early 1960s positioned South 
Carolina’s black civil rights attorneys to contest the arrests and imprisonment on a large 
scale.  On August 5, 1961, the Pittsburgh Courier reported that a group of thirteen 
African American lawyers, with Matthew J. Perry at their helm, were preparing 900 civil 
rights cases to go before the State Supreme Court.  The cases included people involved in 
protests throughout the state including Charleston (24 people), Columbia (209), 
Darlington (4), Greenville (52), Florence (59), Spartanburg (2), Rock Hill (105), and 
Sumter (26).  But by far the largest number of cases came from Orangeburg, which 
boasted five hundred individual protestors. Indeed, by May the following year, nine of 
these cases were slated to go before the South Carolina Supreme Court.  Considering the 
sheer number of Orangeburg activist, it was unsurprising that eight of the cases originated 
in the small urban town.  The other case involved high school students from Florence.  
Perry and his committee of civil rights attorneys planned to argue that: the arrest warrants 
were vague, they did not have the opportunity to question jury members before they were 
chosen, prosecutors did not prove that the students broke any laws or intended to incite a 
riot, and police powers were used to deprive the students of their constitutional rights of 
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freedom of speech and to petition government officials.23   In one of the Orangeburg 
cases, the state Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, and remanded it back 
to the lower court for re-trial.  Unfortunately for the young activists, the State Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court’s decision in the seven other Orangeburg cases, arguing that 
because the previous demonstrations had resulted in “very high tension” the subsequent 
protests amounted to disturbing the peace and inciting violence.24  
 As Perry’s role in these court cases demonstrates, despite the fact that the 1960s 
boasted a decidedly youth-led social movement, the young activists were able to garner 
some of the old guard’s support.  In fact, many adults made unequivocally positive public 
statements regarding student activism.  For instance, in response to the Rock Hill 
students’ activism, local minister Rev. C. A. Ivory was quoted as saying, “We are 100 per 
cent in favor of the movement.”  He believed the students needed “adult assistance, 
morally, spiritually and perhaps financially.”25  Additionally, when over 400 Orangeburg 
student activists were arrested in March 1960, the NAACP quickly denounced the state’s 
“storm trooper” actions.  The NAACP asserted that instead of using state power to 
compromise students’ freedoms of speech, peaceful assembly, and right to petition the 
government, Gov. Hollings and other leaders should be using the state’s police power to 
persuade more businesses to serve all patrons regardless of race. In some ways, the state 
NAACP began to emulate the students’ efforts.  In December, 1960, Rev. I. DeQuincey 
Newman, NAACP field secretary, announced the NAACP’s Christmas shopping 
campaign to boycott stores that did not serve African American patrons at their lunch 
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counters. Indeed, Roy Wilkins said that the NAACP was proud of the students, and 
credited the 1960 Orangeburg mass arrests for sparking the association’s boycott of stores 
that practiced racial discrimination. Perhaps hoping that the students’ energetic activism 
would energize its own base, the NAACP even hired a Claflin student who had served as 
a leader in the well-known Orangeburg demonstrations.26 
 But not all of South Carolina’s old guard welcomed the students’ tactics.  As one 
North Carolina student, Laureiette Williams recalled, “Our adults are too worried about 
security to do anything.  They are too afraid of their jobs.  We’ve got to do it.  And we’re 
not afraid.”27  Rev. David H. Sims, a former Allen University president, seemed to agree 
with Williams when he praised student efforts to end segregation and criticized black 
adults for “selling out” and focusing too heavily on social life rather than political 
issues.28  Yet, while Williams was correct in her assertion that many African Americans 
feared activism’s economic repercussions, a closer look at what these adults said 
demonstrates that their disapproval was nuanced and grounded in their lived experiences.  
John McCray—African American intellectual, and the well-known editor of South 
Carolina’s black newspaper, the Lighthouse & Informer—seemed to believe that while 
the students’ protests were orderly and well-orchestrated, they were trampling on whites’ 
rights when they “grab all available seats at a store counter for his race while decrying the 
same thing when it is reversed.” McCray believed the students were “mostly sincere,” but 
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that they were being exploited by groups who claimed to raise money to assist the 
students in “a heartless and cold scheme,” to defraud African American adults of their 
money.  McCray, who had been a voice for racial advancement since the 1940s, believed 
that the methods, which brought equal pay for teachers, and desegregation in the 
Democratic primary, had been “serviceable in the earlier years” and were still serviceable 
in the 1960s.  According to McCray, the students “made their point and collected 
answers.”29 It was time to let the “city officials, the store operators and the real and 
responsible community leaders within the two races” finish this conversation so that they 
could come to some sort of resolution.30  Still, when news came that over twenty South 
Carolina State students would be expelled for their role in protests, McCray wrote Gov. 
Hollings and Bruce W. White, chairman of the college’s board of trustees, urging them 
not to punish the students for using their “constitutionally guaranteed rights of protest 
against customs and policies they believe illegal and inhumane.”31  Any punitive efforts 
taken against the students would be viewed as “vengeful and partisan and depriving one 
body of students . . . of the right to express themselves on the issue.”  Furthermore, 
although McCray and other African Americans may not have agreed with the students’ 
tactics, they stood together in their opinion that racial segregation was wrong and had to 
end.32 
 Particularly important  for  the  purposes  of  this  study  were  black  teachers’ 
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reactions to student activism in the 1960s. The job loss teacher-activists had experienced 
over the previous decades prevented many black teachers from openly assuming the 
activist role of someone like Gloria Rackley.  But that did not mean they saw themselves 
as having no role to play in the desegregation movement.  As Dr. Stephen J. Wright, Fisk 
University president stated during a Palmetto Education Association (PEA) conference, it 
was the black teacher’s job to “cleanse the mind of the Negro child of any vestige of 
inferiority.”33  Orangeburg’s African American teachers seemed to agree with Wright’s 
sentiments.  In December of 1960, the Orangeburg County Teachers’ Association drew 
up a resolution affirming their belief “in the fundamental rights of all men, in Christian 
brotherhood, and in the inalienable rights of all citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution 
of the United States of America.”34  The resolution went on to say: 
…we as teachers, citizens of the United States of America, 
law-abiding citizens of the State of South Carolina, 
members of a learned profession, hold that our 
responsibility of guiding the learning processes of our 
youth toward optimum citizenship in a democratic society 
is inseparable to our responsibility as citizens in our 
community . . . We believe that the students of South 
Carolina State and Claflin Colleges are to be commended 
for their passive, orderly demonstrations for first class 
citizenship.  We believe that the brutal attacks and 
incarcerations which have accompanied these peaceful 
demonstrations in Orangeburg are to be deplored.35 
 
The statement—both in open support of the college students and in defiance of state and 
city leaders who saw fit to arrest and jail them—was sent to local and national news 
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outlets, the PEA, and the National Education Association.36  Local segregationists 
challenged the resolution’s authenticity.  Richard Rhame, a local broadcaster, announced 
that the Orangeburg Teacher Association president, Lee M. Tyler, denied that the 
resolution had the teachers’ unanimous approval.  As evidence, he pointed to the fact that 
the resolution bore no signatures.  It was only signed, “Members of the Orangeburg 
County Teachers’ Association.”37  But Rhame’s assertions may not have been entirely 
true.  After all, it was quite likely that teachers chose not to sign their names out of a very 
realistic fear that they would be dismissed from their jobs.  Nonetheless, two teachers 
requested and were given the opportunity to reply, on-air, to the Rhame-Tyler accusation.  
One person was Wilkinson High School teacher Napoleon Ford.  The other person was 
Whittaker Elementary School teacher Gloria Rackley.38  She recalled that being on the 
radio gave her “some kind of notoriety.”39  It contributed to her reputation as a vocal 
activist and made her a target.40 
 But Rackley’s vibrant activist career was only getting started.   The events that 
occurred on, and followed, October 12, 1962, demonstrated how Rackley’s activism 
intersected with motherhood and her teaching career.  On that day Jamelle, her fourteen-
year-old daughter, dislocated her finger during a playground accident and was taken to 
the Orangeburg Regional Hospital.  Gloria Rackley was teaching her elementary school 
class when she was advised that her daughter was at the hospital and was hysterical. She 
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arrived at the emergency room right as hospital staff was finishing an X-ray. 41  Told that 
Jamelle would receive anesthesia and go in for surgery, she was directed to a waiting 
room that was, at best, sub-par.  Mrs. Rackley, concerned for her daughter’s physical and 
emotional well being was distracted.  She remembered: 
When they took her away, a nice woman said, “Oh, she 
really was hurt” and said nice things. . . and this woman 
was white and she said, “now, you can wait over there.”  
…And over there was really some Coca Cola crates up 
against the wall. . . And so, you know how people get left 
and right mixed up?  So I just assumed she had got, you 
know, her directions mixed up.  So I just went on to the 
waiting room.  And when I got there I was really still 
thinking about my daughter, who is so tender.  And I was 
wondering if I had made a mistake in rearing her because 
she’s so fragile and tender.  And she was carrying on so 
about this finger . . . And I did take the moment, very 
seriously, to think about what I might need to do to prepare 
Jamelle for life.  And I looked up and a man was there at 
the door.  Well, I really thought it was still about Jamelle.  
So I jumped up and rushed to the door.  He turned around 
and went ahead of me.  So, I’m thinking it’s very bad.  So I 
almost run to keep up with him.  And when we get to the 
end, to a turn in the corridor, he stops and says, “There’s a 
waiting room for you down there.”  And that’s the first time 
that I’m realizing that I’m being called out of the waiting 
room.42 
 
There were African Americans sitting on the crates, but Rackley chose to wait for her 
daughter in the main area.  One nurse told her that there was a difference between the 
waiting rooms for blacks and whites, and was quoted as saying, “we figured you’d cause 
trouble.”43  Rackley was threatened with arrest when two policemen were called to the 
scene.44  But Jamelle was soon discharged and the two were able to leave without 
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incident.45  Once they returned home and “had time to breath” she and the NAACP knew 
that they could finally build a viable desegregation case against Orangeburg Regional 
Hospital.46  Of course, the NAACP had been committed to desegregation for a long time, 
but for Rackley and other local African Americans hospital desegregation was an 
essential part of gaining equal access to healthcare.  For instance, Rackley recalled that 
when Orangeburg African Americans “needed an appendectomy or something, they got it 
out of town.” African Americans only went to Orangeburg Regional “if you got sick in 
the night.”47  The NAACP had been interested in challenging the hospital’s segregation 
policy for some time, but Rackley also recalled that they were met with many problems: 
. . . you know, it’s very difficult to get a sick person who’s 
still going under the knife, or going back for further 
treatment to bring a suit against the hospitals and the 
doctors serving them.  So, we [the NAACP] couldn’t get 
any further than just kind of talking about it.48 
 
So, when the daughter of a staunch activist was taken to the hospital, the Orangeburg 
NAACP did, indeed, have a unique opportunity.  When the mother and daughter duo 
returned two weeks later to have Jamelle’s finger cast removed, Gloria Rackley again 
chose to sit in the whites’ waiting room.  A doctor told her that they were finished with 
Jamelle and she could go see her, but Mrs. Rackley replied that her daughter would be 
able to find her in the waiting room.  Later, when Jamelle did join her, the Hospital 
Director asked why she had not left.  Rackley replied that she was waiting for her car.  
Upon further refusal to go wait out on the street, a plain-clothes officer came to arrest her 
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for “disturbing the business of the hospital.”49  She was taken to jail in the fashion of a 
violent criminal.  There was a police car escort both in front and behind the plain car she 
rode in.  She was charged with trespassing.50   
The trial that followed gained national media attention and resulted in the first and 
only time esteemed civil rights attorney, Matthew Perry, was arrested.  On November 11, 
1961, Perry was cross-examining Richard Roach, the Orangeburg Regional Hospital 
administrator.  The presiding judge, Fred R. Fanning, believed that Perry’s line of 
questioning—an attempt to get the administrator to plainly state the hospital’s 
segregation policies—was too repetitive and told him to stop.51  Perry, who was trying to 
get the administrator to admit that Rackley’s race was the only reason she was accused of 
trespassing, insisted that he had a right to build his case around discrimination.  Judge 
Fanning ordered him to jail for being “disrespectful to the court.”52  Fifteen minutes later, 
Perry apologized to Fanning, and in a surprising turn of events Fanning in-turn 
apologized for losing his temper and said he understood Perry’s position.  He dropped the 
charges against Perry, and Rackley’s trespassing case was continued indefinitely.  But, of 
course, the NAACP was not done with the case.  On March 24, 1962, attorneys Matthew 
Perry and Lincoln Jenkins filed a suit on behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund against Orangeburg Regional Hospital in Federal District Court.  They 
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asked the court to enjoin the hospital from practicing racial segregation in waiting rooms 
and wards.53   
The NAACP envisioned the Rackley v. Board of Trustees case as having a local-
level impact, but also being part of a broader “all-out legal attack against segregated 
health facilities.”54  The previous month, the organization filed a suit in Greensboro, 
North Carolina’s federal court that challenged racial segregation in hospitals that received 
federal funds.  They would build the Orangeburg suit on similar grounds and argue that 
racial segregation in the hospital violated African Americans’ equal protection of the law 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the hospital received both 
federal assistance and funds from local taxes.55  The hospital’s counsel fired back by 
asking the court to remove this part of the plaintiffs’ complaint. The defense also wanted 
the plaintiffs to formally acknowledge that either the NAACP, or its legal defense wing 
was paying Perry and Jenkins’ fees.  They further claimed that Gloria Rackley went to 
the hospital explicitly so she could be arrested and file a suit.  They believed that they had 
been gracious by allowing Rackley to wait in the white-only waiting room while the 
doctor was seeing Jamelle. Therefore having her arrested was justified because she 
continued to sit in the waiting room after her daughter was discharged.56  U.S. District 
Judge George Bell Timmerman seemed to agree.  He said: “The complaint indicates that 
the adult plaintiff had in mind something other than concern of hospital care or treatment 
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for her daughter.”57  He threw out the class action part of the case.  Perry and Jenkins had 
asked that the case be made a class action suit so that the hospital would be prevented 
from practicing racial segregation in the future.  But according to Timmerman, Gloria 
and Jamelle Rackley did not represent other African Americans, only themselves.  He 
also refused the NAACP’s request for a temporary injunction.  Finally, Timmerman 
threw out the section of the NAACP’s complaint that noted how much the hospital 
received in federal funds.58  Without being able to argue that this was a class action suit 
and present evidence that the hospital received federal funds the NAACP would not be 
able to effectively argue that segregation violated African Americans’ civil liberties.  
Their case was decimated.   
Those familiar with Timmerman’s judicial history did not find this decision 
surprising.  In fact, John McCray positioned Timmerman’s decision within a broader 
recent history of South Carolina officials’ efforts to block integration.  In an article titled, 
“Does Secret Deal Block Integration?” McCray presented evidence that other South 
Carolina U.S. District Court judges—Ashton H. Williams and C.C. Wyche—routinely 
circumvented rulings that were in favor of black civil rights.  For instance, when Bobby 
Brunson filed a desegregation suit against Clarendon County District No. 2 in 1960, 
Judge Wyche ruled that it was not a class action suit.  This was despite the fact that 
Brunson’s case was based on the 1954 Brown decision.59  Judge Timmerman’s decision 
was only the most recent case.  And he, too, had “consistently issued rulings exactly 
opposite to civil rights verdicts where Negroes have been concerned the last 10 years, and 
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more.”60  Indeed, the language Timmerman used echoed his dismissal of the 1954 Sarah 
Mae Flemming city bus desegregation case.61   Therefore, while the NAACP was 
disappointed in Timmerman’s decision, they were also prepared.   
Perry had anticipated an unfavorable ruling and already laid the groundwork for 
their next step.  He quickly appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.  Perry and 
Jenkins were prepared to take their case to the Supreme Court if necessary.  
Unsurprisingly, the hospital’s counsel asked the Circuit Court to dismiss the case.  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals’ opinion was a bit inconclusive.  They decided that the appellants’ 
case was too narrow.  They were making an argument for desegregation of the whole 
hospital, but only presented evidence on the waiting room.  The hospital never admitted 
that they practiced segregation, and the NAACP attorneys did not prove it.  On the other 
hand, the court disagreed with the lower court’s decision to throw out the sections of the 
complaint regarding the contribution of federal funds and separate ward/room facilities 
for patients.  The Circuit Court remanded the case back to the District Court, but ruled 
that the class action issue should be reopened during the permanent injunction trial.62  
The hospital case was not over, but the lower court’s final decision was still some years 
away.   
In the mean time, Rackley’s activism did not subside.   Soon after the she and the 
NAACP filed suit against the hospital, Rackley was jailed by the same judge, Fred. R. 
Fanning, who had jailed attorney Matthew Perry.  Rackley arrived at the Orangeburg 
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court to serve as a witness in a traffic case when she was directed to sit “in what can be 
called the colored side” of the courtroom.  When she asked why she had to sit in the 
section she was told that it was the judge’s orders.  She refused and two officers came 
and put her in what she described as “an indescribably dirty cell.”63  She was not charged 
with anything, but was forced to remain in the cell for thirty minutes until it was time for 
her to take the stand.64  Yet, these types of courthouse incidents were not new for Rackley 
or her daughters.  Her third grade students told her that when their mothers went 
shopping downtown, there was no restroom for them to use.  They had to use a toilet 
located under the courthouse.  But, as Rackley recalled, “I never saw that.”  Her younger 
daughter, Lurma Rackley, agreed.  She said, “We went to the white bathroom at the 
courthouse, and got arrested for it.”65  Still, she filed a complaint with the South Carolina 
Committee on Civil Rights.66   
It is worth nothing that Rackley was not only upset that her civil rights were 
violated and she had to spend time in a jail cell.  Indeed, by this time locals were well 
aware that this was a likely result to challenging segregation.  Rackley was incensed that 
any human being would be expected to stay in such a dirty cell.67  Rev. I. DeQuincey 
Newman read her complaint to the biracial committee who agreed to send it on to the 
Federal Civil Rights Commission in Washington, D.C.    One of the committee members, 
Rev. Herbert Nelson of Sumter, said that the teacher’s civil rights were “definitely 
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abridged.”68  He further said that submitting her complaint to the committee rather than 
filing a lawsuit removed her of “the burden of the prosecution,” and was “an alternative 
to having the expense of hiring private counsel.”69   
Rackley’s brief stint in jail, combined with her and Jamelle’s case against 
Orangeburg Regional Hospital, elicited sympathy.  One person’s letter to Congressman 
H. Allen Smith helps elucidate why Rackley’s story was able to elicit so much public 
sympathy, “Mrs. Rackley is a lovely young mother of two daughters; she is quiet and 
well-mannered, but not one to be pushed around.”70  Many people in the community 
quickly came to her aid and defense. A mass meeting was scheduled at her church, 
Trinity United Methodist, to address the incident.71  So many people wrote letters to their 
elected officials that Robert Kenney’s office asked her to visit their Washington, D.C. 
office.  Furthermore, Rackley’s teaching contract, which her activism compromised, was 
renewed for the following year.72  For some this signaled definite, if too limited progress. 
Mrs. Rackley has been awarded her teaching contract for 
next year.  It was long past due and there was talk of 
carrying an organized protest through channels.  Her finally 
receiving this contract is a long cry from the many 
dismissals of a few years ago merely for belonging to the 
NAACP for signing a petition.  So—even South Carolina is 
moving ahead.73 
 
The fact that this writer connected Rackley’s job security, or lack thereof, to the events 
surrounding the anti-NAACP oath demonstrates that the black civil rights movement may 
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have been undergoing changes, but local people still saw it as the same movement, with 
many of the same risks and objectives. 
 1960-1962 witnessed vibrant moments of civil rights activism in Orangeburg, and 
throughout South Carolina and the entire South.  But 1963 was easily one of the most 
active and significant years of the Orangeburg movement.  That year, Mrs. Rackley read 
the Emancipation Proclamation during a January 2 NAACP sponsored meeting of about 
600 African Americans at Allen University.74  Rackley was the perfect choice to read the 
Emancipation Proclamation that day.  The wife and mother of two was not only an 
emboldened activists and sympathetic victim of segregation, but one paper later referred 
to her as the “coordinator of the Orangeburg 1963 Freedom Movement.”75  1963 was a 
pivotal year for the civil rights movement in Orangeburg and throughout the state.  Even 
Governor Ernest Hollings—the very governor who paved the path for peaceful 
demonstrators to be arrested—admitted during his farewell address to the legislature in 
1963 that if the state did not proceed with desegregation it would cause “irreparable 
harm.”  South Carolina and Mississippi were the only two remaining southern states to 
have no school integration for, as Hollings noted, “We have all argued that the supreme 
court decision of May 1954 is not the law of the land, but everyone must agree it is the 
fact of the land.”76  With even conservative white politicians acknowledging that the 
state’s education landscape must change 1963 would prove to be a year of dynamic, 
stalwart, non-stop activism.  
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Gloria Rackley often found herself in the eye of that storm.  Towards the 
beginning of the year, Orangeburg student activists received some positive news.  The 
Supreme Court ordered the lower court to reconsider the breach of the peace convictions 
of 373 student protestors. Perhaps this emboldened the student activists, because they 
only ratcheted up their protests.  On Saturday, August 24 fourteen African Americans 
were arrested during two lunch counter sit-ins in downtown Orangeburg.  Six of the 
fourteen were turned over to the juvenile authorities, but the other eight were charged 
with trespassing and placed in the city jail.  Fred Fanning convicted the eight jailed 
protestors of trespassing, and sentenced them to $100 fines or thirty days in jail.  None of 
the students posted bond, so all eight were transferred to a county chain gang.  In 
reaction, sixty-five African Americans, mostly teenagers, marched to the Orangeburg 
mayor’s office in protest.  A four-person delegation went inside to speak with the mayor.  
But he was allegedly out of town, and the city administrator later pretended ignorance 
when asked about the meeting.  One of the eight was later released after friends and 
family posted his bond, but the other seven remained on the Orangeburg County Chain 
Gang.77 
 But the chain gang sentence did not effectively dampen the Orangeburg 
movement.  Hundreds of arrests were made in the following month of September. On 
Saturday, September 28, 175 people were arrested as 250-300 protestors marched around 
downtown Orangeburg.  The group—singing, chanting, and clapping—marched single-
file in in the pouring rain.  City and state officials behaved as if they were in a state of 
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emergency.  State Highway Patrol, Orangeburg County deputies, SLED agents, and fire 
personnel (along with their fire hoses), were all on hand to assist the Orangeburg police.  
When the protestors were instructed to disperse, some began to leave.  Those that did not, 
between 162 and 174 people, were arrested. The NAACP filed a report with the FBI for 
police brutality during the arrest.78  
 The Orangeburg demonstrations, and the arrests, continued.  On Monday, 
September 30, 333 people were arrested during a protest for equal job opportunities. 
Some of the older men were placed in the county jail, and 120 women and youth were 
transported to the State Penitentiary in Columbia.  However, as with earlier mass arrests, 
the majority of the group was placed in a stockade style area while awaiting processing.  
The next day, October 1, 189 more arrests were made in Orangeburg.  Most of those 
arrested were South Carolina State and Claflin College students, but there were also some 
high school students.  The majority of the protestors were headed to downtown, but about 
twelve were arrested while actively trying to desegregate all-white restaurants.79  Police 
Captain M.W. Whetstone alleged that the march “could have very easily become a full-
scale riot.”  He remarked, “It looks like these people are determined.”80  And, indeed, 
they were. With the October 1st arrests, more than 1,000 local blacks had been arrested 
over the past four days.81   
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Even with the massive number of arrests, the local movement continued to 
escalate. Clearly concerned, local white officials attempted to halt the protests. City 
officials met with movement leaders in a purported attempt to ease tensions. However, 
their efforts probably seemed insincere since the same officials also threatened to 
immediately arrest any protestors. Surely local whites felt support from Governor Donald 
Russell who warned “disorder would not be tolerated.”82   In reaction to the growing 
movement, the City Council met and passed two resolutions.  The first resolution said 
that they were willing to meet with “responsible leadership.”  The second resolution said 
that the city would maintain order “under any and all circumstances.”83   In what 
movement leaders described as “exploratory talks,” the city offered to drop its charges 
against protestors if the black community agreed to halt all protests for ninety days.84  But 
the movement’s leaders were unwilling to halt their work and were “ready to fill the 
jails.”85   
The city’s protests ban had no effect on the movement.  On the next day, October 
4, three hundred and eighteen more arrests were made while protestors marched towards 
Orangeburg’s business district. 86   On Saturday, October 5, eighty-five African 
Americans, in what was considered “the smallest protest march of the current wave of 
racial demonstrations,” started a march to downtown Orangeburg while a smaller group 
took a different route. 87     Twenty-eight people, including ministers and college 
professors, were arrested.  That Monday, October 7, the city council took further action 
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and approved a bill that required picketers to register with the police department.  Yet the 
protests continued.  That same evening one hundred college students were arrested during 
an anti-segregation demonstration and were placed in the stockade.88   
 Throughout the public protests, the Orangeburg Movement continued to boycott 
white businesses with segregated lunch counters and those that refused to hire African 
Americans in their stores.  They presented a ten-point list of demands for desegregation 
of public facilities and for equal job opportunities.  But the Orangeburg Merchant’s 
Association publically dismissed all ten of the demands.  This was despite the fact that 
white business leaders acknowledged that the boycott had negatively affected their 
profits.89  As the state’s foremost newspaper noted: 
Business is disrupted. The schools are disrupted.  The city 
administration is disrupted.  The Negro community is 
disrupted.  And the state’s law enforcement officers are 
disrupted.90 
 
Orangeburg’s black and white communities were, essentially, at a stalemate.  And, for 
their part, black activists showed no interest in conceding.  In fact, they had a bit of a 
victory when, on October 21 the Supreme Court overturned the 1960 convictions of 373 
Orangeburg student protestors.  After the State Supreme Court twice affirmed the 
students’ convictions, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions and ruled that 
they violated the students’ right to peacefully protest. 91  The state NAACP heralded the 
Supreme Court decision as proof that the students had a right to protest racial segregation 
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and discrimination.92  The Chicago Defender, a black newspaper that reported on the 
Orangeburg events, eloquently vocalized how people involved in movement felt: 
The action of the Supreme Court . . . should clear the air 
once and for all of the mist that had settled over the right to 
peaceful demonstrations. . . The Southern segregationist 
have been engaged long ago in the despicable act of trying 
to preserve their mores under the protective mantle of their 
own unjust laws. . . Let the segregationists everywhere, 
including Chicago, beware!93 
 
The Orangeburg movement had not shown any sign of slowing down.  Validation from 
the highest court in the land would only give them more incentive to continue their 
efforts.   
 In the midst of so much student activism, it would be easy to lose sight of adult 
participation and leadership in the movement.  Certainly, the movement was changing 
shape.  But it is important to remember that Orangeburg’s black college students were 
already a decade into their student movement.  And in a city with two black universities, 
a “highly influential Negro leadership,” and where African Americans made up sixty 
percent of the population adult-youth cooperation may have been closer to the norm than 
the exception.94  For her part, Rackley continued to be an activist throughout this year of 
lively activism, and became only more well-known for it.  In fact, her activism seemed to 
crescendo at the same point as the college students’.   It was that increased activism that 
eventually led to Rackley’s dismissal from her teaching position.  The first hint that her 
activism could cause problems came in the 1962-3 school year when the school 
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superintendent, H. A. Marshall, chose not to send her reappointment letter until he could 
have a meeting with her.  Marshall told her that the episode at Orangeburg Regional 
Hospital was “embarrassing to the school system and particularly to our profession,” but 
the next day she received her employment letter and was able to return to her job.95  But 
the meeting likely did not have its intended effect.  Rackley’s activism did not lessen.  In 
fact, she filed her case against the hospital only two weeks later. So the following year, 
on October 7, 1963, Superintendent Marshall called her to his office for another meeting.  
But this time it was to explain that she was being dismissed from her teaching duties 
effective immediately, and he would recommend to the board that they take the same 
actions.  He then gave Rackley a letter he wrote that unequivocally placed her activism as 
the foremost, indeed sole reason for her dismissal. 96 The letter concluded with: 
It would appear that you have become so rabid in your 
desire for social reform that you are advocating breaking 
the law as a means of calling attention to what you consider 
your grievances.  A teacher in the public schools cannot 
advocate lawlessness without destroying her usefulness in 
teaching young people.97 
 
The fact that the multiple arrests he outlined resulted from peaceful, lawful protests was, 
to someone like Superintendent Marshall, not the point.  Her leadership in and open 
support of the NAACP and its goals made her an enemy to a state and city that was 
stalwart in its efforts to protect racial segregation.  As her activism had already 
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demonstrated, Rackley was unwilling to simply accept Marshall’s decision without a 
fight.  She informed him that she would request a hearing before the Board of Trustees.98   
In a testament to her role as a teacher and activist, Rackley quickly garnered 
community support. The following day, October 8, teachers and students at all seven 
black schools in the area formed picket lines that morning outside their schools.  Jamelle 
Rackley, Mrs. Rackley’s teenage daughter, was among them.  She and the rest of the 
students and teachers effectively shut the schools down for the day because 
Superintendent Marshall ordered them closed.  As a result of the pickets, thirty-seven 
black youths were arrested and placed in jail overnight.  But even that was not sufficient 
to dampen their activism.  That afternoon, a protest parade was organized as boycotting 
students began marching to downtown.  Youth activists carried signs that said “Save Mrs. 
Rackley.”  About fifty-seven juveniles were arrested and taken to jail.  The first-time 
offenders, about twenty children, were released.  The other children had records due their 
participation in previous protests, and were forced to stay in jail overnight.99  While 
protests were often the purview of college students and adults, Rev. I. DeQuincey 
Newman, NAACP field secretary, asserted that the school boycott was “the desire of the 
students.”100  He and the NAACP supported the students, but hoped that the situation 
would be resolved soon.  Classes did resume the following day, but attendance was low 
as approximately seventy-five percent of students continued to boycott classes because of 
Rackley’s dismissal.  For their part, African American teachers decided, in a 62-18 vote 
to observe the picket lines, but when they returned to school on Wednesday there were no 
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pickets outside the schools so they returned to work.   Robert E. Howard, the African 
American school supervisor, said he expected most students to return to classes by the 
end of the week.  One African American woman, Lizzie Matthews, was arrested for her 
alleged role in organizing the pickets, and charged with the delinquency of a minor.101 
Mrs. Rackley said that she would “do everything possible” to keep her teaching 
position.  On Monday, October 14, the board permitted her to make a statement, but they 
demonstrated no interest in her case.  They neither asked nor allowed her to ask any 
questions regarding her dismissal.  Superintendent Marshall was also allowed to testify, 
and gave previously unmentioned reasons for his decision to fire her.  Marshall testified 
that she had left three teacher workshops, without previously obtaining permission, in 
order to attend civil rights meetings.  The insinuation was that she neglected her duties as 
a teacher, and that her activism was directly responsible for that neglect.102    
In direct contradiction to his words, that night Mrs. Rackley encouraged students 
to return to their classes.  The following day, October 15, attendance doubled.  A few 
days later, she received special recognition during the state NAACP’s annual conference, 
and Rev. Newman confirmed that the NAACP intended to bring a suit against the school 
board to have Rackley’s teaching position reinstated.  In the meantime, Rackley became a 
professional activist.  The SC NAACP created a third vice president position, which she 
filled.  In this role she continued to be a leader in the Orangeburg movement, but also 
travelled the state to assist NAACP chapters, and travelled to New York to speak to the 
High School of Fashion Industries and the United Federation of Teachers where she sat 
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on a panel with noted author James Baldwin, who she remained friends with throughout 
the duration of her life.103   
 The children’s arrest during the school boycott emblemized their past activism 
and served as a precursor to what was to come.  Rackley, in her new role in the NAACP, 
as a mother, and as a member of Orangeburg’s black community was, once again, in the 
thick of things.  On Wednesday, October 23, police arrested fifty-eight youth who were 
marching toward City Hall.  Most of them were jailed overnight and then turned over to 
their parents.  However, those over sixteen were also charged with breach of the peace.  
They were arrested for staging a protest, but Rackley insisted that they were actually 
walking to City Hall in order to register for permission to picket.  The children’s parents 
had a meeting the next day.  They and the NAACP asserted that the children’s arrest was 
illegal and that the children behaved in an orderly manner.  They asked Governor Donald 
Russell to meet with them and to investigate the case.104  Their accusations against the 
police were not simply that their children had been unlawfully arrested, but that they had 
been manhandled during their arrest, denied food and water for thirteen hours, and placed 
in cells with individuals who were not only “common criminals,” but also adults.105  As a 
Rev. J. Herbert Nelson wrote: 
We are Tired and Sick [sic] of the intimidation of the 
threats of fire hoses, jailing of children under age, locked 
																																																								
103 “Negro School Boycott Ends,” New York Times, 15 October 1963; “Darlington 
NAACP Meet Opens,” The State, 19 October 1963; “NAACP Honors Pioneers in School 
Integration,” The State, 20 October 1963; Blackwell and Rackely interview; “Don’t Shop 
Downtown Orangeburg,” Palmetto Times, 5-11 December 1963; “Events Today,” New 
York Times, 6 December 1963.  Jamelle Rackley (Gloria Rackley’s daughter), in 
discussion with the author, August 26, 2016. 
104 “Orangeburg Protest Hailed,” New York Times, 24 October 1963; “Parents, Officials 
Meet Over Children’s Arrest,” The State, 26 October 1963. 
105 “Russell Takes Orangeburg Protest Under Advisement,” The State 28 October 1963. 
 
	 265 
up several to a cell without privilege of seeing their parents 
or adults advisors, without food or personal needs.106 
 
It is unclear to this writer whether or not one of Rackley’s daughters was involved in this 
particular protest.  But it is certain that she would have understood the parents’ anguish.  
Her eldest daughter, Jamelle, was still one of the plaintiffs in the ongoing case against 
Orangeburg Regional Hospital. Her younger daughter, Lurma, was all too eager to be a 
full-fledged activist.  Yet as Lurma recalled, black parents had historically limited how 
active their children could be in the movement.  The children’s increased role was at their 
own behest. 
We [the teenagers] were all charged, and pumped and ready 
to do our part.  And, walking around on the campus 
[carrying picket signs for the boycott of downtown 
Orangeburg] didn’t seem to be significant enough. . . The 
parents were involved, and the college students were 
involved, and the little children were restricted. . . we were 
either restricted to marching on the campus or making a 
picket sign in the basement of the church, you know, not to 
actually wear the picket sign . . . So finally the movement 
broadened to include the younger people in a more 
significant role.107 
 
Governor Russell met with the parents that Saturday.  According to their spokesperson, 
Professor H.D. Smith of Claflin College, the meeting gave the parents received “some 
measure of satisfaction.”108  Attorney Matthew Perry was also in attendance.  He told the 
governor, “your good offices might be used in bringing about the furtherance of the aims 
and aspirations of these citizens.”109  Yet, while the meeting with the governor permitted 
black parents to be somewhat mollified on this occasion, the fact remained that their 
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children’s unlawful arrest and unfair treatment while in police custody was all too 
representative of generations of black folk’s experiences in the Palmetto State.  If 
continued school segregation was not enough to prove to black Carolinians that their state 
did not care about their children, the arrest and abuse of their children certainly did. 
 Orangeburg’s 1963 civil rights movement garnered the “overwhelming support” 
of schoolteachers and college professors.  Their boycott was effective.  During 
Christmas, when the downtown area would normally be buzzing with both black and 
white shoppers, stores were “piled high with Christmas sales.”110  African Americans 
refused to shop there, and a few of the smaller stores had gone out of business.  In the 
coming years, the Orangeburg Movement (the formal organization founded to manage 
the local movement) planned to: continue pickets and other demonstrations, continue 
their selective buying campaign, increase voter registration, fight for school 
desegregation, and open a black-owned shopping center.111 
 As black youth’s activism and arrests in 1963—and Lurma Rackley’s words—
demonstrated, young people were eager to be more involved in Orangeburg’s movement.  
In 1964, Whitaker and Wilkinson high school students became fully immersed.  On 
Saturday, February 1, 1964, twenty-six people were arrested while picketing in the city 
for the dubious crime of violating a city ordinance of not picketing in a single file line.  
The following day, forty-two people staged a march to the county jail where they hoped 
to visit their jailed comrades.  On the way there, twenty-three additional people were 
arrested.  The marchers were not able to get inside the jail, so they remained on the front 
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lawn where they sang freedom songs.  In reaction to yet another spate of arrests, students 
at Whitaker Junior High and Wilkinson High boycotted their classes the following day.  
But the school boycott quickly quieted.  By Wednesday, February 5, attendance started to 
go back up.112  
 On the other hand, Rackley’s hospital case was still ongoing, and was gaining 
momentum.  Both sides first began making their cases before the U.S. District Court in 
1964.  The Rackleys and the NAACP were asking the court to rule that the hospital’s 
policy of racial segregation was a violation of their Constitutional rights.  In their answer, 
the hospital’s attorneys essentially alleged that Gloria and Jamelle Rackley were the 
NAACP’s puppets.  The NAACP was paying their legal fees and was the real party of 
interest.  But the court saw differently.  In his opinion Judge Simons found that Mrs. 
Rackley and her daughter were, in fact, the real party of interest, and that whether or not 
the NAACP was paying their fees was irrelevant.  The plaintiffs were not required to 
answer any inquiries regarding counsel fees or NAACP membership.  Moreover, the 
plaintiffs would be allowed to provoke the defense to answer questions regarding whether 
or not they maintained a policy of racial segregation.113   
So with the judge’s permission, the NAACP attorneys sought to prove that the 
hospital was practicing racial segregation, not only in the waiting room in which Gloria 
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and Lurma Rackley staged their two-person sit-in, but throughout the hospital, including 
in room assignments.  The defense and its witnesses tried to couch their segregation 
policy in professional language. Drs. William Whetsell and Vance Brabham, Jr. testified 
that room assignments were made according to “professional advice” and what was in the 
patient’s best interest.114  But the hospital administrator, Henry Mabry, admitted that 
African American patients were only assigned to the hospital’s south wing.  Dr. Whetsell 
attempted to defend the hospital’s room policy by arguing that patients were “better 
treated, better satisfied, and the nurses could do a better job” in segregated 
accommodations.115  Dr. Brabham echoed this statement when he testified that segregated 
rooms were important to patients’ recovery process.  He said, “It’s best for the hospital, 
and best for the patient, white or Negro, to get them in this environment.”116   
When the case finally concluded in February 1965, Gloria Rackley and her 
daughters were residing in Virginia where she had acquired another teaching position.  
The defense argued that because neither Rackley nor her husband, L. G. Rackley, still 
lived in South Carolina, the plaintiffs had no right to sue them because the hospital’s 
mission was to serve Orangeburg County residents.  But as Chief Judge Robert Hemphill 
acknowledged in his opinion, Rackley was an Orangeburg resident when the issues 
surrounding the case took place, and she still maintained a home on Whittaker Parkway 
in Orangeburg.  As to whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to permanent injunction, 
Judge Hemphill decided that there was “an overabundance of evidence” that they were.117  
The defense’s own witnesses proved that the hospital practiced segregation.  He also 
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agreed with the plaintiffs regarding the importance of how the hospital was funded.  
Hemphill did not dismiss the doctors’ claims that there were “sound medical reasons” to 
practice segregation in a hospital since “psychological factors are important to all 
citizens.”118  But that did not change the fact that the hospital was operating as a 
governmental office or agency.  It was, by this point, a well-established fact that it was 
illegal for such entities to practice racial segregation.119  The court ruled in the plaintiffs’ 
favor, but gave the defense time to adjust to the “drastic change.”120  The hospital was 
ordered to file a plan with the court within sixty days and to have it fully implemented 
forty-five days after that.  If the hospital did not file a plan with the court within that sixty 
day time period, Judge Hemphill said that he would have no choice but to implement an 
integration plan without the hospital’s input.121  
The Orangeburg hospital case was significant because it was the first one filed 
against a South Carolina hospital.  One month after Judge Hemphill handed down his 
decision, the hospital filed notice that they were appealing to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals.122  In April, they proceeded to submit a desegregation plan.  The plan outlined a 
six-point checklist for deciding patients’ bed assignments: 
1. Availability of beds and rooms 
2. Consideration of effect on other patients (contagious 
disease cases, mentally disturbed cases, burns, critically 
ill, etc.) 
3. Economic condition of the patient. 
4. Type of treatment to be rendered. 
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5. Availability of a trained nursing staff for the particular 
type of illness. 
6. Availability of special equipment…123 
 
But the plan still left room for the hospital to make prejudiced choices.  Staff members 
would still be able to assign beds based on what they thought was in the best interest of 
all the patients.  It also allowed patients to be moved if they or their doctors had a 
problem with them being in a room or ward with someone else.124  In short, the hospital’s 
plan would allow the hospital to continue racial segregation without openly admitting that 
that is what they were doing.   Hemphill’s court approved the plan, but the hospital found 
themselves in hot water a couple years later.  In September 1967 the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) cut off funding to the hospital for non-compliance 
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The hospital asserted that they were in compliance with 
the court-approved desegregation plan originating from the Rackley suit.  But Robert M. 
Ball, the Social Security commissioner, upheld the decision.  The hospital filed suit with 
the U.S. District Court where it alleged that the department’s decision was “unlawful, 
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the Constitution.”125  The hospital was asking the 
court to decide that they were not in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and to require 
HEW to reinstate their federal funding.126  The Justice Department also became involved 
when in February 1968 they filed suit in a federal court to compel the hospital to finally 
desegregate its facilities.127  The Justice Department further asserted that Orangeburg 
Regional Hospital practiced racial discrimination in its “medical care, treatment, services 
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and training programs.”128  They asked that the court affirm HEW’s decision to cut off 
the hospital’s federal funding.129  
 Similar to black college and high schools students, there were a few black 
teachers who also found themselves more deeply involved in the movement.  Two 
African American teachers filed suit against their school boards in the U.S. District Court 
to be reinstated to their teaching positions.  One of those teachers was Gloria Rackley 
who, as a NAACP leader and litigant in another case, had already demonstrated a deep 
commitment to the movement.  The other teacher was Sampson Williams.  While 
Williams was located outside of Orangeburg (in Sumter) her case demonstrates that while 
other teachers found themselves dismissed from their teaching jobs, the nature and tactics 
of both the black civil rights movement and the white massive resistance movement were 
changing.  Like Rackley, Williams had performed her work in a satisfactory manner for 
the past ten years at Sumter’s Manchester High School, but did not have her contract 
renewed.  The Rackley and Williams suits alleged that when school officials dismissed 
them because of their activism, they were practicing discrimination.  Additionally, 
Williams alleged that her dismissal was connected to her efforts to enter her students into 
a contest sponsored by a national organization.  White students were allowed to enter the 
competition, but blacks students were not.  The school board denied William’s claim.  
Superintendent Dr. Hugh T. Stoddard claimed that Williams was not rehired because she 
was absent without official permission.  She had acquired permission from her school 
principal, but Stoddard asserted that he did not have the authority to grant her an excused 
																																																								
128 “Hospital Target in Carolina Suit.” 
129 Ibid. 
 
	 272 
absence.130  Williams’ activism demonstrated that, as a black teacher, she was unable to 
separate her activism for social change from her activism for black educational 
advancement. She was just as interested in ensuring her students had the same 
opportunities as white children as she was in desegregating a lunch counter.  However, 
both Rackley and Williams would have to wait another two years for their day in court.  
In the mean time, Orangeburg activists remained vigilant. 
 In 1965 the Orangeburg Movement followed the program it laid out at the close of 
1963 and pushed for increased voter registration efforts.  1965 proved to be an ideal time 
to pursue black voter registration.  On August 6 of that year President Lyndon Johnson 
signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The Act was one of the most far-reaching pieces 
of civil rights legislation for the time period, and perhaps the most significant piece since 
the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation decision. Southern 
segregationist lawmakers predictably objected to the legislation.  South Carolina’s 
governor, Robert E. McNair announced that he intended to challenge the law’s 
constitutionality, and asked the state attorney general to “proceed immediately with all 
proper legal steps.”131 The Orangeburg Movement’s efforts were met with both victories 
and defeats.  For instance, 849 African Americans were registered to vote within the span 
of three days, but fifty people were arrested during a voter registration protest at the 
county courthouse.  The sit-in demonstration was in response to what civil rights workers 
believed as an intentional delaying tactic on the part of registration officials.  The county 
had not hired enough registrars to handle the large number of people who wanted to 
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practice their right to vote.  The allegation was supported by the fact that there were still 
seventy African Americans standing in line when the registration books were closed.  The 
insult was worsened when several white registrants were moved to the front of the line, 
while black registrants remained un-served.132  The civil rights workers made police 
brutality charges.  Indeed, police were photographed carrying at least one demonstrator 
out the Orangeburg County Courthouse by his arms and legs.133    Thirty-four of the 
protestors were sentenced to thirty days in jail or $50 fines.134  
Nonetheless, Rev. H. O. Harvey, leader of the voter registration campaign, was 
more than happy with their progress.  “I have no complaints,” he said.135  It was, 
according to him, the most people Orangeburg County’s Voter Education Project had 
registered in a three-day period since 1960.136  Harvey vocalized disapproval of the sit-in.  
He said: 
My main object is to have people come to work and get 
people registered.  We welcome people to come in and 
help, as long as they don’t break the law. I don’t go for 
that.137 
 
Instead, he advised those that were unable to register to go home and return on the first 
Monday in October.138  But perhaps part of Harvey’s unease came from the fact that these 
civil rights workers were not all Orangeburg County natives.  Those arrested included 
twenty-one whites and thirty African Americans, and out of all of those arrested only one 
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was eligible to vote.139  Local African Americans like Harvery were certainly eager to 
gain full and equal access to the franchise, but they were not necessarily willing to do so 
at the risk of losing autonomy of their local movement.  Moreover, Harvey’s was from 
Elloree.  He doubtless had very real memories of the 1950s and how economic reprisals 
directed towards a whole community could have disastrous effects.    
The Orangeburg Movement also used 1965 as a time to prep for increased school 
desegregation efforts.  That summer, it found allies in white schoolteachers who were 
working with the American Friends Service Committee.  Four such teachers worked on a 
tutoring project that was preparing 105 African American schoolchildren to apply for 
transfer to white schools.140 
Perhaps at this point Orangeburg’s citizens found it predictable that Gloria 
Rackley was a named litigant in a 1965 civil liberties case.  The suit, which sought to 
desegregate two local theatres, was filed in August of 1964, but did not go to court until 
May of 1965.  Rackley was one of four other plaintiffs: C. H. Thomas, Jr., Julie Wright, 
Elease Thomas, and Theodore Adams.141  On July 21, 1964 the plaintiffs attempted to 
buy theatre tickets for the ground floor section—customarily reserved for whites—of 
both the Edisto and Carolina Theatres.  They were denied admission at both locations and 
were asking the court to enjoin the defendants from practicing segregated admission 
policies.  The theatre company, Orangeburg Theatres, Inc. asserted that they did not 
practice segregation, but they also did not deny the plaintiff’s claims.  Instead the current 
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owner alleged that the segregation policy existed before they acquired the theatre, and 
that they had now discontinued that policy.  In fact, on August 31, 1964, the company 
adopted a resolution during one of its meetings informing all its employees that all 
people, regardless of race, were to be admitted to the theatre without restrictions.  Based 
on this, they asked the court to dismiss the case.  Rackley and the other defendants 
expressed that while they were happy with the theatre’s change in policy, they did not 
wish for the case to be dismissed.  Yet Judge Simons went ahead and dismissed the case, 
citing that it was a well-established rule “that an injunction will not issue for the purpose 
of punishing past offenses.”142  Rackley and her colleagues had successfully desegregated 
the movie theatres, but not in a court of law.  There were undoubtedly happy with the 
victory, but disappointed that future desegregation petitioners would not have one more 
legal case to prove their arguments. 
Rackley still needed to settle her suit against her former employer.  Likewise, 
Irene Williams’ case also needed to be settled.  Williams and Rackley’s cases would 
prove to be very similar.  Williams’ suit against her Sumter school district was decided in 
a U.S. District Court in June 1966—a few months before Rackley’s.   Williams’ attorneys 
wanted a permanent injunction against the school district that would require them to 
reinstate Williams’ teaching contract and to continue reissuing it without regard to her 
civil rights activities.143  Williams had been teaching at Manchester School for ten years 
																																																								
142 C. H. Thomas, Jr., Julie Wright, Elease Thomas, Gloria B. Rackley, and Theodore 
Adams, Plaintiffs, v. Orangeburg Theatres, Incorporated, a Corporation, Defendant, 241 
F. Supp. 317 (E.D. SC.1965). 
143 Irene Williams, Plaintiff, v. Sumter School District Number 2, a public body 
corporate, Dan L. Reynolds, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Sumter School District 
Number 2, Sumter South Carolina, and H. Curtis Edens, Jr., Clarence E. Phillips, Jr., W. 
Hazel McCoy and Russell F. Jones, Members, Board of Trustees of Sumter School 
 
	 276 
when she was dismissed explicitly for her leadership role in the Sumter civil rights 
movement.  That she was a dedicated activist was not a point of dispute.  It was 
“admitted by all parties that she was vigorous in the promotion of civil rights in and about 
Sumter.”144  But also not up for dispute were her abilities as a teacher.  Aside from 
having a decade of experience at that school, her principal’s description of her as “the 
best teacher we had—understanding, sympathetic, very diligent, very cooperative,” made 
it very clear that her work in the classroom was above par.145  The defense argued that 
Williams’ activism was a sufficient reason to fire her by noting that some of the people 
involved in the protest were children between ten and sixteen years old, and that some of 
these children went before the Domestic Relations Judge.  In short, they were arguing 
that she posed a danger to young children.   Echoing Rackley’s school officials, the 
Sumter school district also said that Williams was absent from the first teachers’ meeting 
during the 1964-65 school year without first obtaining permission. This, unlike the 
former topics, was a point of contention because both Williams and her school principal 
testified that she obtained permission from him. But school district officials said that his 
permission was not sufficient.  She needed to gain permission from the Superintendent or 
a Supervising Principal.  Either way, these issues must not have negatively affected her 
performance at work because her principal, Benjamin F. Robinson, recommended she be 
rehired for the 1964-65 school year.  However, instead of sending her a reappointment 
letter, Superintendent Stoddard wrote her a letter advising her that he would like to meet 
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with her.  During their meeting, he informed her that he would not be recommending her 
for reemployment and advised her of her right to appeal.  She did so immediately, and 
appeared before the Board of Trustees on June 16, 1964 to plead her case. 146  
Superintendent Stoddard wrote her the next day and explained that the Board had 
considered her case “at considerable length” but had not come to a final decision.147  She 
would receive an answer in two weeks.   On June 24, Stoddard informed her that the 
Board decided not to intervene in her case.  Her dismissal stood.148  When her counsel, 
NAACP attorney Ernest Finney, plainly asked the defendants’ counsel, Shepard K. Nash, 
why Williams was dismissed he was told “the board doesn’t care to state” the reason.149  
And, as Judge Hemphill noted in his opinion, “At no time during the entire proceedings 
was (or has she yet been) advised of the reason for refusal of reemployment.”150  Still, 
Stoddard’s testimony made the reason for his and the board’s decision clear: 
At some time during the fall, on Saturday morning, when I 
had gone by the post office to pick up the school mail, I 
observed Mrs. Williams picketing some business 
establishments on the streets of Sumter, which in my 
personal opinion reflect poor professional judgment and did 
not dignify the position which she held in the schools in the 
eyes of the community.151 
 
Judge Hemphill must not have found this testimony compelling enough, for he noted that 
one’s right to freely practice their constitutional rights without fear of reprisal was a 
guarantee already decided by the Supreme Court: 
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The Constitution for the United States is the written 
guarantee of freedom and justice to Americans everywhere.  
The United States Supreme Court, in its interpretation of 
the Constitution’s application to human rights, or civil 
rights, as exposed by trial under common law or effect of 
statute, decided and that decision is the Law of the Land 
unless changed by proper authority.152 
 
While Judge Hemphill agreed with the defense’s assertion that the court could not create 
a contract between Williams and the school district, he was equally emphatic that the 
court was “prepared to protect, interpret, insist upon the securing to plaintiff of all of her 
constitutional rights.”153  He appreciated the fact that the school board had a right to hire 
and not hire at its own discretion, but asserted that this discretion did not cover violating 
one’s constitutional rights.  Of course, the 1964-65 school year was over, and the judge 
had already mentioned that it was not within his power to draft a contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant.  With that in mind, the judge told the parties to come to an 
agreement for monetary relief.154 
 A few months later, on September 16, 1966, Rackley’s case against her school 
district was also decided.  The issues in this case echoed, almost verbatim, the issues 
covered in Williams’ case.  The “sole issue” before the court was whether or not the 
school board was justified in using its discretionary power to dismiss Gloria Rackley 
from her position.155  There was never any question regarding Rackley’s abilities as a 
teacher.  In fact the Whittaker Elementary School principal, John H. Pearson, described 
																																																								
152 Irene Williams v. Sumter School District Number 2. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Gloria B. Rackley, Plaintiff, v. School District No. 5, Orangeburg County, et al., 
Defendants. 258 F. Supp. 676 (U.S. Dist. 1966). 
 
	 279 
her job performance as “excellent.”156  She was one of his “better classroom teachers,” 
had a good relationship with the rest of the faculty, and had no parent complaints.157  
Unlike Williams’ employers, Rackley’s school district did not wait until the end 
of the school year and then simply choose not to rehire her.  Rackley was dismissed, upon 
Superintendent Marshall’s recommendation, only halfway into the school term on 
October 15, 1963.  And, of course, she had not been offered reemployment for the 
following school year.  What was truly at issue was her very visible leadership role in the 
Orangeburg NAACP.  She had participated in many peaceful demonstrations and, as a 
result, had been arrested numerous times. As Judge Charles E. Simons noted in his 
opinion, the decision to dismiss Rackley had to be “viewed by the court in light of the 
matters before the board as recommended to it by Superintendent Marshall . . . There is 
no evidence of record to indicate that any other considerations were before the Board in 
this connection.”158  Judge Simons acknowledged that it was within a school board’s 
power to hire and fire at their own discretion, but that discretion had to be exercised 
carefully in order to ensure that no schoolteacher’s constitutionally guaranteed personal 
liberties were compromised.  His decision had to come down to whether or not the 
board’s decision to dismiss Rackley was justifiable based on the reasons Superintendent 
Marshall outlined in his letter.  Therefore, Judge Simons ruled that the school district had 
to pay Rackley the remainder of her salary from the 1963-64 school year.  But, perhaps 
because Rackley’s dismissal was so much more flagrantly unconstitutional, Simons also 
ordered that the defense to “immediately reemploy, or offer to employ” Rackley in the 
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same position she had before.159  If the position was no longer available, they were 
ordered to offer her a position of equal status and salary as soon as it became available.  
If she accepted the position, they were ordered to continue her employment without 
regard to her civil rights activities.160 
Losing her teaching position was obviously an enormous sacrifice, but despite the 
fact that the judge ruled in her favor Gloria Rackley and her family did not return to 
Orangeburg.  By the time the case finally ended, she was already living in Virginia where 
she had a more lucrative position teaching at Norfolk State University. And despite the 
fact that her husband was a college professor, he no longer had a viable career in 
Orangeburg.  Because of his wife’s activities, Professor Rackley found himself a target of 
economic reprisals.  He had been given leave, with pay, to finish his doctorate.  So the 
college administration must have at least found his work satisfactory.  Despite that, South 
Carolina State chose not to renew the professor’s contract.161  So Professor and Mrs. 
Rackley moved to Virginia, but Mrs. Rackley admitted that by this time their relationship 
was already ending: 
And by that time, our marriage was ended.  So, if we talk 
about losses that can be another thing we count as a loss.  
Though no one thing ends a marriage . . . we never 
recovered, our family never recovered from that.162 
 
Indeed, the personal costs of Rackley’s activism not only included a professional setback, 
and the dissolution of her marriage, but also compromised her relationships with her 
daughters.  For instance, she came very close to losing custody of her younger daughter, 
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Lurma Rackley, who was eager to be more directly involved in the movement.  A judge 
ruled that she was a juvenile delinquent because of the long arrest record she accrued 
during civil rights protests. The day they went to court regarding this issue was the same 
day she and her mother were arrested for using the white restroom.163  There were 
actually in jail when their case went before the judge.  Lurma remembered: 
And he was mad, mad.  He was livid.  He was beet red with 
anger that we had not only come down to the court and 
used the ladies room, but then had been continuously 
protesting. . . He said to me, “I love all children, black and 
white. Treat ‘em just the same.  Feed ‘em out the same 
spoon.  But if you come before my court one more time 
you’re going to reform school for seven years, until you’re 
twenty-one.164 
 
Lurma was arrested again and, as the judge warned, sentenced to seven years in reform 
school.  Fortunately, their ever-vigilant civil rights attorney, Matthew Perry, was able to 
have Lurma returned to her mother, but he advised them both that Lurma should not 
participate in any more demonstrations.  He could not guarantee that she would not be 
required to go to reform school.  After all, Mrs. Rackley had been accused of being an 
unfit mother due to her daughter’s many arrests.165  One newspaper even referred to her 
as “wildly dangerous.”166  Initially, Rackley disagreed with Perry’s advice.  She said a 
judge could not just take a child away from their mother.  Perry told her that she must not 
know anything about the juvenile court system.  The possibility that her daughter could 
be taken away scared her.  She spoke with Lurma and asked her to stop picketing for a 
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while.  But Lurma wanted to continue, unless her mother was in jail.  So, she continued 
to participate, but fortunately was not arrested again.167 
 Gloria Rackley also seemed to feel some guilt about having to move her 
daughters to another state.  They had to leave their friends. Lurma, who was looking 
forward to being part of the class to integrate Orangeburg High, ended up in a city that 
had already desegregated its schools.  She understood that her mother needed to move on, 
but regretted not being able to see the fruits of their labor. For her part, Jamelle Rackley, 
who was named alongside her mother as a plaintiff in the suit against Orangeburg 
Regional Hospital, excelled.  In many ways, she did exactly what middle-class African 
Americans like the Rackley’s expected their children to do and embodied what 
generations of African Americans had hoped for.  She did well in high school, winning a 
New American Library of World Literature Award during the PEA’s annual meeting. She 
started Bennett College in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1963—the same tumultuous 
year in which her mother lost her teaching position. She graduated in 1967 and received a 
scholarship to go to graduate school at Wesleyan-Middlebury University to study modern 
language. Her engagement in 1968 was announced in three different black newspapers.  
Jamelle had become quite the socialite.  Her fiancé, John Tollie Patterson, Jr. of New 
York City, was a well-know businessman, and a founder and the National Director of the 
Interracial Council for Business. But these same announcements, which help underscore 
her status as a respectable member of the black middle-class, also hint at the possibility of 
a strained relationship with her mother.  Jamelle Gloria Rackley, who was so clearly 
named after her mother, was repeatedly referred to as Mr. and Mrs. Louis Cargile 
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Frayser’s daughter.  And although one paper mentioned her father, Dr. Larney G. 
Rackley, and both her maternal and paternal grandparents, Gloria Rackley was never 
mentioned.168 
And Gloria experienced all of these repercussions without the unequivocal 
support of her parents.  Her father, who essentially introduced her to the NAACP and the 
civil rights movement, was largely acceptant of her activism.  But her mother, like many 
other civil rights activists’ parents, worried about her and thought she and her daughters 
might be safer if they were not always on the front lines of the battle for civil rights.169  
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EPILOGUE: “NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH:” TEACHERS IN A 
DESEGREGATING SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 
At its 1964 national convention in Seattle, Washington, the National Education 
Association (NEA) requested that teachers associations in eleven southern states adopt a 
merger plan: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.  Teacher associations in other 
states that practiced racial segregation had voluntarily joined together after the 1954 
Brown decision.  The Palmetto Education Association immediately began working on a 
merger plan.  They put together an Executive Committee to draft guidelines for the 
merger, and submitted their plans to the PEA House of Delegates.  The guidelines were 
then sent to every county association and printed in the PEA journal to ensure the 
information was shared with as many members as possible.1   
The PEA Unification Committee chairman, Hudson L. Barksdale, said in a report 
to the House of Delegates that he wanted the PEA to formulate a plan that would 
guarantee the PEA met the SCEA “as equals,” and “negotiate from strength.”2  The 
merger discussion interrupted the PEA’s previously steady growth.  Membership 
declined during the 1966-7 school year.  Yet there were also more PEA members joining 
the NEA. Potts believed that this was because many members believed the merger was 
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inevitable and that, under these circumstances, the NEA was best equipped to meet their 
needs.3 
He specifically referenced the Rackley and Clarendon County cases.4  One issue that 
Barksdale pointed out was that unlike the SCEA, the PEA had a history of meeting black 
teachers’ needs. Walker E. Solomon, the longtime PEA executive secretary, also had 
concerns, including: the new constitution, if the new association would continue 
employing PEA staff, and “the protection of PEA members.”5  Solomon wanted the new 
teachers’ association to maintain the Defense Welfare Fund, and to continue making 
contributions to the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.6  Behind Barksdale 
and Solomon’s concern was the knowledge that black teachers faced specific issues 
completely unknown to white teachers.  The PEA leaders wanted some assurances that 
black teachers would continue to have a supportive organization behind them.  Their 
concerns help demonstrate that in addition to professional concerns the PEA served as a 
black teachers’ civil rights organization. 
PEA representatives had four meeting with SCEA representatives.  The PEA 
House of Delegates met and accepted a merger plan on April 1, 1967.  The new 
organization would be called the South Carolina Education Association.  Most of the 
merger plant set in motion committees and leadership positions that would contain 
current leaders from both organizations for a one year period.  Both organizations’ full 
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staff were to remain employed for a full year.  The new merged teachers’ association 
would officially begin April 1, 1968.7 
Despite the PEA’s desire to come to the merger discussions as equals, the agreements 
laid out in the Memorandum of Agreement illustrate that they were not truly regarded as 
equals.  The PEA leaders maintained leadership positions, but they were normally lower 
positions—directly under the current SCEA leaders.  For example, Walker E. Solomon, 
the well-respected PEA Executive Secretary, was employed as the SCEA Associate 
Secretary. Likewise, the current SCEA president  kept his position while the PEA 
president became the vice-president.8  Furthermore, the merger plan also specified that 
after the initial one-year period “no individual or group be given any special 
consideration because of race,” leaving former PEA members with no guarantee that they 
could continue to have any significant influence.9  
Overall, the SCEA membership rose after the merger, but that was solely due to 
its new African American members.  White membership fell after the merger was 
announced.10  This turned out to be indicative of the organization’s continued to be racial 
divisions.  For example, the Human Relations Committee, tasked with the role creating 
racial understanding worked “largely in isolation from other activities of the 
association.”11  Additionally, its workshop attendees were predominantly black.  This, 
combined with the lesser positions former PEA leaders held in the new organization, lead 
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some black teachers to believe that there was no real merger at all.  Instead, the PEA had 
simply been absorbed into the SCEA.12 
Things were further complicated when it was revealed that some of the black 
leadership questioned the SCEA’s financial standing.  When the PEA was essentially 
dissolved, their total worth in cash and property was estimated to be $250,000.  There 
were some questions regarding what exactly happened with those funds.  PEA members 
were especially concerned with the portion designated for the teacher defense fund as, per 
the merger agreement, the teacher defense fund would continue to exist and be used in 
the same way.13 
It is perhaps what happened with the former PEA Executive Secretary Dr. Walker 
E. Solomon that best illustrates the rift between the SCEA and PEA leadership.  The 
merger agreement’s language implied that Solomon would work directly under the 
Executive Secretary, Dr. Carlos Gibbons.  Solomon’s rank would be reflected in his 
salary and responsibilities.  Instead, in 1967, the SCEA hired an assistant executive 
secretary, Dr. Henry Wiesman, whose position apparently pushed out Solomon.  
Wiesman received a higher a salary than Solomon, had a prominent office location next 
to Gibbons—while Solomon’s was small and in a non-descript area—and had a higher 
status with more responsibilities.  This was despite that fact that Solomon, with his 
seventeen years of experience as an executive secretary of a statewide teachers’ 
association, clearly had more experience that Gibbons.  When a group of black teachers 
lodged a formal complaint, Gibbons and Solomon’s salaries were equalized.  Yet, 
Weisman maintained the better office and Solomon’s skills continued to be completely 
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overlooked. The NEA noted that Solomon’s treatment was “a clear violation of the intent 
of the merger agreement” as the title Associate Executive Secretary clearly indicated he 
would work directly under the Executive Secretary.14   Instead, not only were his skills 
not used to their best advantage, but there was no evidence that Solomon was included in 
the decision-making process.  He was isolated—both physically and symbolically—from 
the organization’s leadership.  
The SCEA’s misuse of Dr. Solomon deepened the divide between the two 
groups—one that had not been fully overcome before the merger.  There was an 
opportunity to right this wrong when Dr. Gibbons resigned in April 1973.  The Board of 
Directors named Dr. Solomon the Acting Executive Secretary, and the SCEA’s black 
leadership must have hoped that he would be chosen as the new Executive Secretary.  
Instead, when the screening committee interviewed twenty-five candidates, Solomon was 
not one of them.  They initially chose a former SCEA president, Dr. Claude Kitchens, 
who declined the appointment.  Thirty-three SCEA members took this opportunity to 
petition asking that Dr. Solomon be named the new Executive Secretary.15  The petition 
stated: 
Whereas the Screening Committee and the Board of 
Directors will select a person who meets the qualifications 
that have been set fort in the established guidelines; be it 
also resolved that Whereas the present Acting Executive 
Secretary, Walker E. Solomon, having met all the 
qualifications that were included in these guidelines, be 
given primary consideration for the position of Executive 
Secretary of the South Carolina Education Association.16    
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They noted that Solomon served as the PEA’s executive secretary for “17 successful 
years” and implored the committee to place Solomon in the position.17  The committee 
interviewed five applicants for the job, including Dr. Solomon, and elected Michael 
Fleming by secret ballot.18 
In his account of the PEA’s merger with the SCEA, Potts says that although the 
merger agreement only ensured collaboration between the two organizations for one year, 
the organization’s constitution was revised in 1971, 197, and 1975 to to guarantee 
“ethnic-minority representation.” 19  This was likely done at the NEA’s recommendation.  
For after reviewing the PEA-SCEA merger process the national organization noted that 
although “the concept racial quotas and minority guarantees is repugnant to many 
citizens,” there were few other options “until we are able to eradicate, finally, the blight 
of racial bigotry.”20  The NEA further recommended that the black teachers organize a 
caucus in order to ensure that their voting power was used as effectively as possible.  
They also recommended that the SCEA begin collecting racial designations during 
enrollment to guarantee accurate information when determining the racial composition 
for their various committees.21  Another recommendation the NEA believed would help 
make the merger more meaningful was for the SCEA to “delay no longer” in having the 
PEA’s history written before some of that history was permanently lost when the 
organization’s oldest members passed away.22  
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One issue the SCEA was clearly unprepared to address was African American 
teachers’ plight during desegregation.  Desegregation almost always resulted in closing 
black schools, located in black neighborhoods.  As a result, the number of African 
Americans in supervisory positions such as principal and coach fell.23    The demotion of 
African American school faculty was the focal point of a American Friends Service 
Committee sponsored 1970 meeting in New Orleans where conference participants 
agreed that it was “very important for black children to see black persons in positions of 
authority.”24   African American demotion became so routine that civil rights attorneys 
began asking judges to include guarantees in school integration orders that the newly 
desegregated schools retain African Americans in supervisory positions.25  
The Training Coordination Center for Displaced Teachers (TCCDT) was created 
to help teachers who had been displaced due to desegregation in North and South 
Carolina.  They cited a figure of over 2,000 black teachers who were displaced due to 
southern desegregation in the 1968-1971 school years.26  Their focus was not only on 
teachers who had been outright dismissed, but also those who were “demoted, 
unsatisfactorily transferred, or reassigned to lower paying, less satisfying positions,” and 
people placed in positions “outside their area of certification or experience.”27  The 
organization intended to identify these educators, gather helpful data on them, and 
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provide counseling and placement services for teachers to either find new teaching 
positions or receive additional training/education.28  
The Center reached out to other organizations such as the NAACP, teachers 
associations, and school districts to locate displaced teachers, but ultimately decided that 
best way to locate affected teachers was on a county-by-county basis.  For this reason 
they turned to some of South Carolina’s most well-respected black educators to identify 
affected teachers including former PEA leaders Walker E. Solomon, and H. L. 
Barksdale.29  Individuals such as Solomon and Barksdale would likely have direct 
knowledge of which teachers in their communities were having a hard time transitioning 
to desegregated schools, and how to best meet teachers’ needs. 
As of September 1971, the Center had made contact with 259 individuals, twenty-one 
of which were displaced personnel.  Out of that, the center helped fourteen teachers get 
accepted to universities where they could pursue graduate degrees.  All fourteen were 
accepted to out-of-state schools.30  The Center was poised to help even more teachers in 
the 1972-1973 school year since one hundred nine people applied to their Teacher 
Development for Desegregating Schools Programs. 
Yet, all of this may have seemed like a moot point in light of how much public 
schools were changing in the post-Brown era, particularly as judges handed down more 
and more desegregation orders.  For although dual public school systems were being 
abolished, segregation was not. Desegregation suits prevented public schools from 
racially segregating students, but they simultaneously sparked the creation of a plethora 
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white private schools.31  One paper estimated that at least 100,000 students were 
attending these new schools, “five to 10 times as many as there were before passage of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”32  According to a Southern Regional Council study, southern 
students were riding up to seventy percent further to attend private schools; more students 
were riding to private schools than public schools; and the average private school student 
was traveling further (17.7 mi. one-way) than the average public school student (10 mi. 
one-way). In fact, white segregated private schools were growing by leaps and bounds 
along the South Carolina coast where there were large concentrations of black 
Carolinians. For instance, white parents in Hilton Head, South Carolina were sending 
their children on a 120 mile round-trip everyday so they could attend a school in 
Beaufort. The result was that public schools were becoming, by default, predominantly 
African American.33   
In addition to maintaining a segregated school system, school privatization also 
negatively affected public schools because it lowered school attendance, therefore 
threatening public school funding from the local, state, and federal governments.34  After 
all if “segregationist-inclined” state legislators did not care about black children, then 
they would have no qualms about lowering education appropriations.35  Public pressure 
to decrease tax support for public schools was already mounting. And while school 
privatization may have had the most negative effects on black students, it did not always 
bode well for the white students attending private schools.  Many of the schools were 
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32 Private, White School Rise in South,” 14 September 1969, Washington Post. 
33 “Study Cites Busing for Segregation,” 3 May 1970, Washington Post; “Private, White 
School Rise in South.” 
34 “School Battle in South Not Yet Won”; “Private, White School Rise in South.”  
35 “School Battle in South Not Yet Won.” 
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located in old, inadequate buildings, and staffed by unqualified faculty.  The Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools accredited only a few of them.  Other than Florida, 
no southern state had any strict set of standards that private schools had to meet.  State 
officials in Alabma, Georgia, Mississippi, and North and South Carolina were not even 
sure how many private schools were located in their states.  Some of the new private 
schools were attempting to start their own crediting institutions, such as the South 
Carolina Independent School Association.  But older, more established private schools 
were also critical of the new schools that they believed challenged private schools’ 
reputation for providing a superior education.36 
Yet, a few of these new private schools were well-funded.  A prominent example was 
South Carolina’s own Wade-Hampton School, which boasted a $350,000 plant and ten-
acre campus.  Located in Orangeburg, South Carolina, the out-of-way school attracted 
students from all over.  At least forty percent of its students were bused in.  Like the other 
white, private schools founded in the post-Brown era, Wade-Hampton was created out of 
a fear of integrated schools, and a belief that black children were incapable of attaining 
high intellectual standards.37  As the school president Dr. T. E. Wannamker one stated, “I 
believe it is heredity first and environment second.  Many (black students) are little more 
than field hands.”38 
Considering the Wade-Hampton’s history, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
appointment of the school’s former Head Master, Mr. Tiederman, as the new 
Salkhehatchi Community Action Council Headstart director was met with negative 
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reactions from the black community.   South Carolina NAACP leaders argued that the  
Salkhehatchi Community Action Council violated the Office for Economic Opportunity’s 
hiring practices in hiring Tiederman.  As SC NAACP leader, I. DeQuincey Newman 
argued in a telegram: 
Such an appointment undermines confidence in a 
supposedly racially integrated program and can hardly be 
accepted with dignity by those who are sensitive to claims 
of American democracy.  I urge that the appointment be 
withdrawn.39 
 
The teacher associations’ merger, black teacher demotion and displacement, and the 
growth of white private schools demonstrate that school desegregation did not solve the 
issues that either black educators or their students faced.  Instead, without legislated 
racial segregation, continued education inequalities became more nuanced and therefore 
more difficult to alleviate.  As African Americans moved further into the twentieth 
century, education attainment remained a central part of their struggle for equal rights.  
																																																								
39 Memo from I. DeQuincey Newman to Roy Wilkins, 17 June 1967, Papers of the 
NAACP, Part 29, Series D, Box C-73.	
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